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I. Introduction
A set of rules and constraints that shape human action through 
inducing a particular pattern of human behavior. . . .1
Why “a criminal law for cyberspace”? should cyberspace have its own criminal 
law?  What is it about cyberspace that requires the articulation of a set of distinctive 
principles governing the imposition of criminal liability?  
The simple answer is that cybercrime2 creates challenges for the extant model of 
law enforcement3 that are already of a severity sufficient to require the development of a 
new model, one that can address these challenges.4  The model that is currently in use,5
like all models of law enforcement, combines a set of legal principles (“the criminal law”) 
with a repertoire of operational procedures (“police practices”) to create the device, the 
architecture, a society uses in an effort to maintain “order,” a concept which is discussed 
below.6
Because the extant model of law enforcement evolved within a specific historical 
context, it incorporates certain assumptions about the modes and methods of criminal 
behavior law enforcement agents will encounter in a given society.7  Because these 
assumptions are historically derived, they can become at odds with the social realities 
law enforcement officers actually encounter at a particular moment in time; as the 
disconnect between one or more of these basic assumptions and experiential reality 
becomes increasingly apparent, law enforcement personnel will endeavor to have their 
model updated by incorporating new or revised assumptions, but this can be a slow 
process.8  Consequently, the deviation between embedded assumptions and empirical 
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reality is particularly profound when a society is undergoing rapid, pronounced social 
and cultural changes.9
The rise and proliferation of cybercrime is revealing a profound, irreparable 
deviation between fundamental assumptions that configured the current model of law 
enforcement and the emerging texture of social reality in the twenty-first century.10  The 
deviation is profound because several already-apparent characteristics of cybercrime 
are inconsistent with assumptions that shaped the model’s basic operating premises; 11 it 
is irreparable because these premises cannot be modified to adapt the current model so  
that it can deal effectively with these aspects of cybercrime.12  What is needed is a new 
model of law enforcement, one that is specifically designed to address the challenges of 
cybercrime.13
This is where a “criminal law for cyberspace” comes in.  Given the nature of the 
challenges cybercrime poses for the traditional model of law enforcement, developing a 
new, cybercrime-adequate model is not simply a matter of devising new police practices.  
As noted earlier, a model, any model, of law enforcement is based on an array of police 
practices and a set of legal principles.14 Devising new police practices is therefore part of 
the calculus involved in creating a new model, but the model must also be supported by 
legal principles which reinforce and implement the approach it takes to wrongdoing.15
Articulating the precise contours of this new, cybercrime-specific model of law 
enforcement is an undertaking that is quite beyond the scope or ambitions of this article. 
It has two goals:  One is to explain how the current model of law enforcement evolved 
and why a new model is needed; the other is to outline this new model and explain how 
criminal law doctrines can be used to implement it. Sections II and III trace the evolution 
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of the current model and describe its limitations as to cybercrime; section IV sketches 
the contours of the new model and explains the role “a criminal law for cyberspace” 
plays in its implementation.  Finally, section IV presents a brief conclusion.    
II. Evolution of the Current Model
[W]here . . . men live without other security than what their own 
strength . . . shall furnish them. . . . there is no place for industry, . . . no 
culture of the earth, . . . no arts, no letters, no society. . . .16
The current model of law enforcement, like all the antecedent models, is intended 
to provide a baseline of security in a society, a framework within which human activities, 
especially those that are essential to the survival and perpetuation of the species, can be 
conducted confidently and predictably.  A law enforcement model is an extrapolation, an 
operationalization, of a criminal law.  The function of criminal law is to maintain an 
acceptable level of ”order” within a  society;17 it does this by defining certain types of 
behavior, behaviors which threaten essential interests, as intolerable.18  Merely defining 
behaviors as intolerable is not, however, sufficient to eliminate them; there must also be 
processes in place that discourage individuals from engaging in these outlawed 
behaviors.19  The sections below consider these two aspects of a law enforcement 
model  -- “rules” and “process” -- in more detail.   
A. Rules
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[C]riminal law defines the boundaries of permissible and impermissible 
conduct for all members of a society governed by the law’s geographic 
jurisdiction. . . . 20
Criminal law, like all law, is a set of rules.21  A rule is a compulsory principle that 
governs action and inaction; 22 a rule specifies which actions are allowable and which are 
not.23  All natural systems – social, biological, physical – operate according a discrete set 
of rules;24 and rules are also a constitutive element of artificial systems such as software 
programs and games.25  Legal rules differ from other rules found in the natural world in 
certain respects, one of which is that they have been consciously established according 
to some process in place in a human society; they are therefore calculated and 
mutable.26  Functionally, however, legal rules are analogous to the rules that are the 
basic component of order in all self-organizing collective systems, whether populated by 
insects, animals, humans or artificial entities (such as software routines).27
1. Order
“Order” is the state for which all such systems strive, because without it they do 
not (and cannot) exist.  Order is the subjugation of chaos; it means that a sufficient 
measure of control has been established over the environment within which a system 
operates and the individual entities who comprise it so that the latter can successfully 
discharge the tasks necessary for the perpetuation of the system.28  If a self-organizing 
collective system is to survive, it must, at a minimum, ensure the continuity of a populace 
of the entities of which it is comprised.  For biological systems, this means ensuring (a) 
that its constituent entities have the necessities (e.g., food, water, shelter) they need to 
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survive and to reproduce themselves; (b) that their offspring achieve adulthood and are 
successfully incorporated into the system; and (c) that these discrete entities and the 
system itself are protected from the depredations of competitors and predators.29
Order therefore has both an internal and an external component:  Internal order 
governs the constituent entities’ activities and relationships with each other and their 
relationships with the system as a whole; to define and maintain internal order, systems 
must therefore implement rules which define these activities and relationships so that, 
for instance, an ant knows whether it is a worker or a soldier, whether its default function 
is to gather food or wage war. 30  External order governs a system’s relationship with its 
environment; “environment” includes both the physical context within which a system 
functions and biological agents who can threaten its survival by directly attacking its 
constituent entities or by competing with them for food.31  Every system will therefore 
also implement rules that structure its interactions with the environment; ant colonies, for 
example, have rules governing the conduct of war with other colonies and the process of 
relocating colonies and founding new colonies.32  The rules that structure internal and 
external order do not operate independently; instead, they interact and evolve, allowing 
the system to adapt to changes in its environment.33
Rules are an absolute necessity for the emergence of self-organizing collective 
systems.34  Without rules to order activities and relationships, there is no “system”; there 
is, at best, a shifting congeries of entities, an assemblage totally lacking coherence and 
function.35  But while rules are a constant, the ways they manifest themselves are not.  
As the section below explains, intelligence very much influences the types of rules that  
emerge and the ways in which they are implemented.
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2. Intelligence
The most direct control on the behavior of a biological system is 
the knowledge stored in its genes.36
As explained above, rules are an essential aspect of all self-organizing collective 
systems, whether they are populated by biological or artificial life-forms.37  At a very 
basic, constitutive level, rules operate equivalently in all such systems, regardless of the 
characteristics of the entities that comprise them; rules establish the baseline of order 
without which no system can come into existence and survive.38  At a higher level of 
organizational extrapolation, rules function differently in various systems; and the critical 
factor in differentiating the functioning of rules in self-organizing collective systems is the 
intelligence of the entities that populate the system.39
“Intelligence” is difficult to define; it is an elusive concept, one that has spawned 
many definitions.40  Certain elements, though, are consistent:  One that is common to all 
definitions of intelligence is the ability to make decisions, i.e., to consider two (or more) 
alternatives and deliberately elect to pursue one of them.41  Definitions of intelligence 
also emphasize that an entity’s decision to choose a particular alternative is the result of 
reasoning, i.e., the cognitive application of knowledge which the entity has acquired by 
learning from previous experience.42  An intelligent entity,43 therefore, is one that can act 
on its own – one that can make decisions and manifest autonomous behavior on some 
level.44  This definition implies the existence of a residual category – i.e., a non-intelligent 
entity – insofar as it assumes intelligence is a zero sum commodity.  This assumption is 
at once valid and not-valid.   
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At one level, biological and artificial entities can be divided into “intelligent” and 
“non-intelligent” species.  Slime mold cells and other microorganisms, for example, are 
not “intelligent” under the definition given above, nor are the routines that populate most 
software programs.45  While they exhibit self-organizing behavior, slime mold cells and 
other microorganisms are not “intelligent” under this definition because their behavior is 
driven by instinct,46 not by individual choice based on reasoning and learning. Similarly, 
most artificial entities are not “intelligent” because their actions are driven by code that 
programs their behavior.47  Humans and higher primates, on the other hand, are clearly 
“intelligent” under this standard48  (which is not surprising, since it is a human definition 
and a human concept).49  But as we move beyond simple dichotomies and consider the 
gradations of behavior found in more complex species, it becomes more difficult to parse 
“intelligent” and “non-intelligent” entities; ants and reptiles are, for instance, capable of 
learning and of decision-making.50  Does this mean they are “intelligent” in the same way 
humans are “intelligent?”  Obviously, it does not; ants and reptiles may be able to learn 
to make simple choices and elect simple behaviors, but their intelligence is clearly not of 
the same type or of the same magnitude as that of humans and the higher primates.51
At this level, therefore, it is necessary to move beyond the notion of “intelligence” 
as a zero-sum commodity and approach it as a graduated concept -- as a phenomenon 
that manifests itself in various ways.52  Professor Edward O. Wilson divides organisms 
into three categories:  the complete instinct-reflex machine (lowest); the directed learner 
(middle) and the generalized learner (highest).53  The behavior of organisms in the first 
category is completely programmed by instinct or reflexive responses to environmental 
stimuli.54  Much of the behavior of organisms in the second category is also driven by 
instinct-reflex; they are capable of some learning, but their learned behavior “is as 
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stereotyped as the most neurally programmed `instinct.’” 55 The organisms in the third 
category have brains
 large enough to carry a wide range of memories, some of which possess 
only a low probability of ever proving useful.  Insight learning may be 
performed, yielding the capacity to generalize from one pattern to another 
and to juxtapose patterns in ways that are adaptively useful.  Few if any 
complex behaviors are wholly programmed morphogenetically at the 
neural level.  The process of socialization . . . is prolonged and complex. . 
. . The key social feature of the grade, which is represented by man, the 
chimpanzee, baboons, macaques, and . . . other . .  primates . . . , is a 
perception of history.  The organism’s knowledge is not limited to 
particular individuals and places with attractive or aversive associations.  
It also remembers relationships and incidents . . . and it can engineer 
improvements in its social status by relatively sophisticated choices of 
threat, conciliation, and formations of alliances. . . . 56
These hierarchical categories are based on the capacities of individual members 
of a biological species; individual intelligence conforms to the definition provided earlier, 
i.e., it is an entity’s capacity to engage in autonomous action based upon a process of 
decision making which, in turn, is predicated upon reasoning and learning.57   For many 
species, certainly for mammals, “intelligence” is properly analyzed as an individual 
phenomenon because the members of these species are functionally discrete entities --
“individuals” -- who engage in self-directed behavior.58 For other species, particularly the 
social insects, “intelligence” is a collective, not an individual, phenomenon; discrete ants 
are not “intelligent,”59 but a swarm intelligence emerges from the interactions of the ants 
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in a colony.60  The swarm intelligence probably qualifies as “intelligence” under the 
definition given earlier:  It engages in decision making (which is predicated on reaction, 
not reasoning); it has at least some capacity to learn from experience; and the swarm 
(but not the constituent entities, i.e., the ants) engages in autonomous behavior.61  The 
swarm intelligence differs, though, from the individual “intelligence” found in many of the 
mammals, especially the primates; this mammalian “intelligence” possesses all the 
characteristics found in swarm intelligence, but it adds others, including capacities for 
self-awareness, for invention and innovation, and for planning and strategizing.62
This brings us back to the proposition advanced earlier, namely, that while basic  
rules operate equivalently in self-organizing collective systems, rules that emerge at a 
higher level of organizational extrapolation operate idiosyncratically, the differentiating 
factor being the intelligence of the entities that populate the system.63  To understand 
why this is true, it is necessary to consider three systems, each populated by agents 
possessing varying types of “intelligence.”64
a) Ants 
The first system is an ant colony.  This colony, like all self-organizing collective 
systems, must implement rules that establish internal and external order. 65  Establishing 
internal order requires (a) allocating the ants who inhabit the colony to certain essential 
tasks (e.g., nest building, food collection, reproduction and nurturance the offspring to 
maturity) and (b) ensuring that they perform these tasks properly, in a consistent, 
predictable manner.66 The colony uses two types of rule-sets to establish internal order:  
role-allocation and task-performance.67  Role-allocation  rules tell an ant what its function 
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is, i.e., whether it is a soldier, a worker or a queen;68 task-performance rules give an ant 
the repertoire of behaviors it needs to carry out its assigned function, such as foraging 
for food.69  Task-performance rules also allow ants to shift between functions so that, for 
example, a worker ant who has been foraging for food may move to nest-building.70
Ensuring external order involves a similar process.71  In an effort to protect itself from 
predators and competing ant colonies, the colony implements (a) role-allocation rules 
that assign members of the colony to function as soldiers and (b) task-performance rules 
that prescribe the behaviors soldiers employ in fending off aggressors and/or attacking 
encroaching colonies.72
The ants in the colony do not formulate the rules that govern role-allocation and 
task-performance; ants are incapable of such a task.73  To some extent, the basic rules 
governing both endeavors are genetically pre-coded;74 more accurately, the capacity to 
engage in these behaviors is genetically pre-coded, because the behaviors themselves 
are triggered by forces external to the ants.75  Among ants and other social insects, the 
rules that govern the allocation of functions and the performance of tasks are chemically 
and environmentally controlled.  Environmental conditions affect role allocation and task 
performance (a) by determining the number of entities a colony can support and (b) by 
influencing nutrition within the colony.76  Nutrition affects role-allocation in various ways, 
not the least of which is the incidence of cannibalism.77  Chemical signals, though, are 
primarily responsible for the orchestration of behavior among social insects; ants (like  
termites, bees, wasps and other social insects) communicate almost exclusively through 
pheromonal signals.78  Some of these signals are simple binary codes, indicating, for 
example, whether another ant is friend or foe, but “ants can also detect gradients in 
pheromones”, which is “essential for forming food delivery lines”.79  Pheromonal signals 
also convey information about tasks, such as whether an ant is foraging for food (and 
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has found a large quantity food which needs to be collected by other ants) or disposing 
of dead nest-mates.80
The basic constitutive rules that govern role-allocation and task-performance do 
a marvelous job of establishing order, especially internal order, in ant colonies and other 
aggregations of social insects.   They do this laterally; no one is in charge of formulating 
or implementing the rules or otherwise seeing to the creation and continuance of order in 
colonies populated by ants or other social insects.81 Order is an emergent phenomenon: 
It emerges from the basic repertoire of rules available to members of the colony; these 
rules shape the behavior of all members of the collectivity. 82  The rules are for the most 
part fixed and pre-given; they define the limited universe of behaviors that are available 
to colony members.83  It is true that individual ants have the apparent ability to, in effect, 
make “choices”; it seems that foraging ants who are not following a pre-established 
pheromone trail “choose” the paths down which they proceed in search of food. But what 
looks like “choice” to a human being is not; an ant’s taking a particular path is not the 
product of decision making as defined above.84  The ant does not formulate alternatives 
and use a process of reasoning, which is based upon a learned store of knowledge and 
inferences from that knowledge, to select the path that rationally seems the most likely to 
offer the opportunity to find food; an ant cannot do this because individual ants are not  
“intelligent.”85  And while this approach might well prove unsuccessful if only one or two 
ants were searching for food, with hundreds or thousands of ants foraging, some of them 
are very likely to happen upon food.  When this occurs, the lucky forager returns to the 
colony with the food it can carry; if the site contains more food than it can carry, the 
forager uses use chemical signals to direct other ants to the food source.86
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In a sense, an ant colony is like a board game: chess with thousands of players.  
Each ant (each “player”) has its defined set of behaviors (“moves”), which vary with the 
ant’s role in the system (e.g., worker, queen, solder).  The collaborative activities of the 
players produce a self-organized collective system which is directed toward achieving 
certain ends.  In a chess game, the ends are the players’ amusement and the resolution 
of a competitive endeavor; in an ant colony, the ends are the survival and perpetuation 
of the colony and its inhabitants through a collaborative endeavor.  
An ant colony and a chess game are functionally analogous in certain respects, 
one of which is particularly relevant to the issues addressed in this article:  The rules of 
both systems are entirely constitutive; they define what the members of that system can 
and must do.87  Chess players must move when it is their turn, utilizing a circumscribed 
range of alternatives in doing so; the alternatives are prescribed by the rules of the game 
and depend upon which piece (queen, pawn, rook) a player uses.88  Ants must perform 
the tasks attendant upon their role (worker, queen, soldier), utilizing a circumscribed set 
of biologically-defined behaviors in doing so.  
How is any of this relevant to the issues under consideration in this article?  It is 
relevant because this functional analogy between chess and an ant colony illustrates 
what is missing in systems that are organized laterally, according to the principles that 
structure ant colonies (and chess).  What is missing is the capacity for deviant behavior; 
“deviant behavior” is, essentially, an entity’s deliberate failure to follow applicable rules.89
The behavior of the ants, like that of the pieces in a chess game, is pre-defined.  A white 
Rook cannot capture a white Pawn; an ant cannot steal food from the colony stores and 
flee, attack another ant from its own colony or take a day off from work.90  Ant rules, like 
chess rules, are simple and straightforward; they leave no capacity for deviance.  Since 
Brenner – Distributed Security
15
there is no capacity for deviance, there is no need for an enforcement mechanism; ants 
have war but not crime, soldiers but not police.   
Systems populated by non-intelligent entities do not confront the risk of chaos 
arising from internal forces, i.e., from deviant behavior.91   The absence of individual 
intelligence means there are no “wild cards” in the deck -- no potential for antisocial 
behavior.92  That, in turn, means they have no need to devise special rules – “criminal 
rules” – to deal with deviance.93  As is explained below, 94 “criminal rules” deal with the 
potential for deviance in a system by defining the behaviors that are prohibited; systems 
populated by intelligent agents find it necessary to define behaviors they will not tolerate 
because the constituent entities can innovate, i.e., indulge in behaviors other than those 
that are socially prescribed.95  Systems populated by intelligent agents will therefore 
have two sets of rules in place that govern the behavior of their constituents:  a set of 
constitutive rules that establish the rights and obligations of the constituent entities; and 
a set of proscriptive rules that outlaw certain types of behaviors.96   Systems populated 
by non-intelligent entities, however, have no need for proscriptive rules because there is 
no capacity for behavioral innovation and, consequently, no potential for deviance. 
The sections immediately below examine two systems that are populated by 
entities of varying degrees of intelligence; the entities that populate both systems are 
sufficiently intelligent to engage in deviant behavior.  The sections below, therefore, 
analyze how systems deal with a constituent entity’s failure to follow governing rules.   
b) Wolves
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Individual intelligence is found in many species, but it is most highly evolved in 
mammals.97  Notwithstanding their intelligence, many mammals are not suitable for the 
present analysis because they live “solitary” lives.98  Since our focus is on ensuring order 
in collective systems, we must consider how order is established and maintained among 
mammalian species that are both “intelligent” and “social.”99
Wolves are clearly intelligent under the definition given above; indeed, they are 
one of the most intelligent non-primate mammalian species.100  Wolves are also social 
creatures:101  Among mammals, “the carnivores are surpassed only by the primates in 
the intricacy and variety of their social behavior”, and at “what might be called the 
summit of carnivore social evolution,” wolves display a level of social organization that is 
otherwise found nowhere except among “a few of the Old World monkeys and apes.” 102
Wolves, like ants, must establish and maintain internal and external order if their 
social groupings are to survive.103   Wolves live in packs that contain as many as twenty 
individuals.104 As with ants, establishing internal order means the pack must ensure that 
its members carry out essential tasks (creating and maintaining a den,105 hunting food,
reproducing and nurturing offspring to maturity) in a consistent, predictable manner.106
Individual wolves, unlike individual ants, are intelligent;107 intelligence confers the ability 
for independent decision making and autonomous action upon members of a species.108
This means that wolves cannot rely on the strategies ants use to maintain order in their 
colonies.109  Unlike ants, wolves have to deal with the potential for deviant behavior, i.e., 
with the possibility that a pack member will deliberately steal food, attack other members 
of the pack or otherwise disrupt the internal order that is necessary for the survival of the 
pack and of its members.110   Wolves deal with this potential, and with the processes of 
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establishing and maintaining internal order, by implementing a dynamic hierarchical rank 
order among pack members.
Many species use rank order to structure their social systems.111   Known as a 
“dominance hierarchy,” this strategy consists of a set of
sustained aggressive-submissive relations. . . . The simplest . . . version 
of a hierarchy is . . . the rule of one individual over all other members of 
the group, with no rank distinctions being made among the subordinates. 
. . . More commonly, hierarchies contain multiple ranks in a more or less 
linear sequence:  an alpha individual dominates all others, a beta 
individual dominates all but the alpha, and so on down to the omega 
individual at the bottom, whose existence may depend simply on staying 
out of the way of its superiors.112
Dominance hierarchies are formed during “encounters between animals by means of 
repeated threats and fighting.”113  After these encounters resolve the issue of rank, 
subordinates give way to their superiors “with a minimum of hostile exchange.”114  Once 
a dominance hierarchy has been established, it is often maintained 
by `status’ signs.  The identity of the leading male in a wolf pack is 
unmistakable from the way he holds his head, ears, and tail, and the 
confident, face-forward manner in which he approaches other members 
of his group.  He controls his subordinates in the great majority of 
encounters without any display of overt hostility.115
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Once established, a dominance hierarchy is far from permanent, especially among some 
species:  “The behavioral ontogenies of species seem designed to give each loser a 
second chance, and in some of the more social forms the subordinate need only wait its 
turn to rise in the hierarchy.”116 Among some species, this is simply a matter of waiting 
until the dominant animal “weakens or expires from age or injury”.117  Another alternative 
is for defeated challenger(s) to leave the initial social grouping to form another group.118
Wolf packs conform almost exactly to this description of a dominance hierarchy:  
A pack “is a well-ordered society” in which “each member is expected to learn, observe, 
and obey the laws. . . . The elder pack members teach the cubs about pack etiquette.”119
Pack etiquette revolves around “linear dominance orders” that form among the members 
of a pack. 120   Wolf packs have rank orders for each sex:
[T]he dominant, or alpha, male lords it over all the other males, and a 
dominant, or alpha, female asserts her will over the other females.  There 
may be a beta and a gamma, second- and third-ranked wolves of each 
sex, each imposing some will on the lesser-ranking wolves down through 
the Greek alphabet to omega. . . . 
The dominance rank order of a pack changes as wolves age or 
get  injured and younger wolves mature and gain strength, confidence, 
and understanding. . . . Old dominants may be chased out of the pack or 
beaten and brought down to submissive roles.  Younger challengers may 
arise, assert themselves, be beaten and sink back into submission.121
Brenner – Distributed Security
19
A wolf’s rank “begins to be established early in life, when puppies play-fight.” 122  Once 
established, rank is “reinforced . . . by repeated exchanges of hostile and submissive 
displays.” 123  Wolves have a “complex language of gesture and posture for dominance 
behavior.  Dominant wolves may need only to stare at a subordinate to freeze it in its 
tracks.”124
The alpha male is the dominant member of a wolf pack; he holds it together as a 
society.125  He tends to be the center of attention, and is treated with great deference by 
the others.126  When a pack travels, any of the higher-ranked pack members can take 
the lead, but the alpha male takes command when the pack hunts or battles enemies.127
When they hunt, pack members pack display “elaborate cooperative behavior.”128
They coordinate their actions; this can extend to splitting pack members up so they can 
encircle or otherwise entrap their prey.129 Pack members play different roles in hunting, 
depending upon their strengths and aptitudes.130  Packs also employ a basic division of 
labor in caring for their offspring:  Initially, the mother stays in the den and cares for the 
cubs when they are small.  “[O]ther wolves bring both her and the cubs food when they 
return from a hunt.  As they mature other members of the pack take turns baby-sitting so 
that the mother can join the pack in a hunt.”131
Like ants, wolf packs must maintain external order.  This requires that they do 
two things: (a) preserve the integrity of their territory against predation by other packs; 
and (b) fend off attacks from other packs.  Here, too, wolf packs display an essential 
characteristic of dominance hierarchies:  a “violent united front against strangers.”132
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Given their size and specialized predatory habits, wolves must maintain “low 
population densities and occupy relatively immense home ranges.”133  Each pack 
occupies a distinct territory, which it defends from other wolves.134
Territories change size and shape from year to year.  Resident wolves 
scent-mark heavily at the boundaries of their territories, and trespassing 
wolves mark assiduously when they stray inside another pack’s domain.  
It is as if a wolf thus leaves a string of boasts and threats . . . to taunt and 
intimidate other packs and keep them out of its larder.  Wolves . . . have 
been known to kill neighboring wolves that strayed into their territories.135
In addition to defending their territory, wolves engage in “a primitive form of warfare.”136
One expert has described how they leave their territory to raid “neighboring territories, to 
all appearances bent on murdering their neighbors. . . . If . . . one pack senses a strong 
advantage, it will attack the other.”137
As a self-organizing collective system, a wolf pack is an interesting intermediate 
analytical step between an ant colony and human society (which is the last system to be 
considered).138  Like ants, a wolf pack relies on laterally-structured behavior, at least for 
basic interactions:  No one, for instance, not even the alpha male, articulates rules that 
“tell” wolf pups to play-fight and thereby begin the process of achieving pack rank;139 and 
no rule “tells” adult wolves to play and thereby hone their skills for hunting.140  Wolves do 
not need formal, articulated rules to structure basic behaviors such as these because a 
wolf is essentially a small extended family the members of which collectively carry out 
the activities needed to ensure the survival of the pack and its constituent members.141
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Except for the care of cubs, there is no division of labor in a wolf pack; the adults join 
together to hunt and to defend themselves from competing packs and enemies.142
Unlike the ants, wolves cannot rely exclusively on laterally-structured behavior 
because they are intelligent creatures who use their intelligence to survive.143 A wolf’s 
life is not like a chess game;144  while some general rules of conduct exist,145 individual 
wolves survive because they successfully establish and maintain their rank in a wolf 
pack and because they work cooperatively with other members of the pack.146  Much of 
the behavior within a pack is unorchestrated, but the overall activities of the pack and its 
essential cohesion reflect an underlying order that derives from the dominance hierarchy 
described above.  As noted earlier, the dominance hierarchy holds a pack together;147 in 
so doing, it controls the limited capacity for deviant behavior that exists in a wolf pack.  
As explained earlier, “deviant behavior” is an entity’s deliberate failure to follow rules that 
govern behavior in a social system.148 For various reasons, this capacity is not nearly as 
evolved among wolves as it is in human beings,149 but it is an aspect of wolf sociality.  
In an ant colony, each ant’s function and behaviors are prescribed by external 
factors; an ant has no ability to elect not to perform her assigned function by engaging in 
the prescribed behaviors.150 This is to some extent true of wolves; they must hunt to 
survive and their chances of hunting successfully, and surviving, are much greater if they 
belong to a pack.151  Unlike ants, however, wolves are not inevitably tied to their original 
pack; they can leave to strike out on their own or join another pack.152  Wolves can also 
shift position within their original pack.153 As noted above, wolf packs are hierarchical,154
and higher rank brings certain advantages; only alpha wolves breed, alphas feed first, 
and alphas bully and dominate subordinates.155  These and other advantages create 
incentives for subordinate wolves to try to move up in a pack hierarchy; their efforts to do 
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so create a potential for disorder within a pack.156  But wolf hierarchies also establish 
other ranks and ordered priorities within a pack and thereby reduce the potential for 
disorder that is an inevitable aspect of a system populated by highly intelligent, highly 
aggressive predators.  In one sense, therefore, wolf hierarchy creates the potential for 
disorder, in another sense, it produces order and stability.  
How do wolf hierarchies control deviance and promote order?  As noted earlier, 
the ranks establish priorities that serve to channel behavior in predictable ways, thereby 
minimizing casual, individual conflict between wolves.  The ranks ensure, for instance, 
that a gamma or even lower-ranked wolf will not take food from a beta wolf, at least not 
unless and until the lower-ranked wolf is ready to mount a full-blown challenge to the 
beta’s authority.157  The ranks create a fluid system of rules that predictably order the 
interactions – and some of the essential functions – of a wolf pack. 
But what about a subordinate’s challenging a higher-ranked wolf’s authority?  
Dominance hierarchies are based on personal characteristics; an alpha male’s rank is 
based on his ability to subordinate other wolves through physical aggression and/or 
psychological influence.158  Since an alpha male’s position at the top of the hierarchy is 
based on his ability to impose his will upon the other members of the pack, it is transient, 
subject to divestment.  Challenges occur almost constantly, at all levels of the hierarchy 
in a pack.159  If a challenge succeeds, the challenger becomes the new ranking wolf and 
the defeated wolf becomes a subordinate or leaves the pack;160 if a challenge fails, the 
challenger sinks back into subordination or leaves the pack. 161Is this dynamic another 
type of deviant behavior threatening order within a pack?
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One could argue that challenges to a higher-ranked wolf’s authority represent 
deviant behavior insofar as they constitute a failure to abide by the rules that constitute 
the pack at a given time.  That is, if Wolf Y is the alpha male of Pack Dakota, one of the 
rules of the pack is that other wolves defer to Wolf Y; by failing to defer to Wolf Y, Wolf Z 
violates the rules of the pack as they exist at the time he challenges Wolf Y’s authority.  
In that sense, Wolf Z’s challenge represents deviant behavior.  That characterization of 
Wolf Z’s behavior is inaccurate, however, because it ignores the fact that challenges to 
the authority of higher-ranked wolves is an intrinsic component of wolf social life.  No 
rule of pack or species behavior prohibits such challenges; indeed, as noted above, Wolf 
Y’s claim to dominance rests upon his ability to withstand such challenges.  Challenges 
by lower-ranked wolves are therefore the legitimate process that is used to determine 
leadership; 162 as such, they cannot be considered deviant behavior. 
Notwithstanding that, wolf packs do conform to the proposition advanced above, 
namely, that systems populated by intelligent agents find it necessary to define certain 
behaviors as prohibited because the constituent entities can engage in behaviors other 
than those prescribed by the system.163 Unlike human societies, wolf packs accomplish 
this by using relational instead of structural rules.  That is, the definition of behavior as 
prohibited derives from the status relationship which exists between the specific wolves  
who are involved in an encounter.  It is therefore prohibited behavior for a lower-ranked 
wolf to feed contemporaneously with an alpha wolf because such conduct violates the 
essential constitutive rules that sustain order in the social system.164  In modern human 
societies, on the other hand, the definition of behavior as prohibited derives from formal, 
institutionalized rules which apply without regard to the identities and/or relative status 
positions of the individuals who are involved in an encounter.165 It is therefore prohibited 
behavior for, say, an American citizen to attack any other American citizen regardless of 
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their social, economic or other positions in society; unlike the relational rules that govern 
wolf behavior, this prohibition is structural and therefore categorical in nature.166
Wolf packs also conform to the secondary proposition advanced above, i.e., that 
systems populated by intelligent agents will have one set of rules that prescribes rights 
and obligations and another that proscribes certain types of behavior.167  Here, too, wolf 
packs use relational rules instead of structural rules.  The rules that prescribe rights and 
obligations are embedded in the web of relationships that exist among the wolves in a 
pack.  In wolf society, the two types of rules essentially operate as mirror images of each 
other:  The rights and privileges an alpha male enjoys are defined by his status as alpha 
male; his status as alpha male also defines the respective behaviors that are proscribed 
for specific members of the pack.168  Fewer behaviors will, for example, be proscribed for 
the alpha female than for a beta female, for a beta male than for a gamma male, and so 
on.169 Unlike the categorical rights and obligations that are structurally conferred upon 
members of a modern human society,170 the rights and privileges a member of a wolf 
pack enjoys are dynamic, changing if and when the wolf’s status changes.171
c) Humans
A being, independent of any other, he has no rule to pursue, but 
such as he prescribes to himself. . . . 172
Humans, like wolves and ants, are social creatures.173  Humans, like wolves but 
unlike ants, are intelligent creatures under the definition given above.174  Humans are so 
far the most intelligent species to inhabit the Earth; human intelligence not only exceeds 
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that of all other species, it is far more complex.175  Since humans are social, they live in 
self-organizing collective systems;176 and since humans are far more intelligent than any 
other earthly creature, the social systems they create are far more complex than those 
found among any other terrestrial species.177  The social systems humans create are 
also much more flexible than those found among other species.178
Why are human social systems much more complex and yet much more flexible 
than those of other species?  One reason is the complexity of human beings, who vary 
greatly in behavior, intelligence and achievement:
Even in the simplest societies individuals differ greatly. . . . Human 
societies are organized by high intelligence, and each member is faced 
by a mixture of social challenges that taxes all of his ingenuity.  This 
baseline variation is amplified at the group level by other qualities 
exceptionally pronounced in human societies:  the long, close period of 
socialization; the loose connectedness of the communication networks; 
the multiplicity of bonds; the capacity, especially within literate cultures, to 
communicate over long distances and periods of history; and from all 
these traits, the capacity to dissemble, to manipulate and to exploit.179
Another reason is the relative rigidity of the processes that maintain order in 
social systems populated by other species, including the social insects:
In honeybees and in ants of the genera Formica and Pogonomyrmex. . . . 
[s]ome. . . . specialization . . . occurs. Certain individuals remain with the 
brood as nurses far longer than the average, while others concentrate on 
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nest building or foraging.   Yet . . . [w]hen one colony  . . .  is compared 
with another of the same species, the statistical patterns of activity are 
about the same. . . . . [S]ome of this consistency is due to negative 
feedback.  As one requirement such as brood care . . . intensifies, 
workers shift their activities to compensate until the need is met, then 
change back again.  Experiments have shown that disruption of the 
feedback loops, and thence deviation by the colony from the statistical 
norms, can be disastrous.180
Human societies do not operate within such a narrow range of behavioral possibilities.  
Indeed, as one scholar noted, “anthropological literature abounds with examples of 
[human] societies that contain obvious inefficiencies and even pathological flaws—yet 
endure.” 181
It is the “lack of competition from other species” that frees human societies from 
the constraints that channel other animal social systems into rigid patterns:
[M]an . . . has been so successful in dominating his environment that 
almost any kind of culture can succeed for a while, so long as it has a 
modest degree of internal consistency and does not shut off reproduction 
altogether.  No species of ant or termite enjoys this freedom.  The 
slightest inefficiency in constructing nests, in establishing odor trails, or in 
conducting nuptial flights could result in the quick extinction of the species
by predation and competition from other social insects.  To a scarcely 
lesser extent the same is true for social carnivores and primates.182
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As a sociologist noted, humans are unique in the animal kingdom in that they have “no 
species-specific environment.”183  A wolf, for instance, “has a largely fixed relationship 
with its environment, which it shares with all other members of its respective species.”184
This relationship, which is common to all non-human species, is “biologically fixed”, so 
that “all non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose 
structures are predetermined by the biological equipment of the . . . species.” 185
Humans, on the other hand, create their environment; unlike the biologically 
determined environments in which non-human animals live, human environments are “a 
social enterprise” -- the collective product of collaborative human activity.186 The creation 
of such environments is a matter of necessity, since humans lack the “biological means 
to provide stability for human conduct.  Human existence, if it were thrown back on its 
organismic resources . . . would be existence in . . . chaos.”187  The question is how 
humans successfully create and maintain social order; as explained earlier, every social 
system, whether populated by biological or artificial entities, must establish and maintain 
order – both internal and external – if it is to survive.188  The answer is that social order is 
a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. . . . 
Social order is not biologically given. . . . Social order . . . is also not given 
man’s natural environment, though particular features . . . may be factors 
in determining certain features of a social order. . . . Social order exists 
only as a product of human activity. . . . Both in its genesis (social order is 
the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time 
(social order exists . . . insofar as human activity continues to produce it) 
it is a human product.189
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Human social order is, therefore, an artifice, a construct; since order is an artifice, 
it can assume various forms in different social systems, but it is a necessary constant in 
every such system. 190  The question is:  How is this artifice produced?  Since humans --
unlike ants, wolves and other non-human species -- are not constrained by biologically-
driven behavioral parameters, it is at least conceptually possible that the tactics humans 
use to produce social order across their social systems are idiosyncratic; that is, it is 
conceivable that while social order is a constant, the devices humans use to achieve it 
are not.  It may seem, though, that this conceptual possibility is inconsistent with the 
postulates advanced earlier, namely, that systems populated by intelligent agents (a) will 
find it necessary to define behaviors they cannot tolerate and (b) will therefore rely upon 
two types of rules -- constitutive rules and proscriptive rules -- to establish and maintain 
order within the system.191
In point of fact, human systems – like the wolf packs discussed in the previous 
section and other systems populated by intelligent agents – do construct social order in 
accordance with these postulates.  But because human beings are very intelligent and 
do not operate within a limited range of biologically-driven behavioral possibilities, the 
ways in which they accomplish this can and do vary somewhat from system to system.  
There is, in essence, a macro-consistency in the way social order is constructed across 
human societies, but there has historically been a level of idiosyncrasy in the discrete 
manifestations of social order in particular societies.  
To understand why this is true, it is necessary to consider how humans construct 
social order.  Unlike other self-organizing collective systems, systems that are populated 
by intelligent entities (such as humans and wolves) do confront the risk of chaos arising 
from deviant behavior, which is an entity’s deliberate failure to follow governing rules.192
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As was noted earlier, all systems – social, biological, physical and artificial – operate 
according to a set of rules.193 In many systems, these rules are pre-given:  The rules that 
govern physics, for instance, are fixed and predetermined; the laws of thermodynamics 
are subject neither to dispute nor modification.194  The same can be said of the rules that 
govern many biological systems; a particular colony of ants does not hold a referendum 
to decide how it will establish order.195 The rules that maintain order among the ants and 
other social insects are for the most part biologically determined;196 since ants are not 
intelligent, they do not have the capacity to alter these rules or to contumaciously refuse 
to comply with them.197
Intelligent entities can do either or both. The specific ability to do this varies with 
the degree of intelligence possessed by the individual members of the species and the 
extent to which they are subject to biological constraints that limit their capacity to realize 
the potential their intelligence gives them.198  Because humans are highly intelligent and 
essentially free from biological constraints, the ability to create, alter and ignore rules is   
most pronounced in mankind.199  Consequently, the most elaborate rule systems have 
grown up among humans.  
In human social systems, as in all self-organizing collective systems, rules are 
used to establish and maintain order both internally and externally.200  Internal order is 
the highest priority, and the first task undertaken, because without it a system cannot 
exist and cannot, therefore, resist external threats.  Consequently, the first type of rules 
to emerge in human society are the constitutive rules noted earlier.201  These rules 
establish order by specifying and limiting the choices individual constituents can make.  
In human societies, the complexity of these constitutive rules evolved as human social 
groupings increased in size and complexity.  
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Initially, human systems were organized around the nuclear family; until about 
10,000 years ago humans were hunter-gatherers who lived in “multi-family . . . bands of 
a few tens of people.”202 The constitutive rules that established order in these systems 
were simple.  The purpose of these rules was ensuring that each social system – each 
band – met the conditions needed for it to survive and continue. This requires ensuring 
that the members of the system survive and reproduce; that their offspring mature and 
are incorporated into the system; and that the members of the system are protected from 
predators and human competitors. 203  The constitutive rules that governed the bands 
which were the first form of human social organization channeled the activities of their 
members toward the achievement of these ends by establishing a basic command 
structure and a general division of labor.204  The command structure was analogous to 
that found in a wolf pack;205 it consisted, minimally, of a male who had gained authority 
over the others by birthright or physical prowess.206  The dominant male directed the 
basic activities of the band:  summoning the other men for hunting or defense, leading 
them in these and other essential activities, directing the movements of the band as it 
migrated from place to place, and orchestrating its relations with other, non-hostile 
bands.207  The division of labor was gender-based; men hunted while women remained 
in the band’s camp to raise children and gather food.208  While conflict was certainly not 
absent from these bands, this minimal set of rules sufficed to maintain the level of 
internal order needed for the bands and their constituent entities to survive. It did this by 
channeling the efforts of the members of the band in productive directions; this at once 
ensured that the tasks needed to sustain the band would be performed and limited the 
behavioral options open to the band members. 209
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Once agriculture was invented, “populations increased enormously in density, 
and the primitive hunter-gatherer bands gave way . . . to the relentless growth of tribes, 
chiefdoms, and states.”210  As human social systems grew in size, they also grew in 
complexity; this complexity extended to the constitutive rules that set the baseline for 
social order in a system.211  The constitutive rules still specified the contours and staffing 
of system authority (i.e., government) and the division of labor, both of which became 
more complex; they also expanded into other areas.  Constitutive rules came, for 
example, to govern such matters as: (a) the categories, identities and number of 
individuals one can marry; (b) the ages and conditions under which one can marry; (c) 
the conditions and constraints, if any, placed upon reproduction; (d) the endeavors one 
can/must engage in to “earn a living” ( i.e., to obtain the resources needed to survive and 
reproduce); (d) the duties and practices involved in religious observances; (e) the terms 
and conditions upon which one can validly enter into contractual agreements with others;  
(f) one’s right to recompense from another who inadvertently causes injury or loss; (g) 
the obligations one owes to one’s family; and (h) the obligations one owes to the social 
system itself (which can range from paying taxes to serving in the military).212  In more 
evolved social systems, constitutive rules come in two forms:  norms (informal 
consensus-based standards that define what is, and is not, “correct” behavior); and laws 
(formally adopted standards governing behavior, obligations and expectations).213  Both 
work to sustain social order, but they do so in different ways:  Norms operate internally; 
to the extent the members of a social system accept and internalize its norms, they will 
seek to conform their behavior to the standards the norms embody.214  Laws can operate 
both internally and externally; the members of a social system will conform their behavior 
to its laws because they accept the legitimacy of the standards they embody and/or 
because they seek to avoid the consequences of not doing so.215  Constitutive laws and 
norms create and maintain social order by providing direction (indicating the choices 
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members of a social system should make and the behaviors they should engage in) and 
channeling behavior in socially constructive directions.216  Their effectiveness is due in 
large part to the socialization process all members of a human social system undergo; it 
is in the course of this process that the members of a social system internalize its 
constitutive rules and learn to follow them. 217
The laws embodying constitutive rules are the “civil law” of an evolved human 
social system; they are “rule[s] of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a 
state, `commanding what is right’”.218  Constitutive rules are sufficient to maintain order 
in social systems populated by entities that are not “intelligent.”219 As explained earlier, 
Intelligence introduces a “wild card” – the possibility of choice.220  Choice means that the 
entities who populate a social system can decide (a) what the rules are and (b) whether 
or not they, as individuals, will follow a particular rule or set of rules.  The intelligence of 
the entities who populate a system determines the extent of their ability to make these 
choices; the greater their intelligence, the greater their ability to make these choices will 
be.221 Humans, who are equipped with what Henri Bergson called the “dissolving power” 
of intelligence, 222 can make these decisions. The existence of that ability creates a direct 
and intolerable threat to social order:  If each member of a social grouping can decide for 
him/herself whether to follow the constitutive rules in effect in that system, the rules are 
of no import; the system essentially exists in a state of anarchy because any member 
can freely elect to abide by its constitutive “civil” rules or ignore them.223 This erodes the 
system’s ability to maintain order in two ways:224  (1) individual behavior is not structured 
and channeled in socially constructive ways, which means that essential functions are 
not performed; and (2) decisions not to abide by the “civil” rules can be prompted by one 
person’s inclination to prey upon other,225 which means that socially destructive behavior 
proliferates.226 Each of these alternatives is the product of deviant behavior; that is, each 
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represents behavior which is predicated upon a deliberate decision not to conform one’s 
conduct to the dictates of the constitutive rules in effect in the social system one 
inhabits.227
We have not addressed the possibility of deviant behavior because we have 
been concentrating on the tactics systems use to create order; that is, we have been 
concentrating on how social order emerges from the interaction of constituent entities 
whose behavior is ordered by a set of relatively simple rules. 228  As explained earlier, 
deviant behavior, which serves to destroy order, is not an issue in systems that are 
populated by less intelligent entities whose behavior is biologically constrained;229 the 
primary threats to social order in these systems are external, posed by competing 
systems composed of members of the same species or by predators.230
Systems populated by humans (and entities with equivalent capacities)231 must 
confront the problem of deviant behavior; constitutive rules are not enough to maintain 
order in these systems.232  To prevent the erosion of social order, systems populated by 
humans (and equivalent entities) must therefore come up with a solution, a way to defeat 
and discourage deviant behavior.  The solution human social systems have used for 
several millennia is to create a new set of rules – criminal rules – that essentially require 
members of the system to follow the “civil” rules, i.e., the constitutive rules that constitute 
the system.233
Human systems essentially employ a tripartite system to maintain internal order:  
The first and most basic device is the internal controls implemented by the unwritten 
rules, the norms every member of the social system learns in their socialization process.  
Individual internalization of these norms is the primary technique used to establish order 
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at a very basic level.  The second device is the constitutive rules, which supplement the 
norms by defining appropriate behavior at a higher level of complexity; while norms, for 
example, dictate that individuals should support their children, a system may well find it 
necessary to establish constitutive rules which formalize this obligation and attach 
consequences to one’s failure to discharge it.  The third device is the criminal rules 
which are used for those who respond neither to the informal dictates of the norms nor to 
the institutionalized commands of the constitutive rules.      
Criminal rules will therefore be linked to the “civil” constitutive rules that define 
the basic structure of expectations and obligations which constitute a social system. 
Social systems, for instance, consistently, if not inevitably, adopt constitutive rules that 
define parent-child relationships and obligations.  These rules address such matters as 
whether (and under what circumstances) adults are allowed to reproduce,234 the 
circumstances under which a child will be deemed to be legitimate (which often triggers 
other constitutively-defined obligations),235 to whom the custody of a child belongs,236
who is obligated to provide care and support for children and for how long that obligation 
lasts.237  Correlative criminal rules impose criminal liability and penalties on those who 
do not abide by these “civil” constitutive rules.238  The same dynamic exists in other 
areas:  Constitutive rules define property and concept of ownership;239 criminal rules 
impose liability and penalties on those who violate these “civil” rules by stealing or
destroying another’s property.240  There is, though, another type of criminal rule:  The 
rules in this category are not specifically linked to constitutive rules; these are the rules 
that impose criminal liability and sanctions for conduct that violates another individual’s 
legitimate expectations of life, liberty and safety.241  Most social systems do not explicitly 
articulate the legitimacy of such expectations vis-à-vis other members of that system, 
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perhaps because they are(such deeply-embedded assumptions that it does not seem 
necessary.242
Since the capacity for deviant behavior is a constant across human populations, 
every social system will have criminal rules.  These rules will be designed to maintain 
the integrity of several vital interests:  the safety of persons; the security of property; the 
stability of the government; and the sanctity of particular moral principles.243 No system 
can survive if its constituents are free to harm each other at will, to appropriate each 
other’s property, to undermine the political order and/or to flout the moral principles the 
citizenry hold dear.244  Every society will therefore formulate penal prohibitions defining 
(i) crimes against persons (e.g., murder, assault, rape); (ii) crimes against property (e.g., 
theft, arson, fraud); (iii) crimes against the state (e.g., treason, rioting, obstruction of 
justice); and (iv) crimes against morality (e.g., obscene materials, defiling a place of 
worship).245  As to the content of these rules, the greatest degree of consistency will 
occur in the first two categories because they intrinsically involve citizens preying upon 
each other, something no social system can tolerate if it is to survive. There will be a fair 
degree of consistency on a core of rules in the third category --e.g., treason, riot, and 
obstructing justice --because every social system must ensure the stability of its political 
order.246  Beyond this core, there will be more deviation in the rules that fall into this 
category because nations vary in terms of the extent to which they feel it necessary to 
discourage political dissidence.247  Finally, there will be a great deal of inconsistency as 
to rules in the fourth category because they are the product of a society’s values and 
religious principles and, as such, tend to be much more idiosyncratic in nature.248
All of these rules are designed to establish and maintain internal order.  They 
are, therefore, formulated by the members of a particular human social system and are 
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applied to those who constitute that social system throughout time.249  Human systems, 
like systems populated by other species, must also maintain external order.250  The rules 
that establish and maintain internal order in human systems play an essential role in 
efforts to maintain external order insofar as they allow the system to focus its resources 
on external threats; if a social system is undergoing inner turmoil, it is likely to 
experience difficulty in fending off external threats.251  The rules that establish and 
maintain internal order have not, historically, been otherwise implicated in the system’s 
efforts to resist external threats because they simply did not apply to the nature and 
source of external threats.  External threats to a system historically came from another 
system -- another group of human beings.  The other system could be another band, 
another tribe, another principality or another state, but it was always comprised of a 
separate populace with a distinct identity and its own agenda.252  Consequently, the 
rules one system devised to maintain internal order, including criminal rules, were quite 
ineffectual against external threats posed by a second system because (a) the members 
of the “other” system were in no way bound to abide by these rules and (b) the conduct 
involved in the external threat was not conduct addressed by these rules.253  Section III 
explains how cybercrime alters assumptions about the relationship between internal 
order and external threats.
As to internal order, the existence of a set of criminal rules – a criminal law – is 
only one part of what is involved in maintaining internal order.  Implicit in the notion of a 
criminal law is the premise that some members of a social system will obdurately violate 
the rules that govern behavior within the system; indeed, this is why criminal rules are 
needed.  But criminal rules do not merely prohibit certain behaviors; they also prescribe 
the consequences of engaging in such behavior.254  Prescribing consequences, though,  
is not enough; there must be some mechanism, some process, in place which ensures 
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that these consequences are imposed upon those who violate applicable criminal 
rules.255  The section immediately below and § II(B), infra, examine this process.
3. Control
Fatta la legge, trovato l'inganno.256
Our analysis of social systems populated by ants, wolves and humans shows 
that  there are two very different ways of approaching the problem of maintaining order 
in a social system.  One is the lateral, distributed approach found among ants and other 
social insects.  In an ant colony, there is no “authority” -- social order emerges from and 
is sustained by the interactions of the constituent members of the colony, none of which 
are individually “intelligent:”
[A]nt colonies . . . form long-range structures without relying on the 
centralized, hierarchical control used in human organizations. . . .  A 
dramatic example is the army ant raids. Army ant colonies comprise 
hundreds of thousands of individuals. . . .[T]he swarm behaves as a 
single entity, searching and expanding . . . as though guided by some 
kind of intelligence. The colony, however, is blind and responds only to 
local concentrations of pheromones laid down by its individual members. 
There is no central control or individually complex behavior. This emerges 
from the interactions between ants.257
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Lateral constitutive rules suffice to establish and maintain order in systems such as this 
because there is no potential for deviant behavior.258  Lacking that potential, the system 
has no need for a set of criminal rules and for a mechanism to enforce those rules.
Systems populated by intelligent entities must confront the potential for deviant 
behavior, i.e., the possibility that individual members will violate system rules.  Because 
the entities who comprise these systems are intelligent, they are also volitional and can 
elect not to conform their behavior to system dictates.  Such systems cannot, therefore, 
rely only on internal controls to establish order; they must also institute measures that 
exert a level of external control upon the behavior of the members of a system.  These 
measures become the “authority” that enforces the rules of a system.259  In a wolf pack, 
authority is relational:  Subordinate wolves’ relationship to the alpha male and to each 
other determines the behavioral rules each must follow; if a wolf violates one of these 
rules, the alpha male or whichever wolf is the target of the violation will respond in an 
effort to bring the offender in line. 260  If the offender submits to the authority of the wolf 
who reacts to his/her misbehavior, order is restored; if the offender overcomes the 
reacting wolf, a new order is restored. 261 This is a classic example of a dominance 
hierarchy.262
“Pure” dominance hierarchies, which are based on relational rules, are typically 
the means by which intelligent species maintain order in small social systems, such as a 
wolf pack or a band of hunter-gatherers. 263   As social systems grow in size, relational 
rules cease to become an effective means of maintaining order within a system; the size 
of the constituent population means that the web of relationships becomes too complex 
to function efficiently.264  To understand why this is so, imagine a wolf pack composed of 
a thousand wolves:  There is one alpha male and one alpha female, but there are many, 
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many beta males and beta females, many, many gamma males and gamma females, 
and so on.  Relying on relational rules – with their attendant patterns of challenge, 
response and resolution (which can alter the structure of the relational rules) – would 
leave the system in chaos.265
Wolves do not live in packs of thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions, 
so they can continue to rely on relational rules.  Humans, however, evolved ever-larger 
social systems and, as the size of these social systems increased, found it necessary to 
develop a different approach to maintaining order. Humans gradually replaced relational 
rules with structural rules; unlike relational rules, structural rules are institutionalized and 
apply categorically.266  Structural rules have been formally adopted according to some 
accepted process and apply categorically across a set or subset of the population of a 
social system.267  They are, therefore, not legitimately subject to testing by individual 
members of that population; the members of the population are bound to accept and 
abide by the structural rules which apply to them. 268 This eliminates the potential for 
chaos that results from the challenges that are an integral part of the relational rules 
which comprise a dominance hierarchy. 269  In a system populated by volitional entities,  
it does not eliminate the possibility that some members of the system will refuse to abide 
by these rules.  This requires the incorporation of a control mechanism, of some system 
for enforcing the structural rules.  As § II(B) explains, human social systems developed 
different approaches to enforcing their structural rules, particularly their criminal rules, 
over the course of human history; as that section also explains, the current approach, 
like a dominance hierarchy, concentrates the power and authority to respond to 
violations of criminal rules in a small subset of the population of the social system. 
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4. Territory
As noted earlier, the rules human social systems devise to maintain system order 
are, for the most part, territorially-based.270  That is, each social system is situated in a 
physical space to which it lays claim by the tenets of the law, by the force of weapons 
and/or by whatever other standard applies.  This is a trait human social systems share 
with wolf packs, ant colonies and, indeed, all real-world social systems, that is, all of the 
social systems that have heretofore been established by biological species.  This is, as § 
III explains, a trait that can make the enforcement of system rules problematic when the 
conduct at issue occurs in or is mediated through cyberspace.  
B. Model
[S]overeignty . . . is rooted to . . . territory and is contingent on 
the ability of the state to protect its citizens, maintain order and 
uphold the law within confined geographical boundaries. . . . 271
The traditional model of law enforcement, which is the model still in use today, 
evolved to deal with real-world crime; 272  the essential components of the model were, 
for all intents and purposes, in place by the nineteenth century.  The discussion below 
examines this model:  Section II(B)(1) identifies four assumptions that shaped the model, 
while § II(B)(2) sketches its evolution. 
Brenner – Distributed Security
41
1. Real-world crime
Because it is firmly situated in a corporeal, physical environment, real-world 
crime has several defining characteristics; these characteristics became assumptions 
that shaped the extant model of law enforcement.  The sections below examine the four 
characteristics that are the most significant for this discussion.
a) Proximity
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of real-world crime is that the 
perpetrator and the victim are physically proximate to each other at the time the offense 
is committed or attempted.273  It is, for instance, not possible to rape or realistically 
attempt to rape someone if the rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart; by the same 
token, in a non-technological world it is physically impossible to pick someone’s pocket,
take their property by force or defraud them out of their property if the thief and victim 
are in different countries (or even different counties). 
b) Scale
A second characteristic of real-world crime is that it tends to be one-to-one crime; 
that is, it consists of an event involving one perpetrator and one victim.  This event – the 
“crime” – commences when the victimization of the target is begun and ends when it has 
been concluded; during this event the perpetrator focuses all of his/her attention on the 
consummation of that “crime.”274  When the “crime” is complete, the perpetrator is free to 
move onto another victim and another “crime.”  The one-to-one character of real-world 
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crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes upon human activity:275  A 
thief cannot pick more than one pocket at a time; an arsonist cannot set fire to more than 
one building at a time; and prior to the development of firearms and similar armament, it 
was exceedingly difficult for one bent upon homicide to cause the simultaneous deaths 
of more than one person.276 Real-world crime is therefore serial crime.
The one-to-one nature of real-world crime is more a default than an absolute; 
exceptions occur, especially with regard to the number of perpetrators.  Rape, murder, 
theft, arson, forgery and many other crimes can involve multiple perpetrators; indeed, 
the aggregation of offenders and the rise of “organized crime” is a tendency that has 
accelerated over the last few centuries.277  But while many-to-one deviations from the 
one-to-one model have occurred for centuries, one-to-many deviations were rare prior to 
the use of technology.  For example, in a world without computers, copiers and similar 
devices the forging of a document must be done by hand, which takes time and means 
that only a limited number of forgeries can be produced.  Consequently, prior to say, 
1800, forgery is almost inevitably a one-to-one crime; the forger falsifies a document, 
uses it to victimize his target and then moves on, to another document and another 
victim.  The same is true of fraud; the perpetrator necessarily focuses his or her efforts 
on a single target, succeeds, and, having done so, moves on to another target.278
c) Physical constraints
A third characteristic of real-world crime is that its commission is subject to the 
physical constraints that govern all activities in the “real,” physical world.279 Since we are 
accustomed to living our lives according to the dictates of these constraints, we do not 
Brenner – Distributed Security
43
appreciate how they enhance the complexity of criminal endeavors.280  Every “crime,” 
even routinized offenses such as prostitution and street-level drug dealing, requires 
some level of preparation, planning and considered implementation if it is to succeed. 
For real-world crime, these activities must be conducted in physical space, actual space.  
So, one who decides to rob a bank must visit that bank corporeally to familiarize 
herself with its physical layout (entrances, teller windows, vault location), security (visible 
alarm systems, guards, surveillance cameras) and general routine (when employees 
arrive and leave, when the bank is likely to have the fewest customers, currency pickup 
and delivery).281  This process exposes the robber to public scrutiny, which can lead to 
her being apprehended after she commits the crime.282  The same is true of the robbery 
itself; while physically inside the bank, the robber can leave evidence or become the 
subject of observations that can lead to her being apprehended.283  It is equally true of 
the perpetrator’s flight once the robbery has been committed; again, the perpetrator is 
exposed to public view and runs the risk of being noticed and identified.284  In addition to 
the risks of exposure that arise from planning and committing the “crime,” the robber will 
presumably need to secure a weapon and some type of disguise;285 and she may need 
to launder the funds she takes from the bank.286 Like the processes involved in the 
robbery itself, each of these steps takes time and effort and incrementally augments the 
total exertion required for the commission of this “crime;” and like the robbery itself, each 
increases the likelihood that she will be identified and apprehended.287
d) Patterns
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A fourth characteristic of real-world crime is that over time it becomes possible to 
identify the general contours and incidence of the “crimes” committed within a social
system.288   Real-world victimization tends to fall into demographic and geographic 
patterns for two reasons. One is that, as is explained below, only a small segment of a 
functioning society’s total populace will be persistently engaged in criminal activity.289
Those who fall into this category are apt to be from economically-deprived backgrounds 
and reside in areas that share certain geographic and demographic characteristics.290
They will be inclined to focus their efforts on those with whom they share a degree of 
physical proximity because these are their most convenient victims.291  This means that 
much of the “crime” in a social system will be concentrated in specific areas, such on the 
“West Side of Notown” or “South of 31st Street in Megalopolis.” 292
The other reason why “crime” falls into certain patterns is that each society has a 
repertoire of “crimes” -- of legal rules that proscribe a set of behaviors ranging from more 
to less serious in terms of the respective “harms” each inflicts.293  The “harm” caused by 
a specific “crime” is encompassed by, and limited to, the definition of the offense:  A rape 
produces the “harm” targeted by the “crime” of rape;294 a theft causes the “harm” inflicted 
by the “crime” of theft;295 a forgery yields the “harm” subsumed by the “crime” of forgery, 
and so on.296  In a functioning society, the more egregious “crimes” will occur much less 
often and may occur less predictably than the minor “crimes.”297 Murder, for instance, is 
an extraordinary event in any society that is successfully maintaining social order and 
resisting chaos.298  Theft in its various forms299 is a far less extraordinary event;300 and, 
depending on the cultural mores of the society, drunkenness and/or prostitution may be 
quite common.301  Also, various “crimes” fall into localized patterns reflecting geography 
and particular types of victimization.302
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Because these characteristics are inevitable aspects of “crime” in the real-world, 
they shaped the traditional model of law enforcement that evolved to deal with this type 
of “crime.” The section below explains how each characteristic contributed to the model.
2. Traditional Model of Law Enforcement
As social control strategies303 evolved, the empirical characteristics of real-world 
crime -- physical proximity of victim-victimizer; one-to-one scale; physical constraints; 
and offender-offense “crime” patterns304 --became embedded assumptions that shaped 
the traditional model and its approach to “crime.”  The model encompasses both a 
general strategy for dealing with “crime” and an organizational model for implementing 
this strategy.  The sections below explain how these assumptions shaped the model and 
how the model evolved through time.
a) Assumptions
The first characteristic contributed a presumed dynamic to the model:  victim-
offender presence in the same general locale; victim-offender proximity and resulting 
victimization; offender’s efforts to leave the locale or otherwise avoid apprehension and 
prosecution; investigation; identification, apprehension and prosecution of the offender.  
The dynamic reflects a time when life and crime were both parochial, when victims and 
offenders generally lived in the same village or in the same city neighborhood.  If a victim 
and offender did not actually know each other, they were likely to share community ties; 
this facilitated the process of apprehending offenders because there was a good chance 
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they could be identified by the victim, by witnesses or by reputation.  If the perpetrator 
and the victim did not share community ties, that is, if the perpetrator was a stranger, his
alienness was likely to contribute to his being apprehended, since the local citizenry paid 
particular attention to those who “did not belong” in their portion of the physical world.305
Law enforcement dealt effectively with this type of crime because its parochial character 
meant that investigations were limited in scope.306  The model therefore assumes that 
the investigation of a “crime” can focus upon a specific geographical area surrounding 
the site where the “crime” occurred.307
The second characteristic contributed another element: The traditional model of 
law enforcement assumes one-to-one victimization and that assumption, in conjunction 
with an unrelated assumption, structures its conceptualization of the scale of “crime”. 
The unrelated assumption is that incidents of criminal activity are extraordinary events in 
a social system; the model assumes, in other words, that “crime” is a deviation from the 
law-abiding conduct that constitutes the prevailing pattern of behavior in a system. This 
assumption derives not from the physical characteristics of real-world crime but from the 
nature of criminal law, the function of which is to maintain an acceptable level of social 
order within a social system.308  It does this by defining what behaviors are unacceptable 
and by specifying the consequences of engaging in such behavior. 309 The presumptive 
result is that “crime” becomes a subset, generally a small subset, of the total behaviors 
in a system population; law enforcement personnel can, therefore, focus their efforts on 
a limited segment of the conduct within a given society. 
This assumption that “crime” is committed by a small subset of the populace is 
the first element – the “offender element” – that structures the model’s conceptualization 
of the scale of “crime.”  The second element – the “offense element” – is the assumption 
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that one-to-one victimization is the default case.   As explained earlier, “crimes” involve 
the infliction of a specific type of “harm” upon the victim.310  If one-to-one victimization is 
the norm, each completed “crime” inflicts one “harm” upon one victim; additive “harms” 
must be inflicted sequentially.311  So, while a serial killer can cause many deaths, many 
“harms,” he necessarily does so sequentially.312
The conceptualization of scale derived from these assumptions posits that the 
incidence of victimization in a system will be relatively small both (a) in relationship to the 
size of the population and (b) in terms of the absolute level of “harm” inflicted.  The first 
proposition derives from the assumption that only a subset of the system populace will 
engage in criminal activity. The derivation of the second proposition is more complex. 
The level of “harm” inflicted by the incidence of victimization in a system is a function of 
three variables:  (1) the number of individuals engaged in committing “crimes”; (2) the 
number of discrete “crimes” these individuals commit during a given time period; and (3) 
the types of “harm” caused by the “crimes” these individuals commit.  The operation of 
these variables is illustrated by a hypothetical.  Assume that a social system consists of 
10,000,000 people, of whom 500,000 engage in criminal activity on a more or less 
regular basis.313  Assume that 200,000 of these 500,000 miscreants are incarcerated or 
are for other reasons not actively engaged in criminal activity during the time period at 
issue.  This defines the first variable by giving us the basic pool of individuals who will 
commit “crimes” during this time period.314  Defining the remaining two variables is more 
problematic because they tend to interact.  That is, it is difficult to set a generic number 
of “crimes” our 300,000 persistent offenders are likely to commit because the number of 
“crimes” an individual commits tends to be a function of the seriousness of the “crimes” 
at issue.  A low-level drug dealer or a street prostitute may commit fifty or more “crimes” 
a week, but this will most certainly not be true of an arsonist or a career bank robber.315
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As the seriousness of a “crime” increases, the frequency with which it is committed tends 
to decrease; most murderers, for example, kill only once.316  Crime statistics therefore 
indicate, and the traditional model assumes, that most of the “crimes” committed by a 
system’s persistent offenders – the 300,000 miscreants in our hypothetical – will be less 
serious “crimes,” i.e., “crimes” that do not involve the infliction of death, physical injury or 
massive property damage/loss.317
Finally, the traditional model’s conceptualization of scale incorporates the fourth 
characteristic of real-world crime:  the assumption that offenses and offenders fall into 
identifiable patterns.318  What this adds is the notion of localization.  As explained above, 
the traditional model’s conceptualization of the scale of real-world “crime” postulates that 
it will be limited in incidence and in the relative type of “harms” it inflicts on a populace.319
This final premise contributes the notion that an identifiable percentage of these real-
world “crimes” will occur in geographically and demographically demarcated areas.320
The traditional model therefore assumes real-world “crime.”  It relies upon the 
empirical characteristics of real-world “crime” and certain extrapolations from these 
characteristics to structure its approach to law enforcement. The model assumes that  
“crime:” (a) consists of discrete events – “crimes” – each of which is physically situated; 
(b) is subject to the constraints associated with activity in the physical world; (c) is 
qualitatively and quantitatively limited; and (d) falls into identifiable geographical and 
demographic patterns. These assumptions combine to generate the principle upon 
which the model’s approach to “crime” is based -- that it is a manageable phenomenon 
for law enforcement.  The first two contribute the premise that “crimes” necessarily leave 
information, evidence, in the real-world locale where they are committed; extrapolating 
from this premise yields the conclusion that law enforcement personnel reacting to the 
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report of a “crime” can locate this evidence and use it to apprehend the perpetrator. The 
model further postulates that perpetrators remain in or near the area where their “crime” 
was committed, which facilitates their being apprehended. The first two assumptions, 
therefore, inferentially establish law enforcement’s ability to deal with specific “crimes.” 
The last two establish its ability to deal with “crime” as a systemic phenomenon; the 
premise here is that since real-world “crime” occurs on a limited scale and assumes 
certain patterns, law enforcement can mobilize its modest resources so as to deal with it 
effectively.321
b) Strategy and Structure
The model assumes real-world crime because it is historically derived; like the 
common law, the traditional model of law enforcement is a compilation of past practices 
that have been deemed to be effective in dealing with the phenomena it confronts. The 
model’s general strategy has been in use since pre-history and the dynamic employed in 
its implementation is the same as it was centuries ago, when law enforcement consisted 
of a constable or night watchman:  A “crime” is committed and called to the attention of 
law enforcement personnel, who investigate; if their investigation is successful, they 
identify and apprehend the perpetrator, who is charged with the “crime,” prosecuted, and 
presumably convicted and punished.322
This reactive approach to deviant behavior is a very basic strategy, functionally 
analogous to the social control tactics common in dominance hierarchies.323  A violation 
of the rules in effect in a social system occurs, which produces a reaction by the member 
of that system charged with maintaining order.  In a wolf pack, this is typically the alpha 
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male, who enforces the relational rules that maintain order in the pack; 324 in evolved 
human social systems, it is typically a member of the system who has been assigned to 
enforce the structural rules that maintain order in the system.  The source of authority for 
the rules differs in the two systems, but the operating rationale is the same:  A violation 
of the rules requires a reaction by someone in authority; the purpose of the reaction is to 
achieve a response.  Ideally, the response takes the form of continuing submission to 
authority; the offender ceases to offend at that moment and does not re-offend in the 
future.  This is control-by-deterrence (though it can also be control-by-incapacitation if 
the reaction results in the offender’s incarceration or demise).325  That is, the threat of 
sanction brings the offender into line and has the consequent effect of impressing the 
other members of the system with the consequences of offending, thereby helping to 
ensure that they will not offend in the future.326  As human societies develop more 
complex cultures, the reaction can also be seen as having a symbolic effect, i.e., “doing 
justice” or “exacting retribution” according to some philosophical or religious principles.327
This reactive approach emerged millennia ago as a pragmatic solution to what 
was then atypical behavior. “Crime” is an unusual event in small social systems because 
the informal social control exerted by shared norms and values is sufficient to deter most 
would-be offenders.328 When a “crime” does occur, it is relatively easy to address given 
the nature of the system in which it is committed: Identifying the perpetrator, who may 
literally be caught red-handed, is generally not difficult given the small size of the 
populace; the operation of the physical constraints discussed above is magnified, so it 
may be impossible for an offender to avoid observation and detection in the process of 
committing the “crime” or in the process of fleeing from it.329  And the unlikelihood of 
“stranger danger” makes it relatively easy to deduce who might have had the motive and 
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opportunity for the offense.330  The reactive approach to deviant behavior emerged from 
this context and persisted as social systems evolved in size and complexity.  
Why has it endured?  One reason, no doubt, is that we are accustomed to this 
model and the dynamic it incorporates; we expect law enforcement to respond when a 
“crime” is committed and we assume the identification, apprehension, prosecution and 
eventual punishment of the offender will satisfactorily resolve things, returning “harm” for 
“harm” and deterring future “crimes.”331  Another reason is that societies are unwilling or 
unable to allocate the increased resources that are needed to implement a proactive 
model which emphasizes “crime” prevention as well as control-by-deterrence.332  Yet 
another reason is that it is still a workable means of dealing with real-world “crime”.  The 
reactive approach may not be the most effective means, but real-world “crime” retains 
the characteristics described earlier; the persistence of those characteristics means this 
approach continues to be a viable strategy for addressing traditional “crime.”333
But strategy alone is not enough.  There must also be an allocation of human 
and other resources plus an organizational structure designed to implement the strategy, 
i.e., to identify and apprehend those who commit “crimes.”  The level of organizational 
development in the society determines who will actually be responsible for reacting to a 
completed “crime.”  Among some hunter-gatherers, for example, “communal, collective 
security efforts generally suffice;” 334 in others, this function is assigned to a subset of the 
populace, typically males who enjoy higher status within the grouping.335 Historically, as 
human social systems became larger and more complex they tended to institutionalize 
this function:  Egypt had established an “early system of citizen police” by 1500 B.C.; the  
ancient Greeks used “an effective system of `kin policing’” and the ancient Romans used 
both civilian patrols and military forces to “maintain law and order.” 336  The disintegration 
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of the Roman Empire plunged Europe into chaos; social systems that had relied on 
Roman institutions were forced to resort to older measures to maintain order:
The closest equivalent to the modern police officer that emerged 
at the time of Alfred the Great . . . was the `Saxon tythingman.’ Every 
male person over the age of twelve was required to participate in . . . the 
tything system. A tything was a group of ten families, headed by a 
`tythingman’ responsible for the acts of the persons . . . in his group. It 
was each tythingman's duty to raise the `hue and cry’ when a crime was 
committed, to collect his neighbors and to pursue a criminal who fled. . . .
If such a group failed to apprehend a lawbreaker, the tything could be 
required to pay a fine. . . . 337
The Normans kept this system in place but expanded the role of the “shire reeve” 
(later, sheriff).  Under the Norman system, the shire reeve could “raise a `hue and cry,’ 
but instead of merely requiring the members of a tything to . . . apprehend an accused, 
he was able to summon the posse comitatus which consisted of the tythingmen . . . of 
several hundred tythings.” 338  The shire reeve was responsible for maintaining order in 
the shire over which he presided; by the end of the thirteenth century, the shire reeve 
had an assistant, the constable, who eventually assumed responsibility for maintaining 
law and order. 339  In 1285, the Statute of Winchester established a system of
patrols in each of the large towns of England. Men between the ages of 
fifteen and sixty were required to perform watch service on a rotating 
basis between sunset and sunrise. They were responsible for protecting 
property against fire, guarding the town gates and apprehending anyone 
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who committed a crime. The `hue and cry" could be commenced by any 
watchman and the entire community of able-bodied males was required 
to join in the pursuit of any wrongdoer. A failure to participate in the watch 
or to aid in the pursuit of fugitives would result in punishment. . . .340
The statute also “required every man between the ages of fifteen and sixty to maintain 
specified weaponry, which varied according to his wealth.” 341
Policing in England, and later in the American colonies,342 “continued to follow 
this style, known as the `watch and ward’ system of law enforcement, for nearly five 
hundred years.” 343  But “as time passed the voluntary observance of the `watch and 
ward’ system” weakened, and it became common practice “to pay others to do the 
required service.344 The substitutes were generally “too old to be of any value” and the 
consequent rise in crime rates caused wealthy merchants to hire “private watchmen to 
guard themselves and their businesses”. 345  The Industrial Revolution brought “a vast 
migration to urban areas and the need for a regular system of policing became greater 
than ever before.”346  For a time, London experimented with “a number of fragmented 
civic associations,” which tended to disintegrate into bounty hunters.347 The “first regular 
professional police force” in London was created in 1800; when the privately-funded 
force was a success, Parliament authorized a publicly funded police force. 348  But since 
it was small, the primary burden of law enforcement remained with elderly or indifferent 
night watchmen.349
This changed in 1829 when Sir Robert Peel successfully maneuvered the
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Metropolitan Police Act through Parliament.  The act called for the 
creation of a tax-supported police force for the London metropolitan area. 
. . . [T]he Metropolitan Police created by this legislation provided the 
model for modern policing. . . .  First, the officers were independent from 
the courts. . . .  Second, the force was uniformed, and quasi-military in 
organization.  Patrols were assigned to constables, who were supervised 
by sergeants, who in turn reported to inspectors, who were under the 
command of superintendents, who reported to the commissioner.  Third, 
policing was a full-time occupation, and officers were not allowed to 
demand or to accept supplemental private payments for their work.350
In 1856, Parliament required that similar police forces be established in the cities and 
towns outside London, and “the English police system has remained practically 
unchanged since that time.” 351
As American cities rapidly expanded in the nineteenth century, they experienced 
the same problems London had dealt with until it established the Metropolitan Police. 352
In the early part of the nineteenth century, some called for the creation of a public police 
force, but these early advocates of professional policing “were unable to overcome the 
long-standing American aversion to anything resembling a standing army -- an aversion 
dating back to the abuses of Cromwell's constabulary in seventeenth-century England 
and reinforced by the Redcoats' behavior prior to the Revolution.”353  By the mid-1800s, 
unrestrained growth, frequent mob violence . . . and the influx of foreign 
immigrants into urban areas fueled social disorder and contributed to 
rising fear among the country's growing middle class. . . . When fears of 
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social disintegration finally became stronger than distrust of a quasi-
standing army, America's larger and more disorderly cities began 
searching for a successful model. . . . [T]hey seized upon the `modern’ 
police model established by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, which 
created the first police force in the world. . . . 354
In 1845, New York “became the first American city to establish a fully consolidated police 
force, with 800 paid full-time officers.” 355  Other cities followed suit, and in “less than 
fifteen years, New York-style, full-time consolidated police departments . . . had become 
standard in all large American cities.” 356 A similar process occurred in other countries, 
and eventually public police forces modeled on Peel’s Metropolitan Police became the 
general global standard for maintaining internal order.357
The net effect of all this was to eliminate citizen involvement in the process of 
maintaining internal order and assign that task exclusively to professionals employed by 
the state.358  In exchange for receiving free police services,359 citizens effectively 
surrendered responsibility for their own security.  We return to this issue in § IV, infra.
III. Cybercrime and the Current Model
There is currently no effective way to police cyberspace.360
While our experience with cybercrime is still in its infancy, it is already apparent 
that the traditional model of law enforcement is not an effective strategy for dealing with 
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cybercrime.  The primary reason it cannot deal effectively with cybercrime is that online 
crime possesses few, if any, of the essential characteristics of real-world “crime.”  
A. Proximity
Unlike real-world “crime,” cybercrime does not require any degree of physical 
proximity between victim and victimizer at the moment the “crime” is committed.361
Cybercrime is unbounded crime, borderless crime.362  It can be committed against a 
victim who is in another city, another state, another country.363  All a perpetrator needs
is access to a computer that is linked to the Internet; with this, he can inflict “harm” upon 
a victim directly, by attacking her computer, or indirectly by obtaining information that lets 
him assume her identity and use it commit fraud on a grand scale.  As a report issued 
several years ago explained, 
In the physical world .  . . . human travel is spatially based.  By 
contrast, because one can access a computer remotely without knowing 
where, in physical space, that computer is located . . . . cybercriminals are 
no longer hampered by the existence of national . . . boundaries. . . . 
[A] cyberstalker in Brooklyn . . . may send a threatening e-mail to 
a person in Manhattan.  If the stalker routes his communication through 
Argentina, France, and Norway . . . the New York Police Department may 
have to get assistance from the Office of International Affairs at the 
Department of Justice . . . which . . . may have to get assistance from law 
enforcement in . . . Buenos Aires, Paris, and Oslo just to learn that the 
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suspect is in New York. . . . [T]he perpetrator needs no passport and 
passes through no checkpoints as he commits his crime, while law 
enforcement agencies are burdened with cumbersome mechanisms . . 
.that often derail or slow investigations. . . . . And any delay in an 
investigation is critical, as a criminal’s trail often ends as soon as he or 
she disconnects from the Internet.364
B. Scale
 Cybercrime differs from real-world “crime” in another important regard:  It is not 
one-to-one “crime” because it is not corporeal crime; consequently, a one-to-one scale 
of offense commission is not a viable default assumption for cybercrime.365 Much of 
cybercrime is already “automated crime,” and the use of automation will only increase.   
“Automated crime” is using technology to multiply the number of “crimes” someone can
commit in a given period of time;366 automation gives perpetrators the ability to commit 
many cybercrimes very quickly.367  Indeed, with automation, a perpetrator can start the 
process of victimization and then turn his attention to other matters, letting automated 
systems complete it.368
This capacity to automate crime alters traditional assumptions about the scale of 
crime and thereby creates problems for law enforcement.369 Under the traditional model
of law enforcement, officers react to a report of a “crime” by initiating an investigation; 
the investigation is intended to culminate in the identification and apprehension of the 
perpetrator, who will then be prosecuted and presumably sanctioned.370  This ensures 
that the criminal law is enforced and order is maintained.371 The problem with this 
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scenario is that it assumes real-world “crime” and, in so doing, assumes “crimes” will be 
committed on a manageable scale. 372
Cybercrime violates these assumptions in two ways: (a) i t is committed on a 
scale far surpassing that of real-world “crime;” 373 and (b) it represents an entirely new 
class of “crime” that is added to the real-world “crimes” with which law enforcement has 
traditionally dealt and with which it must continue to deal.374 These factors combine to 
create a overload; law enforcement’s ability to react to cybercrime erodes because the 
resources that were adequate to deal with the real-world “crime” are inadequate to deal 
with real-world “crime” plus cybercrime.375
C. Physical Constraints 
Cybercrime differs from real-world “crime” in a third respect: The perpetrators of 
cybercrime are not restricted by the constraints that govern action in the real, physical 
world. 376  Cybercrimes can be committed instantaneously and therefore require a rapid 
response; law enforcement, however, is accustomed to dealing with real-world “crimes,” 
the investigation of which proceeds at a more deliberate pace.377  Another complication 
is that all or substantially all of the conduct involved in the commission of a cybercrime 
occurs in an electronic environment; since a perpetrator is not physically “present” when 
the “crime” is committed, one can no longer assume she will leave trace evidence at the 
crime scene.378  The transborder nature of cybercrime further enhances the difficulties 
officers face when they attempt to react to a cybercrime because traditional assumptions 
about a perpetrator’s being observed preparing for, committing and/or fleeing from an 
offense no longer hold.379
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Cyberspace also lets perpetrators conceal or disguise their identities in a way 
that is not possible in the real-world.380  In the real-world, an offender can wear a mask 
and perhaps take other efforts to conceal his identity, but certain characteristics -- such 
as height, weight, accent, age -- will still be apparent.  In cyberspace, one can achieve 
perfect anonymity or perfect pseudonymity;381 consequently, officers may have no way 
of identifying the person who victimized someone in their jurisdiction.382   As one report 
noted, “[t]he ability for criminals to remain anonymous on the Internet presents a huge 
challenge for police”.383
Even if police can identify a perpetrator, gathering evidence of the cybercrime 
can be difficult for various reasons.  The country that hosts the cybercriminal and his 
activities may not define what he did as illegal and may therefore be unable to prosecute 
him or cooperate in his being extradited for prosecution elsewhere;384 the host nation 
may not have agreements in effect with the victim nation which obligate it to assist in 
gathering evidence that can be used against the perpetrator;385 or the evidence may 
have been destroyed, advertently or because it was routine transactional data that was 
not retained by the Internet Service Provider which the offender used to commit his 
crime.386
D. Patterns 
Perhaps because cybercrime is still such a new phenomenon, we cannot identify 
patterns comparable to those that exist for real-world crime. 387 We cannot, at least so 
far, empirically derive conclusions as to how various types of cybercrime will manifest 
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themselves geographically and demographically.388  Consequently, we cannot develop 
the type of crime maps law enforcement uses to allocate its resources in dealing with 
real-world crime.389
One factor which contributes to our inability to identify patterns in cybercrime is 
that it is not accurately documented; nations are not tracking the incidence of cybercrime 
in the same way they track real-world crime.390  There are several reasons for this lack of 
accurate cybercrime statistics:  One is that countries have not defined what “cybercrime” 
is and how it differs from “crime.”391  Another is that while law enforcement agencies do 
record reported cybercrimes, they tend not to break them out into a separate category; 
online fraud, for example, is recorded as “fraud.”392 Yet another reason for the lack of 
accurate cybercrime data is that it can be difficult to parse cybercrime into discrete 
offenses.  Was the “Love Bug” virus which caused billions of dollars of damage in over 
20 countries one crime or thousands of crimes? 393  Clearly, though, the most important 
reasons why we do not have accurate information about cybercrime are that (a) many 
cybercrimes go undetected and (b) many detected cybercrimes go unreported.394
But maybe the lack of accurate statistics is not the real reason why we cannot 
identify patterns:  perhaps the notion of “cybercrime patterns” is an oxymoron.  After all, 
the existence of patterns in real-world criminality is a function of the physical space in 
which real-world criminals operate:  Economic forces dictate that most real-world “crime” 
is committed by individuals who suffer from varying levels of economic deprivation and  
who are, therefore, apt to reside and function in identifiable, economically-disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. 395  These neighborhoods generate offense and offender patterns 
because perpetrators tend to target victims of opportunity, i.e., vulnerable individuals 
who are within some convenient zone of physical proximity.396
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Cyberspace makes physical space irrelevant:  It becomes as easy to victimize 
someone who is halfway around the world as it is your next-door neighbor.397  Does this 
mean cybercrime will never assume patterns, either as to the location of the offense or 
the types of offenses being committed?   
It is impossible to answer that question at this stage of our experience because 
all we know about this new type of crime is what we have seen so far.  The apparent 
absence of cybercrime patterns may be a function either of the fact that they have not  
had time to develop or that they exist but we cannot identify them because they assume 
forms different from those we are accustomed to seeing in real-world crime.  We cannot 
resolve this issue, but it may be helpful to speculate about whether patterns will evolve 
and, if so, how they might be useful in combating cybercrime.
It is useful to begin by considering the patterns that emerge in real-world crime 
and how law enforcement uses them to maximize its effectiveness.  Real-world patterns 
reflect “crime”-categories and “crime”-locations.398  As to the former, the frequency with 
which real-world “crimes” are committed is in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the 
“crime”; less serious “crimes” are committed with greater frequency than more serious 
“crimes,” such as murder.399 This means, among other things, that property “crimes” are 
committed much more often than crimes of violence and that the same is true of “crimes” 
involving traffic in societally-banned substances such as drugs and child pornography.400
“Crime”-category patterns are derived from compilations of data on reported offenses.401
How does law enforcement use the patterns that appear in the commission of offenses?  
They can be used to develop profiles of offenders;402 they can also be used to determine 
the best means of allocating limited police resources among various units.403  “Crime”-
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location patterns are also used to allocate resources; they let law enforcement agencies 
allocate officers to geographical areas where certain types of “crimes,” at least, are 
committed with the greatest frequency.404  Location patterns are derived both from data 
compilations concerning reported offenses and crime-mapping techniques.405
Since “crime”-category patterns are driven by human behavior more than by 
geography, it seems likely that category patterns will manifest themselves in cybercrime.  
Indeed, there is some evidence they are already emerging.  The current inadequacy of 
statistical data concerning the incidence of cybercrime makes it difficult to extrapolate 
with any precision as to offense patterns, but anecdotal evidence suggests that much of 
the contemporary cybercrime falls into three categories.  One is hacking, which can be 
defined as gaining unauthorized access to a computer system either for the purpose of 
exploration or to cause damage once inside.406  Another is online fraud, which may 
exceed hacking in the frequency with which it is committed.407 The third category 
encompasses child pornography and using the Internet to solicit children for sexual 
activity.408  Interestingly, the apparent frequency of these offenses is at least partially 
consistent with the proposition adduced above concerning the frequency of real-world 
crime; that is, in the real-world we can predict that property “crimes” and trafficking in 
banned substances will be committed more often than, for example, “crimes” that involve 
the infliction of death, serious bodily injury or massive property damage.409
What, if anything, does this mean for the development of offense patterns in the 
commission of cybercrimes?  It could mean that the behaviors which shape the contours 
of real-world offense categories are constants in illicit human activities. That is, crime is 
finite:  Since humans commit “crimes” for specific, identifiable reasons, such as to enrich 
themselves, to take revenge, or to discharge psycho-sexual or other impulses, there is a 
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fixed class of “crimes.” 410  If crime is finite, then we should see the same types of “crime” 
being committed in and via cyberspace -- online “crime” will manifest itself in essentially 
the same ways as real-world “crime.”  This assumes that we have seen mankind’s entire 
repertoire of antisocial activity, an assumption which may very well be invalid.  While it is 
reasonable to assume that our experience over the last several millennia has treated us 
to the gamut of motivations which prompt individuals to engage in antisocial activity, we 
need to remember that the way these motivations have manifested themselves so far 
has been the product of the physical constraints imposed by the real-world.411  We may 
well see traditional motivations generating antisocial activity that takes new and different 
forms in cyberspace,412  which of course would mean that real-world offense patterns will 
not recapitulate themselves in this new environment. 
There is another possible explanation for the apparent recapitulation of real-world 
“crime” trends in cybercrime:  It may be that we are so far only seeing the migration of 
real-world offense categories to cyberspace; that is, those who are currently using the 
Internet to commit “crimes” grew up with and were socialized by a climate in which the 
predominating mode of unlawful activity was real-world “crime,” in its traditional guises.   
It would not be surprising, therefore, if these individuals recapitulated what they had 
observed of real-world criminality in their illicit activities online; they are, in other words, 
committing “crimes” and have not yet begun to imagine “cybercrime.”  Cyberspace, after 
all, not only erases the importance of geography - it also lets us do things we cannot do 
in real-space.  So we may see the emergence of new and as yet unimagined varieties of 
“crime” (which will, of course, have to be defined as such).  It is probably reasonable to 
anticipate that much of “crime” will continue to take the form of attempts at illicit self-
enrichment; it is also probably reasonable to anticipate that the incidence of non-violent 
offenses will continue to exceed that of violent offenses.  But beyond that, it is difficult to 
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speculate; we will, for example, no doubt see the emergence of “collective crime,” i.e., of 
automated mass victimization.  If that occurs, we shall have to decide how to factor that 
into the way we categorize the “crimes” that were committed in a given time period:  Is 
the automated victimization of 5,000 victims by one human assisted by technology the 
commission of one “crime” or 5,000 “crimes”? 413  Law enforcement will have to decide 
how to react to phenomena such as this:  Should the allocation of resources continue to 
reflect the frequency with which certain types of “crime” are committed in an era when 
this process is automated and a few offenders can account for thousands and thousands 
of discrete “crimes”?   Or should the allocation of resources be based on other criteria?  
And what about the possibility of mapping the location of cybercrimes?  Is there 
any purpose in doing so?  One difficulty that arises is determining what is meant by the 
“location” of the “crime.”  As explained earlier, the traditional model of law enforcement 
assumes real-world “crime”; one characteristic of real-world “crime” is that the victim and 
victimizer must be in relatively close physical proximity when the “crime” is committed.414
Geography consequently assumes a great deal of importance in dealing with real-world 
“crime;” focusing an investigation on the physical location of a “crime” offers police their 
best opportunity for identifying and apprehending the offender(s).415  But in cyberspace 
there is no “crime” scene, at least not in the traditional sense; for most cybercrimes, 
evidence is scattered over several locations, including the computer the perpetrator 
used, the victim’s computer and the intervening computers and computer servers the 
perpetrator used to accomplish the offense.  If a woman in the Ukraine uses the Internet 
to defraud a man in Texas, where did the “crime” occur?  If one assumes the victim is 
the locus of a “crime,” then it occurred in Texas; but little evidence of the “crime” will be 
found in Texas and the perpetrator will certainly not be found there.  Does this mean 
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“crime”-location patterns will be irrelevant in dealing with cybercrime?  It is impossible to 
answer that question with any certainty.  
E. Sum
While the apparent difficulty of identifying patterns in cybercrime does not itself 
sound the death knell for the traditional model of law enforcement, it, in conjunction with 
the other difficulties discussed above, clearly establishes that the traditional model is not 
a suitable means of dealing with online criminal activity. We must come up with a better 
approach.  Doing so could involve devising an entirely new model of law enforcement, 
one that is more suited for online crime, or modifying the traditional model so it becomes 
an effective means of addressing cybercrime.  The next section takes up these issues. 
IV. Toward a New Model:  Distributed Security416
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[T]here are impediments in the current legal system to fostering . 
. . computer security.417
This section takes up the question posed at the beginning of the article: why do 
we need a criminal law for cyberspace?  The first part of the discussion explains why the 
traditional model of law enforcement will become an ever-less-effective means of dealing 
with cybercrime; this section also explains how modifications in our criminal law can 
improve our ability to deal with cybercrime.418  The remainder of this section posits some 
specific changes to criminal law doctrines and analyzes the extent to which each could 
enhance our efforts to address cybercrime.419
A. From Hierarchy to Network
[N]onstate actors . . . are able to organize into networks . . . more 
readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors. . . . 
[W]hoever masters the network form stands to gain the 
advantage.420
Our need for a criminal law of cyberspace derives from three premises, the first 
of which was derived above:   It is already apparent that the traditional model of law 
enforcement, with its reactive approach and hierarchical, military-style organization, 
cannot deal effectively with cybercrime. 421  The second premise derives from the 
proliferation of technology:  Technology – in the form of computers, personal digital 
assistants, cell phones, mobile entertainment devices, pagers, Global Positioning 
System gear and other appliances – pervades much of our daily life, at least in more 
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developed countries.422  This tendency will only become more pronounced as our 
environment is transformed by wireless communication technologies, sentient chips, 
wearable computers, smart rooms, digital cities and other techno-components of life in 
the twenty-first century.423  As one student of this phenomenon explains,
major population centers of the planet will be saturated with trillions of 
microchips, some of them tiny computers, many of them capable of 
communicating with each other. . . . [P]eople . . . will have a device with 
them most of the time that will enable them to link objects, places, and 
people to online content and processes. . . . 424
The proliferation of these devices, all linked in various and varying ways, will create and 
sustain a fluid global network operating 24/7 x 365.
This takes us to the third premise:  the proliferation of these technologies will 
have a profound effect upon the organization of human social systems and activities.  As 
noted above, the world will become a single interdependent, interlinked network.425  For 
the last several millennia, the organization of human social systems and activities –
government, commerce, education, religion, military – has been hierarchical:   a top-
down approach to the structuring of social relationships and the allocation of authority.426
This default hierarchical organizational model evolved to deal with the organization of 
activity in the real-world; since human activity in the real-world is subject to the physical 
constraints of empirical reality, it requires the use of techniques such as a chain of 
command to orchestrate and focus the efforts of groups of humans on achieving 
particular tasks, e.g., mining coal, smelting steel, sailing ships, building pyramids, 
waging wars and keeping order within a social system.427
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The proliferation of technology and consequent rise of cyberspace change this.  
Communication technologies free us from the physical constraints of the empirical world; 
we can communicate instantaneously with anyone anywhere, with multiple anyones in 
many anywheres.428  This produces a new type of social organization -- the network.429
The rise of the network is not without precedent; the development of new technology has 
historically resulted in the appearance of new forms of social organization.430  Networks 
are displacing hierarchies in every sector of society because hierarchical organization is 
not an effective means of organizing technologically-mediated activities;431 but 
hierarchical organization will persist in areas of human endeavor that are based in the 
real-world because hierarchies are an effective means of organizing activities in this 
venue.432
Networks, unlike hierarchies, are lateral, fluid systems. 433  Networks, unlike 
hierarchies, decentralize power and authority and thereby empower individuals.434
Networks have the capacity to, and very likely will, usher in a new era of cooperation 
among peoples and among social systems.435  Unfortunately, they can also be exploited 
for destructive purposes:
Most people might hope for the emergence of a new form of organization
to be led by `good guys’. . . .But history does not support this contention.
The cutting edge in the early rise of a new form may be found equally
among malcontents . . . and clever opportunists eager to take advantage 
of new ways to maneuver, exploit, and dominate. Many centuries ago . . .
the rise of hierarchical forms of organization . . .was . . . attended . . . by 
the appearance of ferocious chieftains bent on military conquest and of 
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violent secret societies. . . . [T]he early spread of the market form, only a 
few centuries ago, was accompanied by a spawn of usurers, pirates, 
smugglers, and monopolists, all seeking to elude state controls over their 
earnings and enterprises.
Why should this pattern not be repeated in an age of networks? There
appears to be a subtle, dialectical interplay between the bright and
dark sides in the rise of a new form of organization. The bright-side
actors may be so deeply embedded in and constrained by a society’s
established forms of organization that many have difficulty becoming
the early . . . adopters of a new form. In contrast, nimble bad guys may 
have a freer, easier time acting as the cutting edge. . . .436
As §III explained, this is precisely what is occurring with regard to cybercrime.  
Law enforcement, which is for the most part still “embedded in and constrained by . . . 
established forms of organization”, is lagging behind the “bad guys,” who have learned 
how to exploit the distributed, non-territorially-based, automated realities of cyberspace.  
The question is, how do we bring law enforcement up to speed?  That is, how can law 
enforcement adapt to the new realities of cybercrime?437
The core problem is law enforcement’s reactive approach to “crime.”  As §III 
demonstrated, the traditional reactive mode is not effective for cybercrime because 
cybercrime is elusive:  Offenders are elusive because there is no necessary nexus 
between the situs of a “crime” and the perpetrator’s physical location, either at the time 
the “crime” is committed or afterward.438  Offenders are elusive because they can shield 
their identities and avoid leaving traditional types of physical evidence.439  “Crimes” are 
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elusive because they do not fall into recognizable offense and/or offender patterns.440
Finally, “crimes” are elusive because they can be committed on such a scale that law 
enforcement officers simply cannot react to all of them.441
One solution, therefore, would be to somehow improve law enforcement’s ability 
to react to completed cybercrimes.  Doing this could involve any of several things:  It 
could require significantly expanding the number of  officers who are available to react to 
cybercrime; as noted earlier, one of the reasons cybercrime is so problematic for law 
enforcement is that it constitutes an incremental addition to the quantum of “crime” to 
which law enforcement must react.442  Since cybercrime undermines the effectiveness of 
the reactive strategy by increasing the number of “crimes” to which officers must react, it 
seems that increasing the number of officers should offset this effect and restore the 
efficacy of the reactive strategy.  Unfortunately, the problem is that since cybercrime is 
increasingly automated “crime,” there is no longer a necessary one-to-one correlation 
between offender and offense;443 cybercrime is becoming an “arms race” between 
criminals and law enforcement and cannot, therefore, be combated effectively simply by 
hiring more law enforcement officers.444
If hiring more officers is not the answer, what is?  Another alternative would be to 
combat fire with fire, i.e., to automate policing in cyberspace.  This would involve using 
automated agents to react to completed cybercrimes and to “patrol” public areas of 
cyberspace in an effort to prevent the commission of cybercrime.445 While automated 
cyberpolicing is certainly a logical alternative, its implementation is surrounded with 
difficulties, technical and legal, 446 that make it an unrealistic option for the foreseeable 
future.  
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A third alternative is to authorize civilian use of defensive technologies, i.e., to let 
cybercrime victims use “`strike-back’ or `counterstrike’ tools”.447 The rationale here is that 
victims react when they are the targets of cybercrime and thereby supplement the 
reactive capabilities of law enforcement personnel.448 The premise is that a computer 
system which is “under attack automatically traces back the source and shuts down, or 
partially disables, the attacking machine(s).”449  This alternative raises difficult legal 
questions,450 but ultimately founders on the risks involved in authorizing victim self-help:
Not all attacks will . . . reveal a path back to their source . . . [T]racing an 
attack to an intermediate attacking machine, not to speak of the computer
owned by the originator in a DDoS attack, may be impossible. . . . And 
intermediate machines . . . may be operated by hospitals, governmental 
units, and telecommunications entities . . . that provide connectivity to
millions of people: counterstrikes which are not very, very precisely 
targeted . . . could easily create a remedy worse than the disease.  Where 
the offense is spam . . . the trace will generally lead to an anonymous
account on a server -- a server which is legitimately used for other 
communications as well. Disabling that server is overkill.451
Since these three alternatives exhaust the available options for improving 
reactions to completed cybercrime, it seems this is not a viable way to improve law 
enforcement’s ability to deal with cybercrime.  The solution must lie elsewhere.  The 
conceptual alternative to the reactive model is a model based on crime prevention.   
While the reactive approach incorporates notions of crime prevention insofar as it is 
predicated on incapacitating and deterring offenders,452 the alternative model is based  
on strategies that are designed to inhibit the commission of  “crimes.”453  Known as  
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“community policing,” this real-world model emphasizes “putting officers back on the 
streets”, where they become “part of the fabric of the neighborhood, as a constant, 
known, dependable presence, instead of racing around the city in patrol cars, reacting to 
crimes that have already happened.” 454  It also emphasizes cooperation between police 
and citizens in creating a climate where “crime” is not tolerated.455  Community policing 
has had notable successes in the real-world, but it can be difficult to implement, as it is 
labor-intensive, requires organizational restructuring and can raise ethical issues about 
the allocation of scarce resources.456
Community policing has not been implemented in the cyber-world for at least two  
reasons.  One is that doing so would require assigning police officers to “patrol” areas of 
cyberspace, and that would require hiring new officers and/or assigning officers who are 
currently dealing with real-world “crime” to cyberspace.  In an era of scarce resources, 
neither is a viable option.457  The other reason is that there really are no “communities” in 
cyberspace, at least not the kind of communities law enforcement officers can deal with; 
“communities” in cyberspace tend to be defined by interests, not by territory.458  They 
therefore attract people from various locations around the world and consequently defy 
the territorially-based assumptions that are an essential part of “community policing,” at 
least as it has evolved in the real-world.459
While community policing cannot be extrapolated to cyberspace, two aspects of 
the community policing model suggest an approach that can be used to address online 
“crime.”  The traditional, reactive model of law enforcement cannot deal effectively with 
cybercrime because cybercrime is a fluid, lateral phenomenon; it is, in effect, distributed 
“crime.”460  Since cybercrime is a lateral, pervasive phenomenon, it demands a lateral, 
pervasive solution.  This solution can incorporate a reactive element but, as explained 
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above, a purely reactive approach is inadequate. 461  The solution therefore needs to be 
proactive; it must focus on preventing cybercrime, not merely reacting to it.  The solution 
also needs to employ a collaborative approach, one that combines the efforts of civilians 
and law enforcement; combining the efforts of civilians and law enforcement addresses 
the problem noted earlier, i.e., that it is neither financially nor pragmatically possible to 
deploy enough law enforcement officers to maintain order in cyberspace.462  Clearly, 
therefore, the way to address cybercrime is to utilize the community policing model’s 
concepts of a proactive, collaborative approach to “crime.”463
Doing that would seem to require creating a new model of law enforcement, one 
specifically directed at cybercrime.  Actually, it requires disassembling assumptions and 
expectations predicated on the traditional model and replacing them with a different set 
of assumptions and expectations.  As noted earlier, under the traditional model citizens 
have no responsibility for reacting to “crime”;464 consequently, they have come to think of 
law enforcement as the exclusive responsibility of the police.465  The community policing 
model seeks to reverse this process, at least in part, and involve citizens in combating 
“crime” in their real-world neighborhoods.466  Community policing does this by putting 
officers in neighborhoods where they work to prevent “crime” by patrolling the area to 
discourage criminal activity and by encouraging citizens not to tolerate such activity.467
Citizens are involved, but they still are not responsible for reacting to crime.
This particular model cannot be used to deal with cybercrime because, as was 
explained earlier, police cannot patrol “neighborhoods” in cyberspace.468  This model 
relies on an active police presence, reinforced by neighborhood support, to control 
“crime” and maintain order.  A different model, however, a variation on the community 
policing model, could be used to control cybercrime.  This modified model does not rely 
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primarily on an active police presence and only secondarily on citizen efforts; instead, it 
relies primarily on active citizen efforts and secondarily on police support of those efforts.  
It is not a community policing model; it is a distributed policing model in which citizens 
assume responsibility for discouraging the commission of cybercrime.   It represents the 
disassembling of the traditional model of law enforcement insofar as citizens assume 
responsibilities with regard to a particular type of “crime;”469 it does not represent the re-
establishment of the antecedent model because while citizens may have some role in 
reacting to completed cybercrimes, their primary responsibility is to prevent the 
commission of cybercrimes.470  Citizen prevention serves at once to maintain internal 
order and to ward off external threats, since cyber-attacks, unlike conventional real-world 
“crimes,” can constitute acts of war or terrorism, as well as criminal activity.471
Postulating this model raises two questions:  Why should citizens assume 
responsibility for preventing cybercrimes when they have no such responsibility as to 
real-world “crimes”?  And, assuming citizens should assume such responsibility, how is 
this to be achieved?  That is, how are assumptions fostered by the traditional model of 
law enforcement to be displaced and new expectations to be inculcated?  The sections 
below address these questions.
1. Why impose responsibility for prevention?
We in no way make citizens472 responsible for preventing real-world “crimes.”  
We take a laissez-faire attitude toward crime prevention in the real-world.473  I can go to 
work leaving my front door unlocked and a rear window open secure in the knowledge 
that if a burglar takes advantage of the situation to steal my television, my laptop and my 
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stereo I can call the police, who will make an effort to find the burglar and recover my 
property.  It is, of course, possible that the officers involved may not exert themselves to 
the fullest in doing so; they may make the burglary of my home a lesser priority than 
other “crimes,” perhaps out of a sense of frustration at my irresponsibility. I, however, will 
never know that this is the case and, indeed, it may not be; the officers may well expend 
their best efforts to recovery my property and apprehend the perpetrator.  The point is 
that my irresponsibility is legally irrelevant; criminal law does not require a blameless 
victim.474  The doctrinal reason why the criminal law disregards my carelessness is that a 
“crime” is an offense against the authority of the state and therefore must be addressed 
by the state, without regard to the circumstances which contributed to its commission.475
This proposition from the systemic need to maintain internal order and the empirical 
reality that deviant behavior constitutes a serious threat to such order. 476  The criminal 
law’s disinclination to take victim blameworthiness into account is probably also 
attributable to another factor, namely, that dealing with “crimes” such as these is no 
doubt easier than trying to enforce laws requiring people to maintain security.477
Why should citizen obligations be different with regard to cybercrime?  The 
primary reason is that if I leave my front door unlocked and a rear window open and a 
burglar takes advantage of my carelessness, the only one harmed is me, the architect 
of my own victimization.478  This is not necessarily true for cybercrime:  Assume that 
instead of leaving my front door unlocked and a rear window open, I access the Internet 
using an always-on broadband connection without using any security to prevent my 
laptop’s being hijacked by a hacker.479  I have opened my laptop up to attack, which 
creates a situation analogous to the burglary discussed above:  I have carelessly 
exposed myself to “harm” from a criminal.  But I have also created the potential for 
“harm” to others; my carelessness has created a situation in which a hacker can take 
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over my laptop and use it to victimize other individuals and entities.480 This latter 
scenario results in the infliction of incremental “harms” that exceed those which I would 
suffer from any personal attack:  A cybercriminal can use my laptop, along with other 
hijacked laptops, to launch a denial of service attack on an online business or a 
government website, shutting them down; to do this, the perpetrator requires access to 
a critical mass of zombie computers, which I have helped to supply.481  The effects of 
my carelessness will be particularly egregious if terrorists or organized criminals use my 
laptop to attack my country’s infrastructure; it is at this point that victim defaults threaten 
to jeopardize a system’s ability to sustain both internal and external order.482
The first, most compelling answer, to the question posed above, therefore, is that 
responsibility for preventing cybercrimes should be imposed upon citizens because their 
failure to secure their systems can result in the infliction of “harm” upon other members 
of the social system to which they belong, and could even threaten the security of the 
entire system.  Another answer is that law enforcement is less effective in maintaining 
order in cyberspace than it is in real-space:  In the real-world example, police may well 
apprehend the burglar who stole my property because he was seen by my neighbors, 
because he left trace evidence in my house and/or because he came to their attention 
when he tried to dispose of the property he took from me.483  In the online example, the 
cyberperpetrator stands an excellent chance of avoiding apprehension, since he is able 
to act remotely and anonymously, and since he has no need to risk identification and 
apprehension if he elects to dispose of electronic property he acquired in the course of 
his online depredations.484  Therefore, since (a) citizen lapses in security can endanger 
others and (b) law enforcement cannot, alone, maintain order in cyberspace, citizens 
should assume a measure of responsibility for maintaining order, just as they have done 
in the past.485
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2. How is responsibility to be imposed?
If responsibility for preventing cybercrime is to be imposed, it becomes necessary 
to decide how that should be done.  In deciding how this should be done, it is necessary 
to consider two dichotomies.  The first deals with how a social system goes about 
achieving particular conduct on the part of its constituents:  Conduct can be voluntary or 
obligatory.  In this context, voluntary conduct is conduct which the members of a social 
system engage in because they believe that it is “right” or “appropriate.”  Their belief that 
particular conduct is “right” or “appropriate” (and, conversely, that other conduct is 
“wrong” or “inappropriate”) is based on norms which the members of the social system  
have internalized; this type of  conduct is “voluntary” because it is the product of internal 
social control mechanisms.486  Obligatory conduct, on the other hand, is the product of 
external social control mechanisms.  Obligatory conduct is conduct which the members 
of a social system engage in or avoid engaging in because they understand that their 
failure to conform their behavior to what is externally required can result in their being 
sanctioned by that system to some greater or lesser degree.487  Obligatory conduct is 
voluntary in the sense that a member of a social system decides whether or not he or 
she will engage in the prescribed conduct; it is not “voluntary” in the sense used above 
because the decision to behave in particular ways is prompted by the awareness of 
externally-imposed consequences for one’s failure to do so.488
a) Voluntary 
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A voluntary approach to achieving citizen responsibility for preventing cybercrime 
would require establishing a norm to that effect; once the members of a social system 
had internalized this norm, they would regard preventing cybercrime as the “right” or 
“appropriate” thing to do and would therefore endeavor to achieve this.  How could such 
a norm be established?  The process would involve educating the populace of a social 
system as to the need for preventative efforts; it could also educate them in the use of 
tools that can reduce or eliminate the risk of cybercrime.489  It might appeal to their sense 
of system loyalty by emphasizing the impact cybercrime can have upon the system’s 
economy and the potential for external threats to system infrastructures.490  An approach 
such as this would be the most effective way to achieve citizen prevention of cybercrime;  
the most effective means of channeling behavior into desired paths is not the “imposition 
of external sanction, but the inculcation of internal obedience.”491 The problem is that it 
can take a long time to establish a norm and inculcate an optimum level of obedience.492
This is likely to be especially true for cybercrime prevention because the conduct to be 
encouraged involves cyberspace, which is an alien environment for many members of 
contemporary social systems.  They may believe, particularly if they live in certain urban 
neighborhoods, that it is advisable to install alarm systems and “burglar bars” to ensure 
their safety from real-world threats,493 but they are unlikely to appreciate the very “real” 
dangers that lurk in the virtual world of cyberspace.494 The difficulty of establishing this 
norm is further exacerbated by the fact that it would, at least in part, have to displace a 
deeply embedded norm, namely, that addressing actual or potential criminal activity is 
the exclusive province of law enforcement.495   For these reasons, and others, a purely 
voluntary approach is unlikely to be effective.496
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b) Obligatory
This leaves the obligatory approach.  An obligatory approach requires citizens to 
conduct themselves in certain ways or face sanctions;497 the conduct required can take 
the form either of acting or not-acting.498  An obligatory approach relies upon the law to 
establish the obligation to act or not to act,499 which brings us to our second dichotomy. 
Such laws are of two types:  “do” laws and “do not” laws.500  “Do” laws impose an 
obligation to act and sanctions for a failure to discharge that obligation;501 “do not” laws 
impose an obligation not to act and sanctions for committing the proscribed act.502  The 
laws used to implement an obligatory approach can be civil or criminal in nature;503 this 
discussion will assume that the laws which are used to impose an obligation to prevent 
cybercrimes impose criminal liability for failing to discharge that obligation.504  It makes 
that assumption because criminal liability is generally more effective than civil liability in 
encouraging citizens to conform their conduct to a prescribed standard.505  Use of that 
assumption is also predicated on adapting certain principles of criminal liability for this 
specific purpose.506
Before we can consider how principles of liability can be used for this purpose, 
we must resolve the second dichotomy.  That is, we must decide whether the obligatory 
approach to achieving citizen participation in preventing cybercrime should be based on 
a strategy utilizing “do” laws or on one utilizing “do not” laws.  
A strategy utilizing “do” laws would impose an obligation upon citizens to prevent 
cybercrime by taking measures to secure their computer systems and otherwise avoid 
online victimization.507  A failure to discharge that obligation with the requisite degree of 
Brenner – Distributed Security
80
effectiveness would result in the imposition of a sanction, presumably a relatively minor 
one.508  Seat-belt laws provide a useful point of comparison:  By 2002, forty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia had enacted such laws.509  They require the occupants of a 
motor vehicle to use seat-belts when the vehicle is in operation and impose sanctions, 
usually a fine, for failure to comply.510  Seat-belt laws impose a type of criminal liability, 
since the sanction is a fine levied by the state,511 and they have proven effective in 
increasing seat-belt use among American motorists.512  One might conclude from this 
that a similar approach would prove effective in increasing American citizens’ efforts to 
prevent cybercrime.
There are, however, important differences between the two types of security 
measures; these differences mean that the approach which encouraged seat-belt use is 
unlikely to encourage cybercrime prevention. For one thing, federal law required that all 
vehicles manufactured after 1968 have seat belts, so when states began to require the 
use of seat belts, they were installed and readily available.513 The duty imposed by the 
seat-belt laws was consequently not an onerous one:  to use a device that had already 
been provided and that required no technical skill to implement.  The duty imposed by 
the hypothesized cybercrime prevention laws is far more complex:  Among other things, 
citizens would have to (a) identify and obtain the tools needed to protect their computers 
from cyber-attacks; (b) educate themselves about these tools so they could install them, 
utilize them and keep them updated; and (c) use these tools in an effective manner.514
Since computer software and hardware is constantly being modified, tasks (a) and (b) 
would be ongoing obligations.  One differentiating factor, therefore, is the relative 
complexity of the duty being imposed.  
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Another differentiating factor is the likelihood that law violators will be identified 
and sanctioned.  Both the seat-belt laws and the hypothesized cybercrime prevention 
laws establish a duty and impose sanctions in an effort to deter what society regards as 
“dangerous” behavior.  The behavior to be deterred is, respectively, (a) not wearing seat-
belts and thereby exposing oneself to a risk of injury and (b) not utilizing cybercrime 
preventative measures and thereby exposing oneself, others and the social system to 
cyber-attackers.  The effectiveness of sanctions in deterring behavior is a function of the 
risk (perceived risk) of being apprehended and sanctioned; the deterrent effect increases 
as the risk (perceived risk) of being apprehended increases.515  Seat-belt laws apply to 
conduct that occurs in public; consequently, it is not particularly difficult for police officers 
to tell if someone is wearing a seat-belt.  Indeed, this is something they can observe in 
the course of carrying out their routine duties.  This means the risk (perceived risk) of 
being apprehended is high and that, coupled with the ease with which one can conform 
one’s conduct to the requirements of the law, makes seat-belt laws an effective means 
of deterring the conduct noted above.  That would not be true of  cybercrime prevention 
laws.  They would for the most part address conduct occurring in very private places --
one’s home or office.516  This means that absent some method of remote monitoring 
(which could raise Fourth Amendment issues),517 it would be difficult for those charged 
with enforcing such laws to determine compliance.  To do so, they would presumably 
have to conduct location by location checks, which would be extremely labor-intensive 
and intrusive.  The consequent low risk (perceived risk) that violators would be identified 
and apprehended, coupled with the difficulty of complying, means these hypothesized 
cybercrime prevention laws would not be an effective means of securing citizen 
collaboration in enhancing cybersecurity.518
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This leaves the final strategy:  the use of “do not” laws.  “Do not” laws impose an 
obligation not to act and sanctions for committing the proscribed act.519 They may seem 
a peculiar candidate for enlisting citizens in the fight against cybercrime, as they typically 
proscribe committing a “crime.”  Homicide laws (“do not take another person’s life”) and 
theft laws (“do not take another person’s property) are examples of “do not” laws.520  It 
seems, therefore, that laws of this type would be quite inapplicable to the undertaking at 
hand:  We are not, after all, talking about sanctioning citizens for committing cybercrime; 
we are talking about sanctioning citizens for not preventing cybercrime.  
Actually, “do not” laws fit quite nicely into the calculus we are endeavoring to 
construct.  One problem with using “do” laws to achieve this is that such an approach is 
fundamentally inconsistent with how we approach criminal liability.  We do not, as was 
explained earlier, require citizens to prevent “crimes” in the real-world; this means that 
an effort to impose a duty to prevent “crimes” in the cyberworld conflicts with norms and 
expectations that are firmly embedded in our culture, as least as to real-world “crime.”521
Under the approach outlined earlier, we would impose a duty on citizens to take steps to 
prevent their being victimized by cybercriminals and impose sanctions if they failed to do 
so. This is inconsistent with the way we have traditionally approached criminal liability in 
two ways:  (a) we would impose an unprecedented obligation to prevent “crime;” and (b) 
we would impose criminal liability for a failure to discharge that obligation even though 
no “crime” has been committed. We would, in effect, be imposing liability for a failure to 
prevent something that never happened.  It is true that we impose criminal liability for 
“crimes” that are not committed, but we require that there have been some steps taken 
to accomplish a “crime” for such liability to be imposed.522
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The fact that the use of “do” laws to achieve citizen participation in the battle 
against cybercrime would violate traditional practice is important not because it goes 
against the way things have been done in the past.  There is sometimes a lot to be said 
for changing how we approach things.  The inconsistency with current and past practice 
is important because we are trying to use legal principles to establish a new pattern of 
behavior; if legal rules are inconsistent with traditional expectations and understandings, 
they are likely to meet with resistance.523  The hypothesized “do” laws would probably be 
regarded as Draconian, intrusive and, given the public’s current lack of awareness of the 
nature and extent of cybercrime threats, unnecessary.524  If we are to succeed in using 
legal rules to un-do expectations about law enforcement’s responsibility for dealing with 
“crime” and inculcate a sense of personal responsibility for preventing cybercrime, we 
need to use an approach that does less violence to societal expectations.  As the next 
section explains, “do not” laws or, more properly, modified versions of traditional “do not” 
laws, can form the basis of such an approach.525
B. Distributed Security526
[A] centralized system is not going to work. We have got to think 
about distributed security.527
As the previous section explained, criminal rules that take the form of “do not” 
laws can be used to inculcate a social climate in which citizens assume responsibility for 
preventing cybercrime without violating implicit social expectations as to the proper use 
and scope of criminal liability.528  The sections below demonstrate how laws of this type 
can be used for that purpose; they examine two complementary possibilities.  
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The first is a specialized expansion of accomplice liability; it allows the imposition 
of criminal liability for conduct that promotes, facilitates or otherwise contributes to the 
successful commission of a cybercrime or an attempt to commit a cybercrime.  This is 
essentially a “do not” law targeting affirmative conduct; it proscribes not the failure to 
prevent cybercrime but the act of contributing to the commission of a cybercrime.  The 
distinction is important for two reasons:  (1) it means criminal liability cannot be imposed 
unless and until a cybercrime has been committed; and (2) it means liability is imposed 
not for the act of becoming a victim (only) but for the consequential effect of contributing 
to another’s victimization.529  This alternative avoids the “overkill” problem discussed in 
the previous section: assessing criminal liability when no “crime” has been committed, 
solicited or attempted.530  It is also consistent with traditional practice and preserves the 
appearance of justice in predicating the imposition of liability upon the act of furthering a 
crime against someone else; imposing criminal liability for the act of becoming a victim is 
unlikely to be regarded as “fair” or “just.”
The second alternative imports an attenuated version of the assumption of risk 
principle applied in tort law into criminal law.  The purpose here is to negate citizens’ 
expectations that their victimization by cybercriminals will produce an effective reaction 
on the part of law enforcement officers.  The attenuated assumption of risk principle is a 
way of emphasizing the need to protect oneself from the risks attendant upon venturing 
into cyberspace.  This alternative does not impose criminal liability upon victims and it 
does not prevent the imposition of such liability upon their victimizers; it merely nullifies  
the contemporary commonsense default assumption of official reaction and redress.  It 
operates as a correlate to the complicity principle:  If Jane Doe ventures into cyberspace 
without taking necessary precautions and becomes a victim (only), she has no right to 
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expect “justice” in the form of sanctions imposed upon her victimizer; if she ventures into 
cyberspace without taking necessary precautions, becomes a victim and, as a result of 
the carelessness that resulted in her victimization, contributes to another’s victimization, 
then Jane Doe can be held criminally liable for facilitating the consequent cybercrime.  
1. Complicity
As § IV(A)(1) explained, the goal of the alternatives discussed in this section and 
subsequent sections is to realign responsibility for preventing cybercrime:  shifting it from 
the police (who prevent by reacting-apprehending-deterring offenders) to citizen users of 
technology.  The goal is to allow the imposition of criminal liability for failing to prevent 
personal victimization that contributes to the commission of cybercrime against others.531
Complicity doctrines are an obvious choice for such an undertaking because they 
impute liability for another’s criminal act to a non-actor (an accomplice) who facilitated 
the criminal act.532  An accomplice who facilitates the commission of a “crime” can be 
held criminally liable for that “crime,” just as if he actually committed it.533  Complicitous 
liability is usually based on an accomplice’s performing an affirmative act, such as giving 
a weapon to a would-be robber, but it can be based on a failure to act.  Under the Model 
Penal Code, one is an accomplice if “having a legal duty to prevent the commission of 
the offense, [she] fails to make proper effort so to do.” 534 This doctrine of complicity-by-
omission has been used, for example, to hold parents liable for failing to prevent harm to 
their children.535  For the doctrine to apply, the putative accomplice must have had a 
legal duty to prevent the commission of the “crime;” a moral duty is not enough.536  Most 
criminal codes require that an accomplice have acted “with the purpose of . . . facilitating 
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the commission of the” target crime.” 537  There is some authority for the proposition that 
accomplice liability can be imposed on those who knowingly facilitate the commission of 
a “crime;”538 and general agreement that it cannot be predicated on reckless or negligent 
conduct under U.S. law.539  Other codes are more lenient:  The statute governing the 
proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia imposes 
complicity-by-omission liability upon commanders who recklessly or negligently failed to 
prevent their subordinates from committing war crimes.540  This result is, as one author 
noted, “troubling to national [legal] systems because they all subscribe to the general 
principle that people should be held accountable according to their own actions and their 
own mode of culpability.”541
The insistence on “intention” (i.e., purpose and, perhaps, knowledge) found in the 
Model Penal Code and in domestic criminal codes is the product of two considerations:   
One is a concern that “otherwise everyday lawful activities would be made perilous”;542 if 
simple negligence sufficed for act-of-commission complicity, selling lawful products could 
result in the imposition of criminal liability if the products were used to commit “crimes.”  
The other consideration is “the belief that people's freedom to act within the law should 
not be restrained by considerations of wrongs others might commit”; 543 in other words, I 
should not be held liable for the intervening volitional act of one over whom I exercise no 
command or control.  This is what differentiates the “command complicity” found in the 
statute governing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from the 
codes that govern average citizens; civilians, unlike military commanders, generally do 
not have the authority to control the actions of others.544
At first glance, it might seem that complicity-by-omission liability for one’s failure 
to prevent consequent victimization545 is quite an unacceptable prospect because it 
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violates certain basic tenets of accomplice liability:  It imposes omission liability in the 
absence of a legal duty to act; and it contravenes the two considerations noted above.  
Actually, with some modifications complicity-by-omission liability can be used for this 
purpose.
The first and most problematic hurdle is the conduct upon which liability is to be 
predicated.  If we use the Model Penal Code’s formulation of complicity, an omission 
cannot support the imposition of complicitous liability unless a duty to act is imposed by 
law;546 one solution to the difficulty noted above is, therefore, to establish a legal duty to 
prevent oneself from becoming the victim of a cybercriminal.547  In establishing such a 
duty, we must resolve two issues:  (1) the scope of the duty; and (2) the extent of the 
obligation one bears in discharging it.  As to the first issue, it is sufficient and reasonable 
to limit the duty to preventing one’s personal victimization; allowing myself to be attacked 
is, after all, how I contribute to the victimization of others.548 This limited duty is sufficient 
because if I protect my computer from attack, I thereby prevent its being used to attack 
others; conversely, if I do not protect my computer from attack, I have created at least 
the possibility that it can be used to attack others.  Making this limited duty the predicate 
for complicitous liability is reasonable because by failing to secure my computer I have 
created the conditions a cybercriminal can exploit to victimize others;549 if a cybercriminal 
takes advantage of the opportunity I have supplied, it is reasonable to hold me liable, at 
least to some extent, for the resulting cybercrimes.550  As to the second issue, the duty 
would have to specify the extent of the obligation one bears to avoid being victimized; it 
could impose strict liability, which would make one categorically liable for consequent 
victimization, but the more reasonable approach is to incorporate a negligence standard.  
Strict liability would undermine the incentive to take precautions, since one would be 
held liable for consequent victimization regardless of the efforts he took to avoid being 
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personally victimized.551  Under a negligence standard, liability would be imposed for a 
failure to take all precautions a reasonable person should have known were necessary 
to protect the system(s) at issue;552 the determination as to whether particular measures 
were necessary would have to include a temporal element, that is, it would have to focus 
on contemporaneously available security measures.553
The imposition of such a duty is, in a sense, implementing a “do” rule under the 
scheme outlined earlier;554it imposes an affirmative obligation to institute and maintain 
security measures that are designed to fend off attacks by cybercriminals.555  This duty 
differs from the implementation of a “do” rule, however, in that criminal liability is not 
imposed for the mere failure to discharge the duty:556  If someone becomes the victim of 
a cybercrime, she will not be held liable as an accomplice to her own victimization;557 the 
sanction for her default in carrying out the duty to prevent cybercrime is that she will be 
deemed to have assumed the risk of her own victimization.558  Criminal liability -- in the 
form of complicity -- is imposed only if she fails to discharge her duty to prevent herself 
from becoming the victim of a cybercrime and thereby contributes to the victimization of 
another or others.  This result is consistent with traditional principles of criminal liability 
because she is being sanctioned for playing a causal role in the commission of a “crime” 
against someone else.559
That brings us to the second hurdle: the considerations which have heretofore 
dictated that accomplice liability must be based on “intentional” (purposeful or knowing) 
conduct.560  We begin with the second consideration, as it is the more challenging of the 
two.  The second consideration dictates that we require purpose or at least knowledge 
for the imposition of accomplice liability because doing otherwise runs the risk of holding 
citizens liable for the intervening volitional act of one over whom they exercise neither 
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command nor control.561  This may seem a fatal objection to the type of complicitous 
liability postulated here:  The scenario encompassed by this type of liability involves a 
cybercriminal (X) who victimizes A and then uses his victimization of A to consummate 
his victimization of B (and C and D and so on).562  It seems inconceivable that we should 
hold A liable for this anonymous cyber-miscreant’s successful attacks on B (and C and D 
. . . ).563  If we assume the most difficult scenario,564 in which A does not know X, has no 
control over X’s actions and was merely negligent in not preventing X’s gaining access 
to his computer, it seems we are holding A liable for nothing more than failing to prevent 
a stranger of whose identity and activities he is ignorant and over whom he exercises no 
control from attacking other strangers.  This may, at first glance, seem as unreasonable 
as holding a liquor store clerk liable as an accomplice if a customer to whom she sold a 
bottle of whiskey uses it to (a) incapacitate a young woman whom he rapes or (b)  enter 
a state of gross intoxication in which he batters his wife to death.565
But there are important differences between the two:  In the second scenario, the 
clerk is being held liable for the purely volitional and consequently quite unforeseeable 
“bad acts” of another human being, one whose predilections are entirely unknown to her.  
The clerk has no capacity to control what the purchaser does after he leaves the store.
In the first scenario, A is being held liable not for failing to control X (which is impossible 
given that A does not know X and has no authority to control X’s actions) but for failing to 
prevent equipment and processes that are within A’s control from being attacked and 
compromised to the detriment of others.566 We cannot hold A liable for what X does on 
the theory that A should have prevented X from attacking others; but we can hold A 
liable for giving X access to the tools he needs to victimize others by defaulting on his 
obligation to prevent his computer system from being compromised.567 The latter theory 
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is consistent with traditional accomplice liability in that A is held liable for contributing to 
the success of the criminal venture.
Some may still find this outcome unpalatable, since it would result in A’s being 
held liable for the cybercrimes X committed against B (and C and D . . . ).568 This is an 
undeniably harsh result, which is no doubt why criminal law has historically insisted upon 
purposive (or at least knowing) conduct as the basis for imposing accomplice liability.  
The harshness of this result can be alleviated by implementing yet another modification:  
Instead of holding A liable as an accomplice to X’s cybercrimes, A can be held liable as
a criminal facilitator of those crimes.  New York and several other states have a separate 
“criminal facilitation” offense; under these statutes, one who provides another with the 
means and/or opportunity to commit a “crime” can be held liable as a facilitator of that 
“crime.” 569 The difference between criminal facilitation and accomplice liability is that the 
facilitator is not held liable for the “crimes” she promoted; she is instead held liable for 
criminal facilitation, which can be a relatively minor offense.570 New York, for example, 
divides criminal facilitation into four degrees:  criminal facilitation in the first degree (a 
class B felony);571 criminal facilitation in the second degree (a class C felony); 572
criminal facilitation in the third degree (a class E felony);573 and criminal facilitation in the 
fourth degree (a class A misdemeanor).574  Criminal facilitation liability, or an analogue 
thereof, could be used to impose criminal liability upon those who default on their duty to 
avoid becoming a cybercriminal’s victim and thereby facilitate consequent victimization 
without the harsh results entailed by employing accomplice liability for this purpose.  The 
sanctions for this kind of criminal facilitation of cybercrime575 should probably be a fine or 
perhaps a fine coupled with another minor sanction, such as a restriction of access to 
computers or the requirement that an offender take a course in cyber-security.576  True 
accomplice liability could be reserved for those who purposefully or knowingly contribute 
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to the commission of cybercrimes against other, and would permit the imposition of more 
severe sanctions, such as incarceration.577
2. Assumption of Risk578
Criminal law does not require a blameless victim,579 but should things be different 
in cyberspace?  Should “assumption of risk” be incorporate into the criminal law that 
governs cyberspace?   Why would we consider doing such a thing?  How would such an 
option fit into the present discussion?  Assumption of risk, after all, is a doctrine that bars 
victims from obtaining redress – it negates liability, it does not impose it.
“Assumption of risk” could not be incorporated into criminal law as it is applied in 
tort law.  In tort, if one is found to have assumed the risk of harm that caused her injury, 
she is barred from obtaining redress for the injury.580 If we were to import this notion 
whole into the criminal law, the consequence would be that those who assumed the risk 
of their victimization would be denied justice.  The effect would be to give cybercriminals 
a “Get out of jail free card” for victims who did not or could not protect themselves.  This 
result is unacceptable:  One of the purposes of the criminal law is to maintain order by 
protecting members of society, including the young, the disadvantaged and the elderly.  
But what about incorporating the concept, not the tort rule?  That is, what about 
incorporating an assumption of risk principle that does not absolve the perpetrator of 
liability for his or her crimes but can be used to underscore the fact that there may well 
be no official redress for “harms” inflicted in cyberspace?
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There is no guarantee of redress for real-world “crime”.  Prosecutors have always 
declined to prosecute offenses that are brought to their attention.581  Real-world “crimes”
and cybercrimes differ, however, as to the factors that result in a lack of prosecution.  
Declination decisions for real-world “crimes” are based on specific factors, such as a
prosecutor’s doubt that an accused is guilty, an accused’s cooperation in apprehending
others, the extent of the harm caused by the offense and the likelihood of prosecution in 
another jurisdiction.  In these instances, prosecution is declined because a prosecutor 
has determined it would be unjust or unnecessary; the declination decision represents a 
considered decision not to prosecute when prosecution is a viable option.  Prosecution 
is, however, often not an option for cybercrimes because of the difficulties involved in  
apprehending cybercriminals.582  This is the critical difference:  Declination decisions are 
a sign that the justice system is functioning effectively as to real-world “crime”; having 
the ability to prosecute, it chooses not to.  The justice system’s inability to prosecute 
cybercrime, on the other hand, is an indicator that it is not functioning effectively in this 
area.  Since this state of affairs will continue, if not worsen, we need to ensure citizens 
realize that when they venture into cyberspace they enter an insecure environment in 
which the implicit guarantees of redress applicable to the real-world no longer apply; 
they must therefore become the guarantors of their own safety online.  
An attenuated assumption of risk principle could be used to accomplish this.
Such a principle would include two components:  (1) a proposition negating the current 
default expectation of an effective law enforcement reaction to victimization; and (2) a 
declaration that the negation of such a generalized expectation does not prevent the 
investigation and prosecution of  cybercriminals.  It might look something like this:
Brenner – Distributed Security
93
(1) One who [understanding the risk of harm to self or property] accesses or 
employs cyberspace to engage in commercial or other activity without having 
taken all reasonable, available measures to protect herself and her property from 
being victimized by online criminal actors during the course of and with regard to 
any matters related to such activity shall be deemed to have assumed the risk of 
that victimization.  Such a victim should report the offense(s) to the appropriate 
law enforcement agency.  The filing of such a report in no way obligates the 
agency to investigate or otherwise pursue the matter; domestic law enforcement 
agencies have full discretion to determine what, if any, action will be taken as the 
result of their receiving such a report.  Law enforcement agencies are under no 
obligation to take action with regard to offenses targeting those who assumed the 
risk of becoming a victim online, though they may do so.  
(2) The fact that a person or entity assumed the risk of being victimized pursuant to 
paragraph (1), above, creates no enforceable rights in the party or parties who 
are in any way responsible for that victimization.  The principles set forth in 
paragraph (1), above, cannot be used as an affirmative defense in a prosecution 
for offenses committed against one who assumed the risk of being so victimized
and they in no way restrain law enforcement’s ability to initiate the investigation 
and prosecution of those responsible for such offenses.
The bracketed language in the first paragraph creates the option of structuring 
the principle so that one must understand the risk he/she assumes; this is a traditional 
component of the tort law principle.583  If the criminal law principle is to achieve the 
desired result, however, it must impose strict liability. The assumption of risk must arise 
from the act of venturing into cyberspace without having taken adequate precautions; 
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knowledge of the risk being assumed should not be required because the purpose is to 
encourage citizens to learn about risks and take steps to avoid them.  Incorporating 
knowledge of the risk nullifies the efficacy of the principle without increasing the fairness 
of the result.  The tort principle incorporates knowledge of the risk assumed because the 
consequence of assuming a civilly-defined risk is that the victim loses the right to seek 
redress for resulting injuries; requiring notice is therefore a matter of simple fairness.584
In the criminal context, the victim loses, at most, the expectation of a law enforcement 
response to her victimization; since this expectation may be quite unrealistic, the victim 
actually “loses” nothing.  The assumption of a criminally-defined risk does not bar the 
victim from seeking damages in a civil action brought against an appropriate party, nor 
does it preclude the apprehension and prosecution of the victimizer.  It merely negates 
the supposition that one’s victimization triggers an entitlement to a law enforcement 
response that is instantaneous and efficacious.
This is where assumption of risk fits into the model being explored in this article.  
As explained earlier, the goal is to recruit citizens into the battle against cybercrime by 
encouraging them to take all necessary and available steps to prevent their being the 
target of a cybercriminal.  The complicity principle discussed in the previous section 
does this by imposing a different kind of assumption of risk -- the risk of criminal liability 
for facilitating a cybercrime.585 This type of liability will be reserved for egregious cases; it 
is neither reasonable nor possible to impose accomplice liability upon everyone whose 
negligence somehow promotes the commission of a cybercrime.586 The assumption of 
risk principle, however, applies automatically to anyone who becomes the victim of a 
cybercriminal; it requires no law enforcement effort to implement, does not affirmatively 
impose liability upon victims but it can serve to underscore the risks attendant upon 
venturing into cyberspace without taking the necessary precautions.  
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The goal is to make it clear to citizens that their victimization will be, at most, a 
low priority for law enforcement.  This merely reflects what is already occurring:  Police 
cannot, for example, seek justice for everyone who foolishly sent someone, somewhere, 
$45 for a Beanie Baby that was advertised on eBay but never delivered (and probably 
never existed).587  Police and prosecutors know cases like this stand no chance of being 
prosecuted but have no viable way to communicate this to the public.  In a system that 
assumes the effectiveness of the traditional, reactive model of law enforcement, it would 
not be a wise career move for a county prosecutor to inform his constituents that if they 
are victimized in certain ways while online, his office will not pursue those cases.  An 
attenuated assumption of risk principle such as the one set out above could be used to 
make the public understand the risks they face online and their evolving responsibility to 
prevent their victimization. 
V.  Conclusion
“. . . public power into private hands. . . .”588
The premise driving the alternatives presented in § IV(B) is that the only way to 
effectively address cyber-threats is through a system of distributed security; this system 
of distributed security supplements the traditional reactive approach to criminal activity, 
at least as to cybercrime.589  The goal of a system of distributed security is to adopt or 
modify rules so as to create incentives for users of computer technology to ensure a 
baseline, minimal level of safety as to the technologies they use.  It is a “bottom-up,” 
rather than a “top-down,” approach to cybersecurity;590 it uses lateral rules that specify 
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options and consequences to encourage the development of new behaviors among the 
general populace.
Distributed security is a necessary consequence of the continuing evolution and 
proliferation of technology.  The traditional model of law enforcement is the product of an 
era when nation-states ruled supreme; nation-states are defined by and primarily 
operate within specific territorial boundaries.  Nation-states maintain internal order by 
implementing the constitutive and proscriptive rules discussed earlier;591 they maintain 
external order by protecting their citizens from “outside” threats, which have historically 
been encroachments by other nation-states.592  The primary challenges nation-states 
have heretofore faced are, therefore, internal “crime” and external warfare; they deal 
with both challenges by monopolizing power, or force.  Internally, nation-states set up 
hierarchical organizations (“police”) to which they delegate a measure of authority and 
the ability to use force against citizens who threaten internal order by committing 
“crimes” within the nation-state’s physical boundaries; these organizations maintain 
internal order by reacting to threatened and completed “crimes.”593  The reaction is 
assumed to maintain order by (a) removing the authors of disorder (actual or attempted) 
and (b) using their removal to deter them and others from engaging in similar activity.594
This system works reasonably well as long as “crime” is domestic “crime;” once “crime” 
begins to bleed across territorial boundaries, the effectiveness of this approach begins to 
erode.595
Cyberspace transcends territorial boundaries and consequently erodes the basic  
assumption animating this model of law enforcement, namely, that policing organizations 
can exert a sufficient measure of control over deviant behaviors within a nation-state’s 
populace to maintain internal order.596  Cyberspace lets external actors threaten internal 
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order by committing “crimes” against the members of a nation-state’s populace; 597 it also 
lets internal actors evade or overwhelm the efforts of traditional policing organizations.598
Both trends are already apparent; the effects of both will become more pronounced as 
technology continues to evolve.  It therefore becomes necessary to move from the old 
state-monopolized-reactive model to a new model, at least as to technologically-
facilitated crime.599 This requires a shift in emphasis -- from deterrence to prevention.  It 
also requires distributing a substantial part of the responsibility for prevention among the 
members of a nation-state.600  It requires, in effect, shifting from a model of security 
analogous to the Maginot Line strategy that proved so disastrous for the French in World 
War II601 to a model in which the obligation to resist and avoid cyber-threats is pervasive 
throughout a society.602
Shifting to this new model requires altering the focus of criminal law with regard 
to conduct involving the use of computer technology.  Traditionally, criminal law has 
focused on perpetrators only.  It has operated on the premise that targeting perpetrators 
for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and, at some moments in history, rehabilitation 
is an effective way of maintaining internal order in a society.  This premise gave rise to 
the traditional, reactive model of law enforcement which has proved sufficient, or at least 
has been perceived as sufficient, for dealing with real-world “crime.”
The concept of a criminal law for cyberspace proposed in this article focuses 
both on the advertent perpetrators of cybercrimes and on citizens who inadvertently but 
nevertheless contribute to the commission of online “crimes.”603  The perpetrator rules 
remain essentially the same (so far, anyway).  The citizen rules focus on the victims of 
cybercrimes, dividing them into two categories:  “mere” victims and victim-facilitators.  
Both, in a sense, assume the consequences attendant on their victimization:  “mere” 
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victims assume the “harm” resulting from their victimization, as they have no cognizable 
expectation that the social system will seek redress for that “harm”; victim-facilitators 
assume the risks both of the “harm” resulting from their personal victimization and of 
criminal liability for facilitating consequent victimization resulting from their failure to 
protect themselves from cyberattacks.  
This new model does not shift the obligation to prevent cybercrime entirely to 
citizens.  The public sector – the nation-state – still has a role in this model of online law 
enforcement.  Its obligation is to:
• monitor cyberspace in an effort to identify cybercrime patterns;604
• impose liability on cybercrime perpetrators and facilitators; 605
• pursue cybercriminals to the extent possible, prioritizing the pursuit by (a) the 
systemic harm inflicted or threatened by specific cybercrimes; (b) the scale of 
cybercrimes committed by particular perpetrators; 606 (c) attacks on those who did 
not assume the risk of being victimized;607 and (d) attacks on those who did 
assume the risk of being victimized; 608
• develop and encourage the development of increasingly sophisticated security 
measures;609 and 
• promote the distribution of security measures and citizen training in their 
implementation.610
In discharging their obligation to avoid becoming the victims of cybercrime, 
individuals may find it advantageous to affiliate with commercial or non-commercial 
entities as a way of ensuring security for their online activities.  One can see cyberspace, 
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at least for the foreseeable future, as analogous to the world of the early Middle Ages:  a 
world in which there were no nation-states to establish order over segments of territory 
and therein create a generally secure environment.  Medieval citizens coped with this 
lack of internal order by grouping together in towns, cities and fortresses for security.611
Something similar may evolve online; individuals and their families could use secure 
portals provided by collective entities as their gateways to cyberspace.612  The collective 
entities would assume the obligation of ensuring users the level of security necessary to 
prevent their being victimized while online (which would negate both victim assumption 
of risk and victim-facilitator liability).613  Employees might, for instance, use a corporate 
employer’s system as their individual (and family) portal to cyberspace; the benefit for 
the employees would be that they could use the corporate entity’s presumably superior 
security systems instead of trying to protect themselves severally.  This could perhaps 
become a benefit of employment, available either gratis or for a relatively modest fee.614
Similarly, access via secure portals could be offered by government entities, educational 
institutions, commercial services and religious or other groups.   A potential downside of 
this alternative is that these portals could provide tempting targets for cybercriminals – a 
readily identifiable collection of potential victims.  This should not, however, prove to be 
a major problem:  The portals would offer sophisticated technical security measures that 
should protect their users from cyber-attacks; they could also provide educational and 
informational programs to help their users avoid becoming the victims of online scams 
and other lapses in judgment.615
It is, of course, a perilous undertaking to speculate as to how human collectivities 
will organize themselves in the future.  From the vantage point of the early twenty-first 
century, it seems clear that  a system of distributed security is a superior way to address 
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cyber-threats.  Indeed, as technology continues its advance, we may conclude, as one 
expert noted, that “the monopolization of policing by government is an aberration.”616
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ENDNOTES
1Grahame F. Thompson, Between Hierarchies & Markets:  The Logic and Limits of Network 
Forms of Organization 120 (2003) (listing the features of an “institution”).
2
“Cybercrime” is not a distinct type of crime, such as rape or murder; “cybercrime” denotes the 
use of computer technology to achieve illegal ends.  See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a 
Thing as Virtual Crime?, 4 California Criminal Law Review 1 (2001),  
http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm.  “Cybercrime” essentially encompasses two types of 
unlawful activity:  The first consists of conduct that targets a computer or a computer system; 
attacks on networks -- hacking, denial of service attacks, and virus dissemination-- fall into this 
category.  See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 
HARVARD J. LAW & TECH. 465, 468-469 (1997), 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/10hjolt465.html.  Conduct of this type is usually the subject of 
“new” criminal prohibitions, even though it is for the most part functionally analogous to prohibited 
conduct found in the real, physical world. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime, 
supra.  The second type of activity constituting “cybercrime” consists of using technology to 
commit traditional crimes such as theft, fraud, and forgery; here, the perpetrator uses the 
computer as a tool, in the same way criminals use guns or motor vehicles. See, e.g., Brenner, Is 
There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra. See also Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care 
About Computer Crime, supra.
“Cybercrime” can also denote a third use of computer technology:  Computers can play 
an incidental role in the commission of a traditional offense, such as when a blackmailer uses a 
computer to generate blackmail letters (or e-mails) or a drug dealer uses a spreadsheet program 
to track his drug purchases and sales. See also Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About 
Computer Crime, supra.  Though scenarios such as these do not represent “true” varieties of 
cybercrime, they do pose challenges for law enforcement; if nothing else, they contribute to the 
enormous amount of investigativework that will eventually become part of most, if not all, criminal 
cases.  See infra § III. 
3As used in this article, “a model of law enforcement” denotes the institutions and processes 
employed to enforce the criminal law in place in a social system.  See infra note 6. See also infra
§ II(A)(2)(c) & § II(B)(2).  
4This proposition is developed in more detail in §§ II & III, infra.  
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5See infra § II.
6For an explanation of “order,” see § II(A)(1), infra. See, e.g., The President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967):
Any criminal justice system is an apparatus society uses to enforce the standards 
of conduct necessary to protect individuals and the community. It operates by 
apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing those members of the 
community who violate the basic rules of group existence. The action taken 
against lawbreakers is designed to serve three purposes. . . . It removes 
dangerous people from the community; it deters others from criminal behavior; 
and it gives society an opportunity to attempt to transform lawbreakers into law-
abiding citizens. 
See also Mark H. Moore & Margaret Poethig, The Police as an Agency of Municipal Government:
Implications for Measuring Police Effectiveness in National Institute of Justice, Measuring What 
Matters:  Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings (1999), 
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/170610-3.txt.
[P]olice, prosecutors, courts, and correctional agencies [are] constituent 
parts of a criminal justice system. . . . [T]heir operations are linked in a specific 
process: the handling of criminal cases. The process begins with the allegation of 
a criminal offense, proceeds through an investigation to the arrest of suspects, 
progresses to the formal charging and prosecution of those arrested, and . . . 
concludes with the adjudication and disposition of the cases. . . . . 
This view of the police as the crucial first step . . . meshes . . . with . . .the 
`professional law enforcement model’ of policing. . . . [T]he fundamental goal of 
the police is to reduce crime by enforcing the criminal law. They do so largely by 
arresting . . . offenders. To . . . produce arrests, they rely on three key operations: 
(1) patrolling public spaces, (2) responding to calls from citizens, and (3) 
investigating crimes.
Id. (citing The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra). 
As the excerpts quoted above demonstrate, a “model of law enforcement” can include not 
only the processes that are used to investigate “crimes” and apprehend criminals, but also those 
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that are used to adjudicate guilt and impose sanctions.  The “model of law enforcement” used in 
this article focuses only on (a) the rules that define behaviors as “criminal” and (b) the processes 
law enforcement officers use to prevent “crimes” and  to pursue and apprehend criminals.   
7See § II, infra.
8See, e.g., The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra (“For example, the American system 
was not designed with Cosa Nostra-type criminal organizations in mind, and it has been notably 
unsuccessful to date in preventing such organizations from preying on society”).  See generally 
infra § II.
9See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1335 (1992) 
(arguing that United States law has employed five different conceptions of “privacy” “with 
historical jolts or `catalysts’ producing new brands of privacy when existing law is incapable of 
dealing with unexpected societal and technological changes”).
10See § III, infra.  “Social reality” is the “humanly produced, constructed objectivity” which the 
members of a given society experience as “real.”  See Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The 
Social Construction of Reality:  A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 51-55 (1966).  See also 
infra § II(A)(2).
This article focuses on the challenges cybercrime poses for law enforcement because 
cybercrime is, so far, the most commonly-encountered variety of technologically-mediated crime, 
i.e., crime which exploits the technologies that are proliferating and/or emerging in the twenty-first 
century.  It is true that many technologies antedate the twenty-first century, and it is equally true 
that these technologies can be and have been exploited for illegal purposes.  Telephone fraud, 
for instance, is a type of technologically-mediated crime but neither telephone fraud nor criminal 
activity exploiting other older types of technology creates the kind of challenges that result from 
the use of these new technologies.  See § III, infra.  
While the unlawful exploitation of other technologies is in its infancy, it is reasonable to 
infer that other varieties of techno-crime will create challenges similar to those produced by the 
use of computer technology.  See § III, infra.  It is, therefore, also reasonable to infer that much of 
the analysis presented in the text will apply with equal force to as-yet-to-emerge varieties of 
techno-crime.
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11See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace:  A New Model of Law 
Enforcement, __ Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal ___ (2003).  This proposition is 
developed in more detail in § III, infra.  As § III explains, a new approach is required for dealing 
with cybercrime; the current model works satisfactorily with regard to traditional, real-world crime.
12See § III, infra.  
13The new model should, with some modifications, be able to address the operational challenges 
resulting from the exploitation of other new technologies for unlawful ends.  See supra note 10.
14See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
15As an example, the model that was in effect until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century 
did not include “police practices” because it consigned law enforcement to private citizens:
Law enforcement in the Founders' time was a duty of every citizen. Citizens were 
expected to be armed and equipped to chase suspects on foot, on horse, or with 
wagon whenever summoned. And when called upon to enforce the laws of the 
state, citizens were to respond `not faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly 
and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities [were] convenient and at 
hand.’ Any person could act in the capacity of a constable without being one. . . .
The Founders could not have envisioned 'police' officers as we know them today. 
The term `police’ . . . . was generally used as a verb and meant to watch over or 
monitor the public health and safety. . . . Only in the mid-nineteenth century did 
the term 'police' begin to take on the persona of a uniformed state law enforcer. 
Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 685, 692-693 (2001) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Barrington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928)).  
See also § III, infra.  The law in effect in the colonies and in the early American Republic imposed 
duties on citizens that derived from an older system, which is described in § II(B)(2)(b), infra. 
16Thomas Hobbes, Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan, Chapter XIII ¶ 9 (1909), 
http://www.bartleby.com/34/5/13.html.
17 See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 3, 56 
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M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 1982).
18See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, supra,  2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. at 56.  For a discussion of what a social 
system must do to maintain an acceptable level of internal order, see infra § II(A)(2)(c).
19See infra § II(B)(2).
20New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Trends in Case and Defendant Characteristics, and 
Criminal Court Processing and Outcomes, of Prosecuted Arrests for Misdemeanor and Lesser-
Severity Offenses in New York City 1 (2001), http://www.nycja.org/research/reports/fnrpt.pdf.
21See, e.g., Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 17 (1960).  See also  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1028 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “law” as “[a] rule or method according which 
phenomena or actions co-exist or follow each other”) & infra note 22.  
22See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1496 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “rule” as “a principle or 
regulation prescribing or directing action or forbearance”).    
23See, e.g., Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative Autonomy” of Law, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1987, 2007-2008 (1998) (German sociologist Niklas Luhmann describes the legal system as a 
binary code specifying positive and negative values, i.e., “legal” and “illegal” actions).
24See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and 
Software 29-40, 53-57 (2001); John H. Holland, Emergence:  From Chaos to Order 1-2 (1998); 
John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals 72-92 (1980).
25See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 53-57 (pattern recognition software); John H. 
Holland, Emergence, supra, at 53-80 (checkers).  Some games – like simple board games –  do 
not really conform to the model of self-organizing collective systems advanced in the text above, 
since they generally only involve a few participants and since each discrete system (each “game) 
only last for a very short period of time.  Structurally, however, more complex games do begin to 
resemble the model; many online games, for example, involve thousands of players and continue 
for months or years.    See, e.g., Ultima Online, http://www.uo.com/ (online game); Origin 
Systems, Inc., http://www.origin.ea.com/  (four years after it was launched, Ultima Online has 
225,000 players from countries around the world). 
Brenner – Distributed Security
106
26See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation:  Agent-Based Models of Competition 
and Collaboration (1997) (noting evolution from informal norms to formal laws).
27See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-40, 53-57 (ants, human cities, software).  
The concept of self-organizing systems emerged in biology to describe structure, such as ant 
colonies and schools of fish, in which “pattern and organization develop through interactions 
internal to the system, that is, without the intervention of external influences such as a `leader’ 
who directs or oversees the process.”  Scott Camazine, Self-Organizing Systems, Encyclopedia 
of Cognitive Sciences, http://www.cognitivescience.net/s00644.pdf.  See also Steven Johnson, 
Emergence, supra, at 17-20.  See, e.g., Carl Anderson, Self-Organization in Relation to Several 
Similar Concepts:  Are the Boundaries to Self-Organization Indistinct?, 202 Biol. Bull. 247-255 
(2002), http://www.isye.gatech.edu/~carl/papers/BoundariestoSO.pdf:
Consider the collective movement of a school of fish. The school snakes through 
the water like a single entity, turning in unison, waves of activity flashing across 
the shoal. This group-level behavior is not encoded within each individual, nor is 
there a leader or small group of individuals directing the movement of the school. 
It is a process whereby individual fish react to movements of their immediate 
neighbors, and, as a result of such local interactions, the grouplevel pattern of 
activity emerges spontaneously . . . in short, the school is self-organized.
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).  The principle of self-organization (or “emergent behavior) has since 
evolved to encompass a variety of systems, including human societies and organizations.  See, 
e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra:
What features do all these systems share? . . . . They are bottom-up systems, 
not top-down. . . . [T]hey are complex adaptive systems that display emergent 
behavior.  . . . [A]gents residing on one scale start producing behavior that lies 
one scale above them:  ants create colonies; urbanites create neighborhoods; 
simple pattern-recognition software learns how to recommend new books.  The 
movement from low-level rules to higher-level sophistication is  . . .l emergence.
Id. at 18.  See also Grahame F. Thompson, Between Hierarchies & Markets:  The Logic and 
Limits of Network Forms of Organization 129-135 (2003).
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This article uses the phrase “self-organizing collective systems” to emphasize its focus on 
systems that are made up of many (tens, hundreds, thousands, millions) of discrete parts, each of 
which has the ability to act autonomously, at least within certain boundaries.  See, e.g., M. Luck, 
S. Monroe & M. d’Inverno, Autonomy:  Variable and Generative in Agent Autonomy 9-22  (H. 
Hexmoor, C. Castelfranchi & R. Falcone, eds. 2003), 
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~mml/papers/autonomy03.pdf.  Later sections of the article use the 
terms “society” and “social system” to denote self-organizing collective systems comprised of 
human beings.
A “system” is a “group of interacting, interrelated or interdependent elements” that form a 
complex whole.  American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2001), 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/12/C0611200.html. See, e.g., Michael van de Kerchove, The Legal 
System Between Order and Disorder 5-6 (1993):
[T]he notion of system appears . . . to require the uniting . . . of a set of elements. 
. . . These elements may be not only of a very different nature, between one 
system and another, but also of a different nature within a single system. 
Moreover, it is perfectly possible for these elements themselves to constitute 
subsystems, uniting in their turn more elementary entities. . . . 
The notion of system therefore appears to imply the existence of specific 
relations between these elements and not their simple juxtaposition; it supposes . 
. . the existence of an ordered or organized totality:  that is, the existence of 
bonds of interdependence, interaction, and solidarity among the system's 
components. Thus, at this level the central idea is that of order or organization.
Finally, the notion of system appears to imply . . . unity. . . . [U]nity . . . involves
both . . . differentiation from the exterior and . . . identity, which makes it possible 
to determine both the elements that belong and those that do not belong. . . This 
unity . . . is based . . . on . . . principless governing the relations among the . . . 
constitutive elements. . . The essential idea . . . is therefore that of structure.
(notes omitted).  A simple system is composed of only a few elements; complex systems are 
composed of many elements.  See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 47-48.  See also 
Michael van de Kerchove, The Legal System Between Order and Disorder, supra, at 5-6.
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The elements, or agents, that comprise a system can be autonomous or non-
autonomous.  See infra §II(A)(2).  A non-autonomous agent “either depends on others or is an 
automaton”; an autonomous agent can, but need not depend on others. See, e.g., M. Luck, S. 
Monroe & M. d’Inverno, Autonomy:  Variable and Generative, supra.  An autonomous agent has 
the capacity to choose between two courses of action, even if the choices involve a very low level 
of abstraction.  See, e.g., Bertil Ekdahl, How Autonomous Is an Autonomous Agent? (2001),
http://www.cs.lth.se/home/Bertil_Ekdahl/publications/HAisanAA.pdf.  See also  infra §II(A)(2).  
The capacity for autonomous behavior is typical of, though not exclusive to, systems populated 
by biological entities.  An ant, for example, can act autonomously in carrying out a set of basic 
behaviors the instructions for which are genetically programmed; specific behaviors are triggered 
by environmental conditions, pheromonal signals and, in some species, at least, tactile 
communication with other ants.  See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals 
77-86 (1980).  See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 30-33, 73-80; Edward O. Wilson, 
Sociobiology:  The New Synthesis 397-415 (2000).  The ant is not acting independently, that is, is 
not exercising individual judgment and deciding what its next action should be; but it is acting 
autonomously in the sense that it can modify its behavior if circumstances so require. See infra
§II(A)(2).  
28See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th edition 2000), 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/3/O0110300.html (defining “order” as “[a] condition of methodical or 
prescribed arrangement among component parts such that proper functioning or appearance is 
achieved”).  Cf. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (10th ed.), http://www.m-w.com  (defining 
“chaos” as “ a state of things in which chance is supreme”).  
29See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 37-62.  Systems populated by artificial 
entities must also ensure the continuation of the entities of which they are comprised.  The steps 
they take to accomplish this may, however, differ from those that are characteristic of systems 
populated by biological agents.  Systems populated by artificial entities will no doubt find it 
necessary to replace members of their population (as they fail or become hopelessly outdated), 
but the replacement process will presumably not include a period of maturation and socialization 
comparable to that required for biological entities.  See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, 
at 58-63 (describing the evolution of software able to simulated the trail navigation abilities of 
ants).   
The conditions stated above are the threshold requirements for the sustainability of 
biological systems composed of non-intelligent entities.  As is explained below, the rise of 
intelligence adds an additional requirement to this list.
Brenner – Distributed Security
109
30See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 399 (three basic castes found in ants:  
queen, worker and soldier).   See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, 
supra, at 79-81 (castes among ants and other social insects).  Environmental triggers can cause 
social insects to manifest behaviors other than those that are their basic assignment.  See, e.g.,
Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 30-31 (describing how, among harvester ants, interior 
workers will carry their queen to the colony’s “escape hatch” at the first sign of disturbance).   
31See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (describing strategies Scottish ant 
colonies use to obtain the “warmest nest sites,” i.e., gradual encroachment on a competitor’s 
nest, occupation of sites abandoned by competitor colonies and siege warfare). While this is, so 
far, less common, the same dynamic can be found among non-biological agents; artificial entities 
comprising one system can either attack the members of another system or compete with them 
for necessary resources.  See, e.g., Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, Growing Artificial 
Societies:  Social Science from the Bottom Up (1996).  See also Gordon Christopher Zaft, Social 
Science Applications of Discrete Event Simulation:  A DEVs Artificial Society (2001), 
http://www.zaft.org/gordon/XeriScape/Thesis.pdf.  The discussion in the text uses biological 
examples because the vast majority of our experience is with biologically-based systems.
32See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (war) and 139-142 (creation of new 
ant and termite colonies).  
33See, e.g., Michael Schillo, et al., Self-Organization in Multi-Agent Systems:  From Agent 
Interaction to Agent Organization in Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on 
Modelling Artificial Societies and Hybrid Organizations 37  (2002), http://www.ki.informatik.hu-
berlin.de/~lindeman/Masho-rcsia-etp-proceedings.pdf:
[T]heoretical approaches . . . call any kind of system self-organizing if it is able to 
determine its internal structure by itself as the environment changes. The 
boundaries of a self-organizing system and its structure . . . are not determined 
by environmental factors. Rather, these systems generate, change and adapt 
their internal organization within their own logic in a dynamic process to cope 
with environmental changes.  
34See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control 3  (1966):
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[I]f human beings are to do business with one another, there must be rules, and 
people must be able to assume that, by and large, these rules will be observed. 
Whatever people want--food, clothing, shelter, sex, fame, contract bridge-they 
must get it by working with and through other people. They must take up 
positions in organized and complex social enterprises: families, clubs, schools, 
armies, political associations, ball teams. Each of these may be thought of as a 
way of fitting together the diverse actions of many people so that the work of the 
world gets done. But if the actions of many people are to be fitted together, there 
must be understandings about who is supposed to do what and under which 
circumstances. . . . [T]he first prerequisite to organized human activity is that 
there be some understandings, however arbitrary they may be. For example, if 
traffic is to move along the highway, it is less important whether the rule 
prescribes that people must drive on the right-hand side or the left-hand side of 
the road then that there be a rule. The alternative is chaos.
(emphasis in the original).  See also infra §II(A)(2)(c).  Even the aggregation of slime mold cells 
into colonies, which represents one of the simplest forms of a self-organizing collective system, 
follows certain rules.  See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 12-17 (citing slime mold 
cells as an example of how “simple agents following simple rules” can “generate amazingly 
complex structures).  See also Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 387-392.  
35See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 120-121:
The intelligence of a harvester ant colony derives from the densely 
interconnected feedback between ants that encounter each other and change 
their behavior according to pre-ordained rules.  Without that feedback, they’d be 
a random assemblage of creatures butting heads and moving on, incapable of 
displaying the complex behavior that we’ve come to expect. . . .
36Francis Heylighen & Donald T. Cambell, Selection of Organization at the Social Level:  
Obstacles and Facilitators of Metasystem Transitions § 2.5, 45 World Futures:  The Journal of 
General Evolution 181 (1995), http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Papers/SocialMST.pdf.  
37See supra § II(A)(1).
38See supra § II(A)(1).
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39See generally supra note 27.
40 See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul:  Intelligent Machines and Human Values 58 
(2003):  
[I]t is useful to recognize as intelligent certain kinds of behavior, regardless of the 
package it comes in—be it human, animal, . . . or machine.  We recognize that 
intelligent behavior is multidimensional, that is, not measurable along a single . . . 
scale.  We distinguish between linguistic, mathematical, musical, kinesthetic, 
spatial, logical, interpersonal, and emotional intelligence, to name a few.  
See also John McCarthy, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, KurzweilAI.net (2001), 
http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0088.html?printable=1 (“Intelligence is the computational part 
of the ability to achieve goals in the world. Varying kinds and degrees of intelligence occur in 
people, many animals and some machines”). 
41See, e.g., W.C. Stirling & R.L. Frost, Intelligence with Attitude in National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, Proceedings of the Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems Workshop § 1.4 
(2000), 
http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/research_areas/research_engineering/PerMIS_Workshop/Part%20II_
Section%201.pdf: 
The ability to make decisions is essential to intelligent behavior.  Indeed, the 
word intelligent comes from the Latin roots inter (between) + legere (to choose). 
We thus assume that there is only one essential characteristic of intelligence in 
man or machine—an ability to choose between alternatives.
See generally supra note 27.
42See, e.g., Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf (L.D. Mech & 
L. Boitani, eds. 1998), http://canis.tamu.edu/wfscCourses/Concepts/Packa98.html (“Intelligence is 
the ability to apply knowledge from previous experience to solving novel problems”).  See also 
Measuring Performance and Intelligence of Systems with Autonomy: Metrics for Intelligence of 
Constructed Systems in National Institute of Standards and Technology, Proceedings of the 
Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems Workshop § 1.4 (2000), 
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http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/research_areas/research_engineering/PerMIS_Workshop/Part%20I%
20White%20Paper.pdf; Soar, Soar:  A Functional Approach to General Intelligence,
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~soar/docs/SoarFunctionalOverview.pdf.
43While we tend to associate “intelligence” with an “individual,” i.e., a discrete organism, some 
species exhibit a collective intelligence.  See infra notes 58 - 62 & accompanying text.
44See, e.g., Gregory J. Smith & John S. Gero,The Autonomous, Rational Design Agent in 
Workshop on Situatedness in Design: Artificial Intelligence in Design 19-23 (H. Fujii, ed. 2000), 
http://www.arch.su.edu.au/%7Ejohn/publications/2000/SmithGeroAIDWkshp.pdf (“An agent is
called autonomous if its beliefs and behaviour are determined from its own 
experience”). See also Intelligent Autonomous Systems, 
http://www.science.uva.nl/research/ias/ (“The IAS group studies methodologies 
to create intelligent autonomous systems, which perceive their environment 
through sensors and use that information to generate intelligent, goal-directed 
behaviour”).  
See also supra note 27.
45See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 382-386.  See also John T. Bonner, The 
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 72-77.
46See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 26-27.  Professor Wilson defines instinct 
as an “innate behaviorial difference between . . . two species. . .  that is based at least in part on a 
genetic difference”.  Id. at 26 (“We then speak of differences in the hereditary component of the 
behavior pattern, or of innate differences in behavior”).   He also notes that instinct is “a behavior 
pattern that . . . is subject to relatively little modification in the lifetime or the organism, or varies 
very little throughout the population, or . . . both.”  Id. See also  John T. Bonner, The Evolution of 
Culture in Animals, supra, at 73;  Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 387-393.
47See, e.g., Jennifer Golbeck, Unintelligent Swarming for Robust Exploratory Systems in 
Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Automation, Control, and Information 
Technology (2002),  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~golbeck/downloads/Swarm02.pdf. 
48See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 151, 516.  See also John T. Bonner, The 
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 179.
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49See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul:  Intelligent Machines and Human Values 58 (2003) 
(“Just as IQ tests have well-known cultural and gender biases, our present thinking about 
intelligence surely has species biases as well”). 
50See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 81 (if ants from an older colony meet ants 
from a neighbor colony, “the next day they’re more likely to turn and go in the other direction to 
avoid each other”); Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 444 (describing how lizards 
learned their way through mazes and how to press a bar to obtain more heat for their cages).  
51See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul, supra, at 58-59:  
We could say . . . that an entity is intelligent to the degree that it
1. stores and retrieves knowledge;
2. learns from experience and adapts to novel situations;
3. discriminates between what is important and what is irrelevant to the 
situation at hand;
4. recognizes patterns, similarities, and differences in complex 
environments; 
5. creates new ideas by combining old ideas in new ways;
6. plans and manages strategies for solving complex problems;
7. sets and pursues goals;
8. recognizes its own intelligence and its place in the world.
      Using these criteria, we would say that an entity is minimally intelligent if it 
does only (1), for example, and more intelligent the more it is able to do.  Dogs, 
for example, appear to do (1) through (4) reasonably well.
See also id. at 57-73 (various aspects of intelligence).
52See supra notes 40 and 51 & accompanying text.  
53 See Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 151-152.
54See id. at 151.   
55Id.
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56Id. at 152.
57See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
58See supra note 44 & accompanying text. At the most basic level, an “individual” is a “physically 
distinct organism.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 8.  This definition serves to 
differentiate more evolved species – such as insects, amphibians, birds, fish and humans – from 
simpler biological entities in which the line between “individual” and “colony” blurs. See id. at 383-
386.  It does not, however, address the functional difference between, say, an ant and a human 
being; each is a “physically distinct organism,” but the ant’s “individuality” ends there. Unlike a 
human being, a single ant is not capable of autonomous behavior because, as is explained in 
note 60, infra, an ant’s behavior is programmed by a series of simple, pre-determined rules, not 
by individual cognition. See supra note 39 & accompanying text (autonomous behavior).  While 
humans, like ants, live in a collective environment, human behavior, unlike ant behavior, is 
individuated, i.e., the product of idiosyncratic reasoning which takes into account both the 
circumstances of the empirical world and the realities of the collective environment. See, e.g.,
Kerstin Dautenhahn, Evolvability, Culture and the Primate Social Brain in Proceedings of the 
Evolvability Workshop at the Seventh Annual International Conference on the Simulation and 
Synthesis of Living Systems (Artificial Life) (2000), 
http://homepages.feis.herts.ac.uk/~nehaniv/al7ev/:
In primate societies, and different from members of social insect societies, an 
individual is not only socially situated (being part of and surrounded by a social 
environment) but also socially embedded which means that the agent needs to 
pay attention to other agents and their interactions individually. Particularly 
human primates are specialized in predicting, manipulating and dealing with 
highly complex social dynamics. . . . Humans, different from social insects live in 
individualized societies . . . .
Id. (citations omitted & emphasis in the original).  See also W.D. Christensen & C.A. Hooker, An 
Interactivist-Constructivist Approach to Intelligence:  Self-Directed Anticipative Learning, 13 
Philosophical Psychology 5 (2000), 
http://www.kli.ac.at/personal/christensen/SDAL_PhilPsych.pdf.
59See infra § II(A)(3).  See, e.g., Brian Goodwin & Ricard Solae, Signs of Life:  How Complexity 
Pervades Biology 148 (2000).  See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 74-75:
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[A]nt colonies constantly adjust the number of ants actively foraging for good, 
based on a number of variables:  overall colony size . . . ; amount of food stored 
in the nest; amount of food available in the surrounding area; . . . the presence of 
other colonies in the near vicinity.  No individual ant can assess any of these 
variables on her own. . . . There are no . . . ways to perceive the overall system—
and, indeed, no cognitive apparatus that could make sense of such a view.
60See infra § II(A)(3).  For a description of how this collective intelligence emerges, see, e.g., 
Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 78-79:
[T]he statistical nature of an interaction demands that there be a critical mass of 
ants for the colony to make intelligent assessments of its global state.  Ten ants 
roaming across the desert floor will not be able to accurately judge the overall 
need for foragers or nest-builders, but two thousand will do the job admirably. . . . 
The simplicity of the ant language – and the relative stupidity of the individual 
ants—is . . . a feature. . . . Having individual agents capable of directly 
addressing the overall state of the system can be a real liability in swarm logic, 
for the same reasons that you don’t want one of the neurons in your brain to 
suddenly become sentient. . . . 
[A]nt colonies rely heavily on the random interactions of ants exploring a given 
space without any predefined orders.  Their encounters with other ants are 
individually arbitrary, but because there are so many individuals in the system, 
those encounters eventually allow the individuals to gauge and alter the 
macrostate of the system itself. . . . 
The primary mechanism of swarm logic is the interaction between neighboring 
ants in the field:  ants stumbling across each other, or each other’s pheromone 
trails, while patrolling the area around the nest.  Adding ants to the overall 
system will generate more interactions between neighbors and will consequently 
enable the colony . . . to solve problems and regulate itself more effectively.   
Ant communication strategies are crude and typically quite limited.  See id. at 75 (communication 
between workers in fire ant colonies relies “on a vocabulary of ten signals, nine of which are 
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based on pheromones”).  See also Deborah M. Gordon, The Organization of Work in Social 
Insect Colonies, Complexity (2002), http://www.santafe.edu/~cmg/netdyn/: 
[A]n ant’s moment-to-moment decision about which task to perform, and whether 
to perform it actively, depends on its interactions with other workers. Interactions 
between workers of some task groups apparently provide negative feedback, 
while others provide positive feedback. It appears that what matters to an ant is 
the pattern of interactions it experiences, rather than a particular message or 
signal transferred at each interaction. Ants do not tell each other what to do
when they meet, but the pattern of interaction each ant experiences influences 
the probability it will perform a task. Each ant uses a set of rules such as, `I’m a 
forager and if I meet a returning patroller every so often, I remain likely to go out’.
See generally Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 413-415.
61See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text.
62See supra note 51 & accompanying text.
63See supra notes 37 - 38 & accompanying text.
64The intelligence levels roughly correspond with the categories discussed above.  See supra
notes 53 - 56 & accompanying text.
65See supra § II(A)(1).
66See supra § II(A)(1).
67In insect colonies, the system of allocating individuals to perform particular functions is usually 
referred to as involving “castes,” not roles.  See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 
298-299.  This distinction is made because the allocation of tasks in insect societies often reflects 
physiological differences.  See, e.g., id. (“In social insects, a caste is any set of individuals of a 
particular morphological type, or age group, or both, that performs specialized labor in the 
colony”).  See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 70-75.
Among ants, “[t]here basic physical castes are found . . . all members of the female sex:  the 
worker, the soldier, and the queen.”  Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 399.  Males are 
not usually considered a caste, primarily because they live for such a short time.  See, e.g., 
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Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 81 (males live for a single day:  “Their life span is so 
abbreviated that natural selection didn’t bother to endow them with jaws to eat”).  Ant colonies 
“can live as long as fifteen years—the life span of the egg-laying queen ant, whose demise 
signals the final death of the colony itself.”  Id. at 80.
68See, e.g., Vanessa S. Fraser, et al., Genetic Influence on Caste in the Ant Camponotus 
consobrinus, 47 Behav. Ecol. Sociobiology 188 (2000), 
http://www.bio.usyd.edu.au/Beelab2/BensPDFs/FraserGeneticInfluenceCaste.pdf. 
69See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 302 (“The behavior of the ant soliders is 
often extremely specialized”).  See also id. at 301-304.  The task-performance rules operate in a 
fashion analogous to the rules governing moves in a board game, such as checkers.  See, e.g.,
John H. Holland, Emergence:  From Chaos to Order, supra, at 33-42 (game theory).  That is, they 
specify the behaviors that are appropriate for an ant assigned to a particular role, or caste; worker 
ants have a repertoire of behaviors that differs from soldier ants and queens have a repertoire 
which differs from that of either workers or soldiers.  The repertoire of behaviors defines the range 
of behaviors in which the ant can engage.  Ants shift into a new range of behaviors if they move 
from performing one task to performing another, but in either event the universe of behaviors in 
which they can engage is delimited, much the way the moves of one playing checkers are 
delimited.  See supra notes 59 & 60.  
70See supra notes 59 & 60.  See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549 (“As one 
requirement such as brood care or nest repair intensifies, workers shift their activities to 
compensate until the need is met, then change back again”).  
71See supra § II(A)(1).
72See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (strategies include encroaching on a 
competitor’s nest, occupying sites temporarily abandoned by other colonies and siege warfare).  
73See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text.  See also infra § II(A)(3).  
74See, e.g., Kenneth G. Ross & Laurent Keller, Genetic Control of Social Organization in an Ant,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 14232 (Nov. 
1998), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pubmed&pubmedid=9826683. 
75See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 83.
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76See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at  303-309 (analyzing effects of 
environmental factors upon colony size and function allocation).   
77See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 85 (discussing cannibalism among social 
insects).  Nutrition can also produce morphological specialization among ants and other social 
insects.  See, e.g., id. at 303-309.  See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, 
supra, at 82 (noting that “an individual that is genetically a queen may become a worker if she is 
deprived of sufficient food during her development”). 
78See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 413-414.  See also Steven Johnson, 
Emergence, supra, at 75 (“the great bulk of ant information-processing relies on the chemical 
compounds of pheromones. . . . Ants secrete . . . chemicals . . . as a means of communicating 
with other ants”).
79Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 76 (“Gradients in the pheromone trail are the difference 
between saying `There’s food around here somewhere’ and `There’s food due north of here’”).
80See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 55-56, 413-414; Steven Johnson, 
Emergence, supra, at 765.  See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 32-33 (ant burial 
details).
81See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-33, 73-79.  See also infra § II(A)(3).  
82See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-33, 73-79. See also infra § II(A)(3).  
83See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 77-79.
84See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text.
85See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text.      
86See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 55-56, 413-414; Steven Johnson, 
Emergence, supra, at 765.  See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 32-33 (ant burial 
details).
87See, e.g.,  Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules:  A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decisionmaking in Law and in Life 6 (1991):
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[C]onstitutive rules create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain 
kind. They define and thereby constitute activities that could not otherwise even 
exist. Rules of games are the archetypes. . . . The rule providing . . . that in order 
to castle a chess player must not previously have castled does not just control a 
process but constitutes it. Without the rules of chess you cannot castle at all. 
88See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra, at 7 (noting that constitutive rules 
can have “regulative” aspects, i.e., can prescribe and proscribe behavior).  
89See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control, supra at 12 (“Deviant behavior . . . is 
behavior that violates normative rules); Edwin M. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and 
Social Control 13 (2d ed. 1972) (“deviance is defined as violations of norms, or departures from 
social expectancies”).  See also supra note 34.
The definition given above incorporates the requirement that the failure to follow rules 
must be “deliberate,” that is, the result of “careful thought and thorough consideration”.  Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary (10th ed.), http://www.m-w.com  (defining “deliberate”).  A failure to 
abide by governing rules can be deliberate or unintentional, advertent or inadvertent.  If, for 
example, an ant were to find a morsel of food and take it to the wrong colony, the ant would not 
have followed the rules that prescribe a foraging ants’ conduct; under those rules, foragers find 
food and bring it back to their own colony.  See supra note 86 & accompanying text.  The ant has 
failed to follow applicable rules, but the error is more properly characterized as a “deviation” from 
expected behavior than as deviant behavior.  
Why is that the correct characterization?  There are two reasons, one context-specific 
and one general.  The context-specific reason derives from the limited capacities of ants.  As was 
explained earlier, an individual ant is not “intelligent” and therefore cannot engage in a process of 
decision making.  See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text.  The hapless forager who goes 
to the wrong colony is, therefore, incapable of having done so “deliberately.”  
The general reason is found in the tension between order and disorder.  As explained 
above, self-organizing collective systems strive for order because without it they cannot perform 
the functions that are essential for the survival of the system and its constituent entities. See 
supra § II(A)(1). In a sense, any entity’s failure to follow the constitutive rules of such a system 
undermines the system’s ability to maintain order; the ant’s error proves that the rules in place in 
the hypothesized colony are not perfect.  If the imperfection responsible for this ant’s default in 
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the performance of her duty were to spread, the colony’s ability to maintain order would be 
threatened and it might well collapse.  But little in life (real life, anyway) is perfect; it is therefore 
reasonable to assume that some level of inadvertent errors will occur in any system.  See, e.g.,
James Gleick, Chaos:  Making a New Science 15, 193 (1988). This ant’s failure to follow the rules 
is an anomaly of the type to be expected in the operation of a system such as this.  It is, 
therefore, a matter of no particular concern for the colony (though it is for the ant, since  she will 
no doubt be killed by ants from the other colony).  See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, 
supra, at 206-207.   
“Deviant behavior,” on the other hand, has a significant potential for undermining the 
order or a self-organizing collective system populated by intelligent entities.  This issue is 
discussed later.  See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
90See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 165 (social insects do not play).  Cf. Antz,
http://www.pdi.com/feature/antz.htm.
91For an overview of how deviant behavior threatens internal order, see supra note 89.  See also
infra § II(A)(2)(c).
92See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (10th ed.), http://www.m-w.com  (defining 
“antisocial” as “hostile or harmful to organized society” and “being or marked by behavior 
deviating sharply from the social norm”).  See also supra note 89.  
93See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
94See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
95See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
96See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
97See generally John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 38-53.  
98See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 499.  “Solitary” means that the species’ 
social groupings are “comprised exclusively of the mother and her unweaned young, and adult 
males and females associate only during the breeding season.”  Id. 
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99Although ants are described as “social insects,” biology differentiates the simple sociality found 
in insect species from the more complex social arrangements characteristic of mammals.  See, 
e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 7 (defining “society” as “a group of individuals 
belonging to the same species and organized in a cooperative manner”) & 8 (defining “colony” as 
a group “of organisms which are highly integrated, either by physical union . . . or by division into 
specialized . . . castes”).  In sociobiology, “colony” is reserved for communities of social insects, 
“tightly integrated masses of sponges . . . and other `colonial’ invertebrates.”  Id. at 8.
100See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text. See also supra note 51.  See, e.g., Peter 
Steinhart, The Company of Wolves 126-136 (1995).  See also Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, 
supra, at 504-513; “Wolves:  The Basics of Wolf Biology and Taxonomy,”  Defenders of Wildlife, 
http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html. 
101See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 12-13 (“Wolves are social 
creatures. . . . The life of the individual is inextricably woven into the life of the pack”).
102Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 499.  This section examines wolves, rather than one 
of these primate species, because the goal is to analyze a species that is, in effect, intermediate 
between the social insects and man.  Wolves are individually intelligent, but their behavior and 
social organization is sufficiently distinct from mankind’s to provide a useful point of comparison. 
The behavior and social organization of the higher primates is in many respects functionally 
analogous to that of mankind, which provides little basis for comparison.  See, e.g., Frans de 
Waal, Chimpanzee Politics:  Power and Sex Among Apes 3-41 (Rev. ed. 1998). 
103See supra § II(A)(1).  Like ants, a wolf pack is an extended family.  See, e.g., L. David Mech, 
Alpha Status, Dominance, and Division Of Labor In Wolf Packs, 77 Canadian J. of Zoology 1196-
1203 (1999), http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/2000/alstat/alstat.htm; John T. Bonner, The 
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 79.  
104See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 13 (“wolves live in packs of two 
to twenty, the pack size depending on the size of available prey”).  See also John T. Bonner, The 
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89.  “A new pack is formed when a mated pair leaves its 
parental group to produce a litter on its own.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.  
See also Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf (L.D. Mech & L. 
Boitani, eds. 1998), http://canis.tamu.edu/wfscCourses/Concepts/Packa98.html (“Packs usually 
are founded by an unrelated male and female, each having dispersed from their natal families 
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and joining up in an area defensible from encroachment by other packs. . . . Each family grows 
with successive litters (typically 5-6 pups) and shrinks as offspring disperse”).
105See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 15.
106See supra § II(A)(2)(a).  Pack members work together to “maintain territories, obtain food and 
rear young.”  Jenny Ryon Social Organization of Wolves, Canadian Centre for Wolf Research 
(2000), http://www.wolfca.com/SocialOrg.html.
107See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
109See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
110See supra § II(A)(1).  See also supra note 89.
111See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 283 (“the vast majority of mammal 
species forming groups with any degree of social complexity . . . display dominance” hierarchies).
112Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 279 (citation omitted & emphasis in the original).
113Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.
114Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.
115Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.     
116Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290.      
117Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290.
118See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290-291; Peter Steinhart, The Company 
of Wolves, supra, at 13-14.
119
“Essential Wolves,” Raised by Wolves, Inc.,  
http://www.raisedbywolves.org/EssentialWolvesWord.pdf.  A wolf pack consists of “an alpha, or 
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dominant pair, their pups, and several other subordinate or young animals. The alpha female and 
male are the pack leaders, tracking and hunting prey, choosing den sites, and establishing the 
pack's territory.”  Wolves:  The Basics of Wolf Biology and Taxonomy,”  Defenders of Wildlife, 
http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html. See also Peter Steinhart, The Company of 
Wolves, supra, at 15.
120Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.
121 Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 13. See also id. at 113 (“A hierarchy of 
strong to weak is constantly evolving and changing in the pack”).  When a dominant wolf is 
dethroned, he/she may leave the pack and form a new pack.  See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing how 
an alpha female who was displaced as lead female left her original pack, found a new mate and 
founded a new pack; the new pack included wolves who had left the original pack to join her).
122Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.  See, e.g., Wolves:  The Basics of Wolf Biology 
and Taxonomy,”  Defenders of Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html.  
See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 113:  “Wolves compete for status 
from an early age.  Fox found wolf pups routinely working out dominance hierarchies at eight 
weeks; Mech saw four-week-old pups fighting for status.”  (citing Michael W. Fox, The Behavior of 
Wolves, Dogs and Related Canids (1971) and L.David Mech, The Wolf:  The Ecology and 
Behavior of an Endangered Species (1970)).
123Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.  See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of 
Wolves, supra, at 113 (“A hierarchy of strong to weak is constantly evolving and changing in the 
pack”).  See also An Overview of Wolf Aggression, The Anglian Wolf Society, 
http://www.anglianwolf.com/D_FrontPage/D_AR_Article/D_Waggr/Waggr.htm.
124 Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 113-114.  “If a stare is not enough, a 
dominant may lunge at a subordinate, growling with bared teeth, erect ears and tail, and bristling 
hackles”)  See also id.  (“Usually, bites . . . are inhibited and do not draw blood.  A dominant wolf 
may discipline a subordinate wolf merely by placing its mouth around the subordinate’s muzzle”).    
125See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 312 (alpha male exercises leadership in a 
manner that is “more nearly consonant” with leadership among human beings than the leadership 
found among other species); Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 103 (noting that 
Brenner – Distributed Security
124
it is not known whether the alpha male accomplishes this by “being aggressively intolerant of 
disorder or by fostering a sense of companionability”).  
126See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.  See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The 
Company of Wolves, supra, at 121.
127See Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 312.  See also Peter Steinhart, The Company 
of Wolves, supra, at 121.
128John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89.   
129See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 112-113.  Some suggest that 
adult wolves’ tendency to engage in frequent play is a way of “rehearsing” the coordination 
needed for the hunt.  See id. at 112-113.  See also id. at 127 (describing how wolves split up to 
encircle a deer); Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505 (describing how wolves split up, 
with one hiding and the others driving the prey toward the hidden wolf).
130See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 24 (“When wolves hunt, they 
make use of disparate special abilities.  Some wolves are good at finding prey, some at reading 
the strengths and weaknesses of prey, some at chasing prey, some at killing prey”).  
131John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89.  See also Peter Steinhart, 
The Company of Wolves, supra, at 15, 121.
132Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 286.
133Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505.  See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of 
Wolves, supra, at 16 (pack territories can range from 50 t0 800 square miles or even more, 
depending on the nature of the terrain).  Wolves “move ceaselessly over their domains in search 
of prey.”  Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505
134See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 16 (“We think wolves keep 
territories either to protect den sites or to conserve hunting opportunities, and that the abundance 
of pretty generally defines the size of a territory”).
135Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 16.
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136Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 115.
137Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 115-116.  See also Edward O. Wilson, 
Sociobiology, supra, at 505.  
138See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
139See supra note 113 & accompanying text.
140See supra note 129. 
141See supra notes 128 - 131 & accompanying text.   See also supra notes 103 & 104.  See, e.g., 
Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra: 
At all ages, relatively hard-wired responses to specific stimuli bring individuals 
into situations where each is likely to learn the contingencies of interaction with 
the specific environmental conditions into which it is born. Examples include 
caching, food-begging, social interaction, foraging, risk-avoidance, activity 
patterns, leadership and orientation relative to homesites.
142See supra notes 128 - 131 & accompanying text.   See also supra notes 132 - 135 & 
accompanying text.
143See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 99 (a lone wolf “may starve 
without the shared hunting experience and concentrated killing power of the pack, or be . . . killed 
by other wolves. . . . [T]hey are immensely more vulnerable to hunters”).
144See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
145See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102 (“Any wolf in possession of 
food is likely to have a zone of one to two feet around it that no other wolf will enter”).
146See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 127-136.  Ants in a colony 
collectively find and acquire food by sending hundreds or thousands of foragers out into their 
territory; when a forager finds a food source, she brings back what she can carry and lays down a 
trail that will signal other foragers to do the same.  Wolves, on the other hand, collectively search 
for, eventually find and then kill their food, a task which can be both challenging and dangerous.  
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See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 22-23, 54-77. Wolves employ 
intelligence in deciding where to hunt, when to hunt, what to hunt and how to hunt. See id.
147See supra note 125.
148See supra § II(A)(1).  See also supra note 89.
149See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
150See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
151See supra note 143.
152See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 12, 93-101.
153See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
154See supra note 121 & accompanying text.  The presence of queens, workers and soldiers may 
suggest that ant colonies and the hives of other social insects are hierarchically organized, but 
that is not the case.  As the previous section explained, ant colonies are organized laterally; there 
are castes in the sense that ants have a fixed, to some extent biologically-determined division of 
labor, but the castes are not ranked.  See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
155
 See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102.  See also Jane M. 
Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra (noting that alpha wolves 
“`police’” access to clumped food”, such as an “ungulate carcass”).  
156See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 99-100, 111-112.  See also id. at 
100:
Wolves are social beings, enjoying warm, companionable . . . lives within the 
pack.  But wolves are also individuals, . . . competing, sometimes violently, for 
social standing. . . . It is in a wolf’s interest to accommodate and coordinate with 
other wolves, yet also to contend with the same wolves. . . . Humans and wolves 
both evolved as group hunters. . . . [T]hey have surprisingly similar social lives.  
Both have dominance hierarchies; both care deeply for their young and their 
families and can display . . . exacting coordination in complex tasks; both take 
pleasure in companionship . . . and play.  Yet both can be aggressive and violent.
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157See, e.g., Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra
(describing how, in one pack “two adult daughters approached their father [who was feeding on a 
deer carcass] in a low crouch, he pinned each to the ground with an inhibited muzzle-bite. . . .The 
grown daughters stayed away from the carcass until their father was finished”).  
158See supra note 125.
159As noted earlier, there are also alpha females, beta males and females, and still other ranks.  
See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
160See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
161See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
162See, e.g., Jenny Ryon Social Organization of Wolves, Canadian Centre for Wolf Research 
(2000), http://www.wolfca.com/SocialOrg.html (wolf social organization is “like politics in that there 
is always a contender for the dominant position no matter how long the incumbent has been in 
power. To quote a political adage `the day you are elected is one day closer to leaving office’”).
163 See supra note 95 & accompanying text. 
164See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102.  Conversely, it is not 
prohibited (deviant) behavior for beta wolves to feed contemporaneously because this conduct 
comports with the behaviors prescribed by the essential constitutive rules that create and govern 
order within a wolf pack. 
165See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
166See infra § II(A)(2)(c). 
167 See supra note 96 & accompanying text.
168See supra note 164 & accompanying text.
169 See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
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170See infra § II(A)(2)(c). 
171The status and consequent rights and privileges enjoyed by particular wolves is a dynamic 
aspect of wolf social life.  The general structure of wolf social life, on the other hand, is far less 
dynamic than the structure of social life in human societies.  See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
1721 William Blackstone Commentaries 39.   
173See supra note 99 & accompanying text.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
174See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
175See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 555.  See also supra note 56 & 
accompanying text.  For the premise that  intelligence and sociality interacted in the process of 
human evolution, see, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-568.
176See supra § II(A)(1).  
177For a discussion of the complexity of human societies, see infra notes 186 - 191 & 
accompanying text.
178See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 548 (“The parameters of social 
organization, including group size, properties of hierarchies, and rates of gene exchange, vary far 
more among human populations than among those of any other . . . species”).
179
 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 548-549.
180
 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549.
181
 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549 (citing the “slave society of Jamaica” and the Ik 
of Uganda).  
182
 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 550.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
183Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 47 (footnote 
omitted).
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184Id.  See, e.g., supra § II(A)(2)(b).
185Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 47.
186Id. at 50.  See also id. (“none of these formations may be understood as products of man’s 
biological constitution, which . . . provides only the outer limits for human productive activity”).  
See, e.g., id. at 47-50 (limited role of biology in human social evolution).  See generally Edward 
O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-574.
187Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 51.
188See supra § II(A)(1).  
189Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 52 (emphasis 
in the original).  See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change, and 
the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 898 (1997) (“social order is produced by identifiable or 
discoverable processes that hold society together”).  
190See supra § II(A)(1).  
191See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
192See supra notes 89 - 96 & accompanying text.
193See supra notes 24 - 25 & accompanying text.
194See, e.g., “All About Entropy, The Laws of Thermodynamics, and Order from Disorder,”  
Archives of Science (2001), http://www.entropylaw.com/entropyenergy.html (laws of 
thermodynamics “sit above the ordinary laws of nature as . . . laws upon which the other laws 
depend”).
Id. (citing R. Swenson & M. Turvey, Thermodynamic Reasons for Perception-Action Cycles, 3 
Ecological Psychology 317 (1991), http://www.ecologicalpsychology.com/SwenTurv.pdf. 
195Id.  See, e.g., supra § II(A)(2)(a).  Cf. Antz, http://www.pdi.com/feature/antz.htm. 
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196See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 79.  See also supra § 
II(A)(2)(a).
197See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
198See supra notes 179 - 181 & accompanying text.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
199See supra notes 179 - 181 & accompanying text.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
200See supra notes 29 - 31 & accompanying text. 
201See supra note 95 & accompanying text.
202John Steward, Evolution’s Arrow:  The Direction of Evolution and the Future of Humanity 116 
(2000),  http://www4.tpg.com.au/users/jes999/Part%204.pdf.  See also Edward O. Wilson, 
Sociobiology, supra, at 553-554, 569.
203See supra notes 29 - 31 & accompanying text. 
204The social order described above is characteristic of characteristic of a “complex” hunter-
gatherer band.  See, e.g., Paul Rubin, Hierarchy, 11 Human Nature 259 (2000), 
http://www.archaeoworld.com/journals/humannature/articleDetail.cfm?articleNumber=154 (noting 
the distinction between “simple” hunter-gatherers and “complex” hunter-gatherers; the former are  
“mobile, egalitarian, live in small settlements and the only `occupational specialization’ is by age”, 
while the latter are organized by a dominance hierarchy and possess a division of labor).  
205There are other similarities between human social organization at this stage of is evolution and 
the behavior of wolves.  Like wolf packs, human bands were territorial; and like wolves, humans 
played.   See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-568.
206See supra § II(A)(2)(b).   For a theoretical model of why dominance evolves even in small 
human social groupings, see, e.g., James L. Boone, Competition, Conflict, and the Development 
of Social Hierarchies in Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior 301-337 (Eric Alden Smith, et 
al., eds. 1992).  See also Polly Weissner, Leveling the Hunter Constraints on the Status Quest in 
Foraging Societies in Food and the Status Quest:  An Interdisciplinary Perspective 171-188 (Wulf 
Schiefenhovel & Pauline Weissner, eds. 1995).  Physical prowess would have been the original 
mode of gaining authority, just as it is with wolves.  As human social life evolved in complexity, 
Brenner – Distributed Security
131
the notion of inherited authority appeared, supplementing, if not replacing, physical prowess.  
See, e.g., Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson, Darwinism, Dominance, & Democracy:  The 
Biological Bases of Authoritarianism 53 & 62 n. 2 (1997) (noting the inheritance of dominance in 
chimpanzees and other non-human species).
207In addition to these routine matters, the dominant male would no doubt deal with challenges to 
his authority, resolve conflicts between members of the band and, perhaps, make decisions about 
mating between members of his band and members of other bands. 
208See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 553-554, 566, 569.
209See supra § II(A)(2)(b).
210Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 569.
211See, e.g., David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks:  A Framework About Social 
Evolution 5-17 RAND (1996), http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P7967/P7967.pdf.    See also
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra at 168 (discussing “permissions” and power-
conferring rules).
212See generally Henry Maine, Ancient Law, Chapter 5 (1861); Claude Hermann Walter Johns, 
Babylonian Law —The Code of Hammurabi, Encyclopedia Britannica (1910-1911), 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hammpre.htm.  See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi, 
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,  
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm; 
Laws of the Kings, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/laws_of_thekings.htm; The 
Statute of Laborers (1351), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/statlab.htm.  See also
Tacitus, Germania, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/tacitus-germanygord.html.
The extent to which constitutive rules define and circumscribe the behavioral options of 
its respective members varies with the nature of the social system; feudal societies, for example, 
were characterized by an intricate system of constitutive rules.  See, e.g., Norman F. Cantor.  The 
Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).   
213See, e.g., Robert K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems:  An 
Introduction to the Sociology of Deviant Behavior and Social Disorganization 21-22 (1961):
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All societies have rules that specify appropriate and inappropriate ways of 
behaving. These . . .  `norms’ . . . are sets of directions for behavior, and 
members of a society are expected to follow them. When a child is born, he . . . 
comes under the influence of the . . . `society,’ in which he lives. . . . [W]hat he is 
fed, when he is fed, and how he is fed all are determined by norms existing in 
advance of his arrival. And as he grows older . . . he is increasingly expected to 
conform to norms himself. . . .
[N]orms . . . are not all of equal importance. The most important ones have been 
called mores, and they constitute the basic rules that are . . . holding a society 
together. When the mores are violated, members of the society respond with 
great moral indignation; punishment is likely to be quite severe. . . . [A]cts, such 
as cannibalism, rape, and murder, are violations of mores. Less important norms 
are called folkways, and punishments for violation of them are likely to be quite 
mild. . . . Rules about table manners, styles of dress, and etiquette are folkways. . 
. . .  [T]he criminal law is a body of rules stipulating that anyone violating certain 
folkways and mores will be considered a criminal and will be officially punished.
(emphasis in the original).  See also Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and 
Enforcing Norms with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 369, 369-372 
(1999). 
214See, e.g., Robert K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems, supra, at 21-
22.  See also Cristiano Castelfranchi, Engineering Social Order, First International Workshop on 
Engineering Societies in the Agents’ World (2000), 
http://lia.deis.unibo.it/confs/ESAW00/pdf/ESAW04.pdf.  
Norms have historically been effective because there was little in the way of behavioral 
innovation; the rise and proliferation of technology, however, can undermine the effectiveness of 
norms as an agent of social control.  See, e.g., Cam Phones Spread New Brands of Mischief,
CNN.com (July 10, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/07/10/naughty.camphones.ap/index.html (“`The problem 
with a new technology is that society has yet to come up with a common understanding about 
appropriate behavior,’ said Mizuko Ito, an expert on mobile phone culture”)..  
215See, e.g., M. Weber, Economy And Society 34 (G. Roth & C. Wittich ed. 1978) (“An order will 
be called . . . law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that . . . coercion will be applied 
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by a staff of people . . . to bring about compliance  or avenge violation”).  See also Edwin M. 
Schur, Law and Society:  A Sociological View 76 (1968); Max Weber on Law in Economy and 
Society 5 (Max Rheinstein, ed., trans. by E. Shils & M. Rheinstein 1954). The “consequences” 
cited above are not the relatively Draconian consequences attendant upon failing to conform to 
the dictates of the criminal law, which is discussed later in the text.  The “consequences” 
attendant upon failing to conform to the dictates of civil, constitutive law are less onerous in 
nature and, indeed, may take the form of a default; if, for example, one purports to enter into 
marriage without having obtained the necessary license and otherwise complying with the 
requirements of the constitutive law, the marriage will null and void.  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 30-1-9 
(“No marriage shall be solemnized without a license”).  See also Parks v. Martinson, 694 So.2d 
1386, 1390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
216See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 562:
The extreme plasticity of human social behavior is both a great strength and a 
real danger.  If each family worked out rules of behavior on its own, the result 
would be an intolerably amount of tradition drift and growing chaos.  To 
counteract selfish behavior and the `dissolving power’ of high intelligence, each 
society must codify itself.
Id. (quoting Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1935)).  See also H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law 27 (1975) (“Legal rules defining the ways in which valid contracts or 
wills or marriages are made do not require persons to act in certain ways whether they wish to or 
not. Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide individuals with facilities
for realizing their wishes”) (emphasis in the original).
217See, e.g., Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 
129-147.
2183 William Blackstone, Commentaries 1.
219Systems populated by ants and other social insects, for example, have only constitutive rules. 
See supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).  For the definition of “intelligence” used in this article, see 
supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.
220See supra note 216.  See also supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.
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221See supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
222See supra note 216.  See also supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.
223See supra note 34 & accompanying text.  See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control, 
supra at 11 (“Deviance, if not contained, is always a threat to organization”).  See generally
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/20/A0282000.html (defining anarchy as “[a]bsence of any common 
cohesive principle, such as a common standard or purpose”).
224For a slightly different perspective, see, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control, supra at 
4  (deviance destroys social organization in three ways:  (1) by disrupting coordinated processes; 
(2) by destroying people’s willingness to play their parts in the system; and (3) by destroying 
one’s faith that other members of the system will play their parts in the system).
225
“Preying upon” another can take any of a variety of forms, e.g., sexual attack, theft, fraud, 
physical assault, murder.
226It is, perhaps, helpful to illustrate the behaviors, and results, that fall into each category: If a 
parent chose not to provide for his children, a function essential for the survival of the system 
would not be performed.  See supra note 29 & accompanying text.  If a man chose to murder his 
neighbor’s children, this would constitute socially destructive behavior.   
227See supra note 89 & accompanying text.  See, e.g., Sex, Mob Hits:  Sims Tests Virtual Morals, 
CNN.com (July 5, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/fun.games/07/05/misbehaving.online.ap/index.html:
. . . Jeremy Chase admits to shaking down his enemies. His Web site advertises 
extortion, hits and prostitution for a hefty fee. 
Chase is a mob leader -- but only in the virtual world. He is one of hundreds of 
players who found the path of lawlessness and deviance too irresistible when 
`The Sims Online’ challenged them to `Be Somebody ... else.’
The popular . . .  game . . . is turning into a petri dish of anti-social behavior. And 
that's raising questions about whether limits on conduct should be set in such 
emerging virtual worlds . . . . 
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See also id. (“`We're going to be forced to create a whole new area of social convention -- and 
probably law -- that reflects that kind of behavior,’ said psychologist David Greenfield”).
228See supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
229The same is true of systems populated by intelligent artificial entities as long as their behavior 
is subject to constraints which operate in a fashion analogous to those biology imposes on most 
species.  See, e.g., Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies, supra, at 
23-26.  If a social system were populated by artificial entities (a) whose intelligence was at least 
comparable to that of humans and (b) who were not subject to constraints analogous to those 
that channel the behavior of non-human biological species, then that system could confront the 
possibility of deviant behavior.  To be truly “deviant,” though, behavior has to originate in the 
intellect and autonomy; deviant behavior, in other words, has to be contumacious.   See supra 
note 89 & accompanying text. See also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th edition 2000), http://www.onelook.com/?w=contumacious&ls=a (defining 
contumacious as “[o]bstinately disobedient or rebellious”).  
230See supra § II(A)(2)(a) &  § II(A)(2)(b).
231See supra note 229.
232See supra notes 218 - 227 & accompanying text.
233See Paul H. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 125 (1997) (criminal law “it 
defines and announces the conduct that is prohibited. . . . Such 'rules of conduct' . . . provide ex 
ante direction to the members of the community as to the conduct that must be avoided . . . upon 
pain of criminal sanction”).   See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 42  (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, ed. 1963) (“purpose of the criminal law is . . . to induce external conformity to 
rule”); Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society:  A Sociological View 72 (1968) (noting that 
“mechanisms of social control are required in all societies” to deal with the “conflict and deviance” 
that “constitute integral aspects of social life”); Model Penal Code § 1.02(1)(a) (purpose of 
criminal law is to “forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably . . . inflicts or threatens substantial 
harm to individual or public interests”).   See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi, The Avalon Project 
at Yale Law School,  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm; The Salic Law, 
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/salic.htm.  
See generally  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27 (1975).
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The “civil” rules in a system can be, and often are, defined to include consequences that 
follow upon a failure to follow a particular rule.  These consequences can consist of civil litigation 
brought either by a private party or by the system itself.  They can also take the form of fines or 
other regulatory sanctions imposed by the system.  
234Constitutive rules can also govern whether or not a lawfully-born child will be allowed to live.  
See, e.g., Cynthia B. Patterson, The Family in Greek History 74 (1998) (describing how Spartan 
fathers took their children to a council of elders, who decided whether it should live). Such rules 
can also govern the number of children those who are allowed to reproduce can lawfully have.  
See, e.g., Kate Xiao Zhou, The Family Revolution in Contemporary China in The Family in Global 
Transition 201-204 (Gordon L. Anderson, ed. 1997) (“one child rule”).  
235See, e.g., 750 Il. Comp. Stat. § 5/303.  See also John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family 
Law 28 (1982) (rules determining legitimacy in classical Islamic law).
236See, e.g., Ark. Code § 9-10-113 (custody of illegitimate child); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-56b 
(presumption of parental custody). See also  J.S. La Fontaine, The Family in Early Modern 
England in The Family in Global Transition 102-105 (Gordon L. Anderson, ed. 1997) (in early 
modern England, families often sent their children to live with others, e.g. wet-nurses, employers 
or relatives).
237See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-211 (“The parent or parents of a child shall give the child 
support and education suitable to the child's circumstances”); Ind. Code § 31-14-11-19 (duty to 
support child is terminated by emancipation).   See also Jane F. Gardner, Family and Familia in 
Roman Law and Life 6-113 (1998).  Constitutive rules governing emancipation also establish 
affirmative rules of conduct; that is, one a child has been emancipated, the parent is obliged to 
recognize that emancipation and behavior in accordance with the child’s new status.  See id.
238See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 270 (“If a parent of a minor child willfully omits . . . to furnish 
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her 
child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand 
dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment”).  See also Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2(a)(1) 
(2003) (“a parent may be guilty of criminal homicide for failure to call a doctor for his sick child 
[and] a mother for failure to prevent the fatal beating of her baby by her lover”).  
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239See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 654 (“The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons 
to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be 
ownership is called property”); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-1-101 (“The ownership of a thing is the right 
of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this code, the thing of 
which there may be ownership is called property”).
240See, e.g. Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 19.8 (theft) & 21.3 (arson) (2003). 
241These rules address what are often called “crimes against persons.”  See, e.g., Model Penal 
Code § 210.1(1) (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he . . . causes the death of another 
human being”).   See also id. at § 213.1 (rape) & § 212.1 (kidnapping).  See also William L. 
Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism:  Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime 
and Punishment, 74 Ind. L.J. 627, 649 (1999).
242See supra note 213.  The U.S. Constitution and many state constitutions do contain provisions 
that refer to general expectations, such as “enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”   
Cal. Const. art. I § 1 (1849).  See also  U.S. Const. amends. v & xiv § 1; Col. Const. art. II § 3; Id. 
Const. art. I § 1; Iowa Const. art. I § 1; Ky. Const. § 1; N.D. Const. art. I § 1; Va. Const. art. I § 1.  
But these provisions are not the constitutive correlates of criminal rules that impose liability for 
what are often called “crimes against persons.”  They are due process guarantees that constrain 
government, not individual action.  See, e.g., In Interest of Reginald D., 533 N.W.2d 181, 184-185 
(Wis. 1993) (provision of Wisconsin Constitution guaranteeing “life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness is the state equivalent of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).   See 
also Jack Stark, A Practical Guide to Drafting State Constitutional Provisions, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 
1061, 1067 (2000); John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to “State Action” as a Limit on State 
Constitutional Rights Guarantees:  A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 Rutgers L.J. 819, 850-
852 (1990).
243See, e.g., Portugal, Código Penal, http://www.cea.ucp.pt/lei/penal/penalind.htm; Criminal Code 
of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1934), 
http://www.tiac.net/users/hcunn/rus/uk-rsfsr.html.  
244See generally Michael E.Tigar, Crime Talk, Rights Talk, and Double-Talk:  Thoughts on 
Reading the Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 101, 108 (1986) (“When the 
powerful prey upon the weak . . . the criminal law has a legitimate concern”).
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245See H.L.A. Hart, Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules, THE NATURE OF LAW 
144, 145 (M. P. Golding ed. 1966) (society must enact “in some form restrictions on the free use 
of violence, theft, and deception to which human beings are tempted but which they must, in 
general, repress if they are to coexist in close proximity to each other”). See, e.g., Criminal Code 
of the Republic of Belarus, http://www.belarus.net/softinfo/lowcatal.htm; Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm; German Penal Code, 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/publik/e_stgb.pdf; The Indian Penal Code, 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/india/manu-full.html;  See also American Law Institute, Model 
Penal Code (1962).  
246 See, e.g., Fiji Islands Penal Code, §§ 50 (treason), 87 (unlawful assembly) & 130 (destroying 
evidence), 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fiji_legislation/Consolidation_1978/Fiji_Penal_Code.html
; Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Articles 114 (treason), 153 (tumults and other 
disturbances of public order) & 180-181 (false testimony), 
http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm.
247 See, e.g., Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1934), § 58-12, 
http://www.tiac.net/users/hcunn/rus/uk-rsfsr.html (“Failure to denounce a counterrevolutionary 
crime, reliably known to be in preparation or carried out, shall be punishable by . . .deprivation of 
liberty for a term not less than six months”).  
248 Compare Zamfara State of Nigeria, Shari’ah Penal Code Law (Jan. 2000), §§ 126 & 127 
(fornication and adultery offenses), 
http://www.nigerianlaws.com/frames/docs/stats/ShariaCodeContents.html with Conn. Gen. Stat.  
§ 53a-81 (adultery offense repealed) and D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1001 (fornication offense 
repealed).  See also Fiji Islands Penal Code, §§ 145 (insult to religion) & 232 (witchcraft and 
sorcery), 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fiji_legislation/Consolidation_1978/Fiji_Penal_Code.html
;  Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Article 200 (grave scandal), 
http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm; United Arab Emirates 
Penal Code Article 358 (1988) (offense of committing “publicly an infamous act constituting a 
violation of the rules of decency”).
249See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 216 (1975) (noting that the term “state” is a 
“way of referring to two facts: first, that a population inhabiting a territory lives under that form of 
ordered government provided by a legal system with its characteristic structure of legislature, 
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courts, and primary rules; and, secondly, that the government enjoys a vaguely defined degree of 
independence”).
250 See supra notes 30 - 33 & accompanying text.
251See, e.g., D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 3-27 (1961) (negative 
impact of Russian Revolution on Russia’s participation in World War I).
252See, e.g.,  Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles:  War, Peace, and the Course of History 75-
205 (2002).
253See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, The International Court Of Justice's Decision In Congo V. 
Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development Of A Principle Of Universal Jurisdiction That 
Would Obligate All States To Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 63, 69-70 (2003) 
(noting that “[t]erritory . . . is the bedrock of criminal law jurisdiction”, with some exceptions). For 
the law of war, see, e.g., Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence:  A 
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 Harv. Int’l L. J. 49 (1994). There are rules defining “war 
crimes,” but these atypical rules transcend the structure of individual systems.  See, e.g., Jeremy 
Colwill, From Nuremberg to Bosnia and Beyond:  War Crimes Trials in the Modern Era, 22 Social 
Justice 111 (1995).
254See, e.g., Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, supra, at 296-297.
255See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 7 (1998) (“Whether one is ever 
held liable for a particular offense depends on the rules of procedure. These rules determine how 
the state enforces the criminal law by . . . convicting and punishing those responsible”).  
256The Italian proverb quoted above translates as “the law has been made, the loophole has been 
found” or, more literally, “”made the law, found the loophole.” See, e.g., Proverbi e detti italiani, 
http://www.italissimo.de/Proverbi.htm. Neil Mitchison, of the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, was kind enough to call the proverb to the author’s attention and 
to provide the translations. 
257Brian Goodwin & Ricard Solae, Signs of Life:  How Complexity Pervades Biology, supra, at 
149-150.  See also supra § II(A)(2)(a).
258See supra § II(A)(2).   
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259See, e.g., J.S. Eros, Karl Mannheim & W.A.C. Stewart, Systematic Sociology:  An Introduction 
to the Study of Society 126 (1957):
[C]ontrol is based upon the existence of authority. There are people of authority, 
there are statements of authority. There is no social order without authority. . . . 
Most societies are built up on an elaborate system of controls among which 
physical force is only a last resort.
260See supra § II(A)(2)(b).
261See supra § II(A)(2)(b).
262
“Dominance is . . . the outcome of a competitive encounter where the prize for the contest 
winner is prerogative to pursue desired incentives without interference from the loser.”  Patricia R. 
Barchas & Sally P. Mendoza, Emergent Hierarchical Relationships in Rhesus Macaques:  An 
Application of Chase’s Model in Social Hierarchies:  Essays Toward A Sociophysiological 
Perspective 81 (Patricia R. Barchas, ed. 1984).
263See supra § II(A)(2).
264See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 50-58 (1975).
265Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror:  The Calamitous 14th Century 482 (1978) (Wenceslas 
IV of Bohemia “lacked the character to dominate” his subjects; “the incessant warring of groups 
and classes, of towns versus princes, lesser nobles against the greater . . . created a network of 
dissension that defied sovereignty—and destroyed the sovereign”).
266See, e.g., Max Weber:  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott 
Parsons, trans. 1947).  See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text.  
267See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text.  See, e.g., M. Marvin Berger & Martin Alan 
Greenberg, Auxiliary Police:  The Citizen’s Approach to Public Safety 14 (1984) (“as ancient 
villages became ancient kingdoms additional norms were imposed upon the community and 
these norms were set down in written form”).
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268See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text.  The process was gradual, and relational 
rules persisted, in some form, for centuries.  See, e.g., Max Weber:  The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947).  See also  Norman F. Cantor.  
The Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).   
269See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text.  The process was gradual, and relational 
rules persisted, in some form, for centuries.  See, e.g., Max Weber:  The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947).  See also  Norman F. Cantor.  
The Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).   
270See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.1 (2003).  See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 
1.03 (territorial applicability of provisions).
271Cybercrime:  The Challenge to Leviathan, London School of Economics:  The Hayek Society, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/clubs/hayek/Essays/cybercrime.htm.
272Real-world crime is crime perpetrated in and via the real, physical world, that is, without the 
use of technology.  “Technology” refers to any technology, not simply computer technology.  The 
model of real-world crime articulated above is based upon the repertoire of “harms” a perpetrator 
could inflict before, say, the nineteenth century, which saw great advances in firearms and other 
technology.
273One can avoid the need for physical proximity by engaging someone to carry out the offense 
on their behalf, as when someone hires another to kill their unfaithful spouse or ungenerous 
wealthy relative.  This does not undermine the validity of the point being made above because, in 
a non-technological world, the actual perpetrator will have to occupy some degree of physical 
proximity to the victim at the time the crime is committed.  See also infra note 276. 
274The characterization of real-world crime presented above assumes substantive crimes such as 
murder, rape, theft, arson, burglary and the like.  The one-to-one character of these substantive 
offenses may not hold for inchoate crimes and clearly does not apply to compound crimes such 
as felony-murder, CCE or RICO offenses.  As to inchoate crimes, one can be part of a conspiracy 
to commit bank robbery while robbing the bank; it is also possible simultaneously to conspire and 
attempt or conspire and solicit the commission of a crime.  See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate 
Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 54-58, 89-91 (1989). The one-to-one nature of real-world 
substantive crime is abrogated by compound offenses such as felony-murder and RICO, the 
rationale of which is that one course of conduct constitutes the simultaneous commission of 
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various offenses.   See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes:  The 
Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 239 (1993).  
Finally, the characterization presented above does not encompass the rare occasions 
when a single course of conduct results in the coincident commission of two different substantive 
crimes.  A father, for example, who rapes his daughter simultaneously commits the crimes of rape 
and incest.  See, e.g., State v. Rosenbalm, 2002 WL 31746708 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). 
275For the additional role physical constraints play in structuring the nature of real-world crime, 
see infra § II(B)(2)(c). 
276This has never been true of murderers who employ poison; they can cause the more or less 
simultaneous deaths of many victims by, say, poisoning the food served at a banquet.  And those 
who use poison also deviate from the model being articulated above in another way:  They do not 
have to be in physical proximity with their victim(s) at the time the homicide occurs, though they 
do require physical proximity either to the victim or to some substance the victim will consume in 
order to cause the victim’s death.  In a non-technological world, “remote” poisoning is not a viable 
possibility.  It is, however, quite possible in a technological world.  The killer might, for example, 
hack into a hospital’s computer system and alter the medication prescribed for patients, either by 
changing the medication entirely or by increasing the prescribed dose.  Such an alteration could 
cause the death of some patients, depending on the nature of the alteration and the likelihood 
that the medical staff became aware of it and decline to administer the modified prescriptions.  
277See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybercrime? How Cyberspace May Affect the 
Structure of Criminal Relationships,4 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 1 (2002), 
http://www.jolt.unc.edu/. 
278There were, no doubt, one-to-many deviations in the pre-nineteenth century world.  A forger 
might, for example, falsify a document and use it to victimize a company, perhaps a bank; if one 
construes the bank as constituting “many” victims, then this would be an instance of simultaneous 
one-to-many victimization.   Or a robber might intercept a stagecoach and use a  weapon to take 
property from several travelers at essentially the same time; this could be brought within the one-
to-one premise if the occupants of the stagecoach are construed as “one,” but it is more logical to 
construe this as an instance of simultaneous one-to-many victimization.
279See generally Hans Geser, Toward a (Meta)-Sociology of the Digital Sphere, § 3, Sociology in 
Switzerland (December 2002), http://socio.ch/intcom/t_hgeser13.htm#3.
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280The operation of physical constraints accounts for the one-to-one nature of real-world crime.  
See supra § II(B)(2)(b).  
281See, e.g., John W. Kennish, Developing a Comprehensive Bank Robbery Prevention Program 
(2000), http://www.kennish.com/robberythreat/.  See also Nebraska Robbery Suspects Denied 
Bail, Muzi News (Sept. 27, 2002), http://news.1chinastar.com/ll/english/1227483.shtml (bank 
robbers planned the robbery for two weeks, “casing” the bank several times during that period).
282See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 254 F.3d 679, 680-682 (7th Cir. 2001). 
283See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, supra, 254 F.3d at 681.See also People v. Ihrig, 2002 WL 
31501922 *1 - *2 (Cal. App. 2002); Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Ga. App. 2002).
284 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, supra, at 681 (7th Cir. 2001). See also People v. Barnes, 
2002 WL 1999737 *1 (Cal. App. 2002). 
285 See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth, 2002 WL 31163645 *2 (Va. App. 2002); People v. Barnes, 
2002 WL 1999737 *1 (Cal. App. 2002). 
286See, e.g., State v. Mullins, 34 Ohio App.3d 192, 194, 517 N.E.2d 945, 948-949 (Ohio App. 
1986).
287See, e.g., People v. Aleman, 809 So.2d 1056, 1065-1066 (La. App. 2002).
288See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Victimization 2001:  
Changes 2001 with Trends 1993-2001 15 (2002),  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf; 
U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States 
(2001), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf.   
289See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy, Erika Poulsen & John Hodgson, Problem Solving Using Crime 
Mapping:  Concentration and Context, Crime Mapping Research Center, 2001 Conference 
Papers, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/cmrc/conferences/01conf/Kennedy.doc (“about 60 percent of 
crime occurs in 10 percent of the places, 10 percent of offenders account for about 50 percent of 
offenses, and 10 percent of victimized people are involved in about 40 percent of the crimes”)
(citing William Spelman & John E. Eck, Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves and Helping Hands: 
New Approaches to Urban Policing, 35 Public Affairs Comment 1-9 (1989)). See also Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:  Arrests by State, 2001, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl69.xls; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Reports:  Index of Crime – United States, 1982-2001, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.
A “functioning society” is one in which the rule of law prevails and the assumption that 
“crime” represents extraordinary behavior consequently holds.  See supra § II(A).  
290See supra note 289.  See generally Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, 
Crime and Victimization:  An Economic Perspective, 1.1 Economia 219 (2000), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/eco/1.1fajnzylber.pdf.
291See, e.g., Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, Crime and Victimization:  An 
Economic Perspective, supra, at 266-273.   See also Ken Pease & Gloria Laycock, 
Revictimization:  Reducing the Heat on Hot Victims, U.S. Department of Justice – National 
Institute of Justice, Research in Action (November, 1996), 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/revictim.pdf.  
292See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy, Erika Poulsen & John Hodgson, Problem Solving Using Crime 
Mapping, supra; Gary LaFree, et al., The Changing Nature of Crime in America, U.S. Department 
of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Criminal Justice 2000 21-24, 
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02a.pdf;  Luc Anselin, et al., Spatial Analyses of 
Crime, U.S. Department of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Criminal Justice 2000, 
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf; Paul Brantingham & Patricia 
Brantingham, A Theoretical Model of Crime Hot Spot Generation, 8 Studies on Crime and Crime 
Prevention 7-26 (1999).  
293See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct 
in Cyberspace, supra,  2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. at 55-65.  See also supra § II(A)(3).  For the 
proposition that a “crime” inflicts “harm” upon the victim, see, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There 
Such a Thing as “Virtual Crime”?, supra, 4 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 1.
294See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1(1).
295See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 223.2.
296See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 224.1.  
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297See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United 
States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.   The unpredictability of some of 
the more serious crimes, such as rape and murder, lies in the motivations for their commission; 
crimes of passion, which is what often drives murder, are often committed spontaneously, in a 
burst of emotion or, in the case of serial killers, as the result of irrational psychological impulse.  
See, e.g., Stephen J. Giannangelo, The Psychopathology of Serial Murder:  A Theory of Violence 
7-43 (1996).  While some types of murder – such as familial homicide – might have been 
predicted by those who knew the family members, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize as 
to the frequency with which this type of crime will occur.  See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, 
Preventing Homicide Through Trial and Error, Australian Institute of Criminology (1992),      
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/17/sherman.pdf .  On the other hand, it is possible 
to predict that certain types of offenses – such as various levels of drug-dealing, assaults, 
robberies, trafficking in stolen goods and prostitution -- will occur in “hot spots,” i.e., urban 
geographies in which crime is highly concentrated.  See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice –
National Institute of Justice, Policing Drug Hot Spots, NIJ Research Preview (January 1996), 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/hotspot.pdf/
298See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United 
States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.   
299See Model Penal Code § 223.1.  
300See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United 
States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.   
301See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, Tables 4.1 & 4.6, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t46.pdf
302See, e.g., Security Alert, Kansas City Police Department – Property Crimes Division, 
http://www.kcpd.org/propertycrimes.html (“[W]e have identified a pattern involving check 
forgeries. These offenses usually occur in areas where there is a strip mall or several businesses 
very close together”); Monica Alexander & Wei-Ning Xiang, Crime Pattern Analysis Using GIS, 
http://wwwsgi.ursus.maine.edu/gisweb/spatdb/gis-lis/gi94001.html (“spatial pattern of homicides” 
in the Charlotte, North Carolina urban area).  
303See supra § II(A)(3).
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304See supra § II(B)(1).
305Indeed, the presence of a stranger might offer a ready, simple solution to criminal investigation.  
Since the stranger had no local ties, prosecuting and punishing him was unlikely to cause unrest 
in the local community; and punishing an outsider avoided any controversy or ill-will that might 
attend the apprehension and prosecution of a local citizen.  See, e.g., Walter Van Tilburg Clark, 
The Ox-bow Incident (2001).
306The premise that victim and victimizer were necessarily physically proximate during the 
commission of an offense also contributed another element to the traditional model:  the concept 
of criminal jurisdiction.  See supra note 253 & accompanying text.  
307See, e.g., Richard H. Doney, et al., Serial Murder:  An Elusive Phenomenon 164 (1990):
In a stranger-to-stranger murder lacking in physical evidence or witnesses, 
criminal investigators are left to deal with a very large set of suspects, with only a 
small probability of this set including the offender.  . . . [M]ost serial murderers 
are caught by chance or coincidence. . . . Law enforcement agencies today are 
simply not adept at identifying or apprehending the murderer who kills strangers 
and moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and crosses state lines. 
308See supra § II(A)(2)-(3).
309See supra § II(A)(2)-(3).
310See supra § II(B)(1)(b).
311See supra § II(B)(1)(b).
312See supra § II(B)(1)(b).
313See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, Table 4.5, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t45.pdf (total arrests per state in 2000 averaged 
roughly 4%-6% of the state population).  
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314Some “crimes” will be committed by individuals who have no history of criminal activity; this is 
often true of domestic violence offenses, for example.  These non-career offenders are not 
included in the analysis above for two reasons:  One is that there is no accurate way to predict 
the number of situational offenders who will emerge in a population during a given time period.  
The other is that persistent offenders are primarily responsible for the rate of victimization in a 
society.  See, e.g., Narrowing the Gap 13, Criminal Justice System (October 17, 2002), 
http://www.cjsonline.org/njg/documents/njg-framework.pdf. 
315Most offenders will perpetrate “crimes” only sporadically; the sporadic nature of crime is a 
product of the motives for committing real-world “crime” and the logistics involved in doing so.  
People commit real-world “crimes” for various reasons, including a desire for economic gain (e.g., 
theft, fraud), passion (e.g., spousal homicide, harassment) or compulsion (e.g., serial murder).  
Since the consummation of a “crime” tends to extinguish one’s motivation, at least for a while, the 
commission of real-world offenses is sporadic, even as to “career” offenders.  The intermittent 
nature of real-world criminality is also a function of the logistical issues offenders must address if 
they are to commit their “crimes” successfully and avoid prosecution.  See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
316This is not true of serial killers, but even they tend to offend sporadically.  See, e.g., Richard H. 
Doney, et al., Serial Murder:  An Elusive Phenomenon 164 (1990).
317The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports establish that the overwhelming 
majority of indexed crimes committed in the United States for the period 1982-2001 were non-
violent offenses.  See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:  Index of Crime –
United States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.  
318See supra notes 313 - 317 and accompanying text.  This premise is similar to the others that 
influence the conceptualization, but it differs in an important respect.  This final premise is 
concerned not with the amount of “crime” but with how it is distributed, geographically and 
demographically, in a system. The amount of “crime” can affect the development of patterns, 
especially at the extremes:  If a system were so crime-riddled as to have become dysfunctional, it 
is doubtful that its “crime” would fall into identifiable patterns; the same would be true of a system 
in which the incidence of “crime” was essentially infinitesimal.  But for most functional societies, 
the incidence of real-world “crime” falls into what might be termed the “normal range,” for the 
reasons given earlier.  See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
319See supra notes 315 - 317 and accompanying text.
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320See supra notes 288 - 301 and accompanying text. 
321See, e.g., Increased Emphasis on Intelligence by Surrey Police, Surrey Police, United Kingdom 
(December 14, 2001), http://www.surrey.police.uk/news_item.asp?artid=1088 (police department 
allocating resources to “more effectively target the active criminals in Surrey. There are a 
comparatively small number of these who are responsible for a surprisingly large proportion of 
crime. By dealing effectively with those individuals we will reduce crime”).   
322See, e.g., J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction :  
The Evolution of the Police Function in Society 14-23 (1994).  
323See supra § II(A)(2)(b). 
324See supra § II(A)(2)(b).  
325See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(1)-(2), 1.5(a)(4) (2003).
326See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(4) (2003)
327See, e.g., Code of Hammurabi, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,  
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm (“the lord of Heaven and earth . . . 
called . . . me, Hammurabi, the exalted prince, who feared God, to bring about the rule of 
righteousness in the land, to destroy the wicked and the evil-doers”).  See also Wayne R. 
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(6) (2003).
328See, e.g., Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society:  A Documentary 
History xxv (1999) (“Serious crimes were rare in the earliest American colonies, and there was 
little need for formal law enforcement”).  See also Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard 
Scaglion, Police in Contradiction, supra, at 15-16. 
329See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
330See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
331See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Some Thoughts about Police and Crime in The Crime Conundrum, 
Essays on Criminal Justice 121-122 (George Fisher & Lawrence M. Friedman, eds. 1997) (“ the 
American public . . . and political leaders all assume that police . . . deter crime.”).  
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332See, e.g., Dennis Jay Kenney & Robert P. McNamara, Police and Policing:  Contemporary 
Issues 178-179 (1999) (proactive efforts are “very expensive).  See also Susan M. Hartnett & 
Wesley G. Skogan, Community Policing:  Chicago Style 13 (1997).
333See infra notes 431 & 437 & accompanying text.
334J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 65.  
See, e.g., id. at 59-64. 
335See id. at 65-71. 
336See id. at 15.  The Greek system seems to have involved private retribution.  See id.  The 
Roman Emperor Augustus organized citizens “into a semimilitary force known as the `Vigiles’”; 
while their “responsibilities included fire protection and street patrol”, their “main purpose was 
apparently to protect the ruling class from the threat of rebellion.”  Id.
337Id at 19 (quoting T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales 1-3 (2d ed.1972) & 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society 3 (1967)) (notes omitted).  See also Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The 
Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 3 (“In England, the active involvement of civilians in 
law enforcement began in about the tenth century. Each citizen was made responsible for aiding 
neighbors who were victimized by outlaws”).
338J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 19.  
See also  L.F. Salzman, English Life in the Middle Ages 215-220 (1926).
339See id. at 20.  
340Id. at 20 (notes omitted).  See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard:  A History 
of the Metropolitan Police 11-18
341David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165 , 1197 (1999) 
342See, e.g., Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 2-3 
(American colonists “variants of the law enforcement and protection procedures that long had 
been in place in their European homelands, such as the night watch, constabulary, and sheriff”).
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343J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 20. 
See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard:  A History of the Metropolitan Police 
11-24 (1956).      
344J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.   
See also Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 4 (similar 
problems with the American colonial version of the night watch-constable system).
345J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.  
See also Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe 149-150 (1999) 
(nineteenth century Italy used the sbirri, “armed thugs who performed some policing functions”). 
346J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.  
347Id.
348Id.
349Id. at 22.
350David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, supra,, 46 UCLA L. Rev. at 1202-1203 (notes omitted). 
See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard, supra, at 73-112.  
351J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 22.   
352See, e.g., Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 25.  
For the origins of the term “police,” see, e.g., Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, Private Security and 
Public Policing 2-3 (1998).
353Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 25.
354Id.
355Id. at 26.
356Id.
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357See, e.g., Clive Emsley & Barbara Weinberger, Policing Western Europe:  Politics, 
Professionalism and Public Order 1-14, 18-24, 55-68 (1991); Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the 
State in Nineteenth-Century Europe, supra, at 155-250.
358See, e.g., Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, Private Security and Public Policing, supra, at 7:
From the mid-nineteenth century . . . a professional state police force not only 
existed but was accorded a degree of legitimacy that would have been 
unimaginable a century earlier. . . . `[I]n contrast to the eighteenth century 
paradigm in which individuals . . . were centrally involved in policing, the 
implication . . . was to . . . exclude . . . the people from such involvement by 
redefining policing as the work of a state bureaucracy.' . . .   
Id. (quoting Philip Rawlings, The Idea of Policing: A History, Policing and Society 129, 143 
(1995)).  See also supra note 6.  
359See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Handbook of Crime & Punishment 439 (1998):
The initial public expectation for modern police was an extraordinary idea . . .: 
that police services should be performed free of charge. Prior to the creation of 
the New York City Police Department in 1845, policing was primarily a fee-for-
service business. If your neighbor burglarized your house and you wanted him 
prosecuted, you would have to pay a fee to the constable to arrest him. . . .  
360Richard O. Hundley & Robert H. Anderson, Emerging Challenge:  Security and Safety in 
Cyberspace in In Athena’s Camp:  Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age  231, 239 (1997),  
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880/MR880.ch10.pdf. 
361See supra § II(B)(1)(a).
362 See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct 
in Cyberspace, supra, at 7-8.  See, e.g., Counterfeit Ring Hacks Nebraska Bank’s Computer,
USA Today (July 23, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2003-07-23-
ne-hack_x.htm (Malaysian hackers attacked Kearney bank).
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363
 “Computer-related crimes. . . . can . . . be perpetrated from anywhere and against any 
computer user in the world.”  Communication from the European Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament, Creating a Safer Information Society By Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastrutures and Combating Computer-Related Crime 9 (2000), 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Crime/CrimeCommEN.html.  
364President’s Working Group On Unlawful Conduct On The Internet, The Electronic Frontier:  
The Challenge Of Unlawful Conduct Involving The Use Of The Internet, § II(D)(2) (March, 2000), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#CHALLENGES.
365See supra § II(B)(1)(b).
366See Donn Parker, Automated Crime, WindowSecurity.com (October 16, 2002), 
http://secinf.net/misc/Automated_Crime_.html/.  For an example of how automation can increase 
the scale of criminal activity, see, e.g., Kelli Arena, U.S. Targets Porn Site’s Customers,
CNN.com (August 8, 2001), http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/08/08/ashcroft.childporn/ (Texas 
website offering child pornography had 250,000 subscribers around the world and took in $1.4 
million in a one-month period).
367See, e.g., About Cybercrime, IPWatchdog.com, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/cybercrimes.html
(“through the use of inexpensive and widely available computer and telecommunications systems 
individuals are able to commit wrongs with unprecedented speed and on scale never before 
seen”)/. See also Christopher M.E. Painter, Tracing in Internet Fraud Cases:  PairGain and NEI 
Webworld, U.S. Department of Justice – U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin, 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/usamay2001_3.htm (online stock fraud scheme involved thousands of 
victims).
368See, e.g., Donn Parker, Automated Crime, supra:
[A]n automated crime is a complete, fully automated, ready-to-use crime—from 
the selection of a victim to the perpetration of the misdeed and the covering of 
the perpetrator’s tracks and identity—that is packaged in a single computer 
program. . . . When the program is executed, it automatically commits the crime 
and removes any damning evidence (including itself) before the victim can blink 
an icon. . . . The perpetrators can then execute the crime to attack any number of 
victims’ computers without the creator’s—or even the perpetrators’ or victims’—
further involvement. 
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. . . . Because the crime can be designed for bi-directional, perfect anonymity, the 
perpetrator need not know who the victim was, what crime occurred, what 
method was used or even the results of the crime. The victim, likewise, would not 
know the perpetrator, what method was used, and where his or her losses went. 
And the entire crime could take place in only a few milliseconds. . . .
See also Automated Tools & Mail Bombs, The Silk Road Group, Ltd., 
http://www.silkroad.com/papers/html/bomb/node17.html.  See, e.g., Stealth Program Hijacks PC’s 
to Send Porn Ads, USA Today (July 11, 2003), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2003-07-11-hijacked-porn-
spammers_x.htm (Trojan program hijacked nearly 2,000 PC’s with high-speed connections and 
used them to send ads for porn sites).  
369See supra § II(B)(1)(b).
370See supra § II(A)(2)(c) & § II(B)(2).
371See supra § II(A)(2)(c) & § II(B)(2).
372See supra § III(B)(1)(b).
373See, e.g., supra notes 366 - 368 & accompanying text.  See also President’s Working Group 
On Unlawful Conduct On The Internet, The Electronic Frontier, supra  (“The potential to reach 
vast audiences easily means that the scale of unlawful conduct involving the use of the Internet is 
often much wider than the same conduct in the offline world.  To borrow a military analogy, use of 
the Internet can be a "`force multiplier’”).
374See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Crime Wave Washes Over Cyberspace, International Herald Tribune,  
(January 28, 2003), 2003 WL WL 56172695 ("Criminal activity on the Internet is growing . . . 
exponentially, both in frequency and complexity”); Inquiry into Cybercrime Takes Paedophilia 
Focus, SMH.com.au (March 31, 2003), 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/31/1048962691620.html (“The exponential growth rate 
of cybercrime has prompted a parliamentary inquiry into child pornography, fraud and national 
security threats associated with the internet”).  See also Diana Thorp, Cybercrime Wave,
Australian IT (July 22, 2003), 
http://australianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,6787309%5E15302%5E%5Enbv%5E,00.html
Brenner – Distributed Security
154
(Victoria Police Computer Crime Squad’s workload increased “by hundreds of per cent” in just a 
few years and is “expected to more than triple again by 2007-8”).   
In sorting out priorities between the two, law enforcement agencies may feel that real-
world “crimes” should take priority because they are, so far, more likely to result in the infliction of 
death or bodily injury; to this point, most cybercrime results in property loss or damage.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Needs 
Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement, 11 (2001),  
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/186276.pdf (participants reported that cybercrime cases are 
assigned “a low to medium priority within their agency”).    
375The inadequacy of these resources is a function both (a) of the incremental offenses added by 
cybercrime and (b) of the fact that cybercrime cases are particularly difficult to investigate.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Needs 
Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement, 16, 23-25 (2001),  
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/186276.pdf.  Cybercrime cases are extraordinarily difficult to 
investigate, first of all,, because of their inherent technological complexity; investigations must be 
conducted by officers who have specialized expertise and access to sophisticated investigatory 
tools.  See id.  See also infra § III(C).  Cybercrime cases can also be difficult to investigate (a) 
because they cross traditional jurisdictional boundaries and (b) because they can pose difficult 
legal questions as to the unlawfulness of the conduct involved.  As to the first issue, see supra § 
III(A).  See also Susan W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence-Gathering 
and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. Law 347, 
375-377 (2002).  As to the second issue, See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – National 
Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Needs Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement, 
supra, at 13; Susan W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence-Gathering and 
Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, supra, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. Law at 
377.  See also Hackers Move on to Hijacking, MSNBC (June 24, 2003), 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/930843.asp (hackers “cyberjacking” websites and using them for 
various purposes – noting that cyberjacking may not be a crime).
376See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
377See supra § III(B).  See, e.g., FBI Overwhelmed By Cybercrime, Reuters (March 20, 2002), 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-864453.html (“`Technology permits cyber crimes to occur at the 
speed of light and law enforcement must become more sophisticated in uncovering them,’ FBI 
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assistant director Ronald Eldon told a conference on fighting organized crime in Hong Kong.  . . . . 
`Government must respond not at government time but at Internet time,’ said Eldon”).
378See supra § II(B)(2)(c).
379See supra § III(A).
380It is useful to distinguish between anonymity and pseudonymity:  Both involve shielding one’s 
true identity, but the approach used to do so varies.  Pseudonymity is using a false name, i.e., an 
alias, to disguise one’s identify, while anonymity consists of concealing one’s identity. See, e.g.,
Susan W. Brenner,The Privacy Privilege:  Law Enforcement, Technology and the Constitution, 7 
J. Tech. L. & Policy 123, 137 n. 43 (2002), http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/ See also, David G. Post, 
Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in 
Cyberspace, 11 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 149-51 (1996).
381See supra note 380.   See alsoTestimony of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder Before the 
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice Oversight of the Senate Judiciary Committee (February 29, 2000),
http://www.cdt.org/security/000229justice.shtml:
[A] criminal using tools . . . easily available over the Internet can operate in 
almost perfect anonymity. By weaving his or her communications through a 
series of anonymous remailers; by creating a few forged e-mail headers with 
powerful, point-and-click tools readily downloadable from many hacker web sites; 
or by using a `free-trial’ account or two, a hacker . . . or web based fraud artist 
can often effectively hide the trail of his or her communications.
See, e.g., Anonymizer Total Net Shield, http://www.anonymizer.com/tns/index.shtml (anonymous 
email, newsgroups, web surfing, chat and instant messages); Freedom WebSecure, 
http://www.freedom.net/products/websecure/index.html (anonymous web browsing).
382For example, in 2000 someone who used the name “Maxus” and claimed to be a Russian 
hacker stole 300,000 credit card numbers from the online retailer CD Universe.  See, e.g.,
Rebuffed Internet Extortionist Posts Stolen Credit Card Data, CNN. Com (January 10, 2000), 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/01/10/credit.card.crack.2/.  Maxus told the company 
of the theft and demanded that CD Universe pay him $100,000 for the return of the numbers.  
See id.  When CD Universe refused to pay, he posted the numbers on web sites and managed to 
Brenner – Distributed Security
156
distribute 25,000 of them before the sites were shut down.  See id.  He was never identified, 
never caught, never prosecuted. See id. See also Greg Sandoval, Why Hackers Escape:  
Organized, Well-Financed Criminals Stay a Step Ahead of the Law, CNETNews.com (May 14, 
2002), http://news.com.com/2009-1017-912708.html: 
The nightmare for Ecount . . . began last year  when a hacker broke in to the 
company's system and stole personal information belonging to its customers.
Nine months later, the criminal is still at large. The thief has brazenly taunted 
executives with repeated e-mails while staying ahead of investigators, deftly 
wiping away his electronic fingerprints and covering his tracks at every turn. . . . . 
383Barbara Etter, Critical Issues in High-Tech Crime, Australasian Centre for Policing Research 
13 (2002), http://www.acpr.gov.au/pdf/Presentations/CIinHi-tech.pdf (footnote omitted).
384 See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner,The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, at 3-5.  See also Charges Dropped Against Love Bug Suspect, 
USA TODAY, August 21, 2000, http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti418.htm.  We may  
see the emergence of “cybercrime havens,” analogies of the bank secrecy havens that appeared 
in the 1980’s.  A cybercrime haven country would refuse to prosecute or to extradite, either on the 
basis of financial gain or ideological considerations.  See, Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. 
Brenner,The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, at 73-76.   
385See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence-Gathering and 
Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, supra, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. Law at 
377.
Evidence-gathering and presentation can be impeded by yet  another factor: expense.  
Assume, for example, that a county prosecutor in Pennsylvania has identified the perpetrator who 
hacked into a local bank from India, has charged her with violating Pennsylvania’s anti-hacking 
statute and is preparing the case for trial.  Further assume that to present the case the prosecutor 
will need to present a witness who lives and works in India to authenticate records provided by 
the Internet Service Provider which the perpetrator used in committing the offense.  Finally, 
assume that it will cost the Pennsylvania county $15,000 to bring the witness in for the trial.  
Many counties may not be able to bear this expense; even if they have the money available, they 
will have to consider whether the funds should instead be used to prosecute more “localized” 
crime, e.g., crimes having a greater and more immediate nexus to that county.  See, e.g., Susan 
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W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence-Gathering and Local Prosecution of 
International Cybercrime, supra, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. Law at 377.
386See, e.g., Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185) – Explanatory Report 
¶¶ 28-31, ¶¶ 149-157 November 8, 2001), http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.   
387See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
388See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
389See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
390See, e.g., Barbara Etter, Critical Issues in High-Tech Crime, Australasian Centre for Policing 
Research, supra, at 9 (“currently, no comprehensive statistics on hi-tech crime are maintained by 
Australasian police”).
391See, e.g., Barbara Etter, Critical Issues in High-Tech Crime, Australasian Centre for Policing 
Research, supra, at 9 (“high-tech crime is variable in its manifestations, so it is difficult to discuss 
in terms of aggregate incidence and impact”).   See also Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a 
Thing as Virtual Crime, supra.
392See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 2002, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/02prelimannual.pdf.  But see Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, 
Prosecutors in State Courts 2001 5 (May 2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc01.pdf
(reporting number and type of cybercrime prosecutors by state prosecutors).  Cybercrime 
statistics are complied in a few specialized areas.  See, e.g., Internet Fraud Complaint Center, 
IFCC Annual Internet Fraud Report 2002, http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/statistics.asp. 
393See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, at 3-5 .    
394See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, at 27-28.  
The lack of official statistics means that the only data we have comes from privately-
conducted surveys.  The oldest private survey is the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security 
Survey, http://www.gocsi.com/press/20030528.html, conducted by the Computer Security 
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Institute and the San Francisco FBI Office’s Computer Intrusion Squad.  The eighth annual 
survey, issued in May of 2003, was based on responses from 530 U.S. computer security 
professionals employed by corporations, government agencies, and educational and medical 
institutions. See 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2,
http://www.gocsi.com/press/20030528.html.  It found that: (1) 56% reported unauthorized use of 
their systems in the last year; (2) virus incidents and insider abuse of networks were the most 
frequent forms of attack, followed by denial of service attacks; (3) 75% of the organizations 
acknowledge financial losses resulting from the attacks but only 47%could quantify damage from 
the attacks; (4) the organizations that could quantify damage sustained US$201,797,340 in 
losses; (5) more (78%) cited the Internet than internal systems (36%) as the source of attacks; 
and (5) only 30% reported the attacks to law enforcement (up from the 16% who reported in 
1996). See 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey at 4, 17.
An Australian survey yielded similar results:  The 2002 Australian Computer Crime and 
Security Survey, http://www.auscert.org, conducted by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and AusCERT 
and based on responses from “a wide cross section” of Australian organizations found that 67% 
of those responding had suffered attacks within the last year and 35% had experienced six or 
more attacks.  The respondents sustained almost A$6,000,000 in damage.  Just as in the CSI 
survey, most attacks (89%) came from the Internet and only a small percentage of the victims 
(31%) reported the attacks to law enforcement.  The survey reported that pessimism as to “the 
apprehension of attackers” was “the primary inhibitor to greater reporting.”
In a survey released in August, 2001, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 
http://www.cbi.org.uk, reported that two-thirds of the 148 companies responding suffered “a 
serious cybercrime attack” within the last year.  Both the CBI survey and a 2002 survey 
conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers, http://www.pwcglobal.com, found that UK businesses 
seldom reported attacks to law enforcement because they were worried about damage to their 
reputation resulting from publicity about an attack.  
395See supra § III(A).
396A victim of opportunity is basically someone who is in the wrong place at the wrong time.  See, 
e.g., Jackie Rosenberg, “Victims,” CourtTV.com 
http://www.courttv.com/onair/shows/profiler/column_rothenberg.html.
397See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
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398See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
399See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
400See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
401See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 2002, supra..  
402See, e.g., John Douglas, Mindhunter:  Inside the FBI’s Elite Serial Crime Unit  (1997).
403See, e.g., Marilyn B. Peterson, Applications in Crime Analysis:  A Sourcebook 2 (1998).
404See, e.g., Advanced Crime Mapping Topics 94-134, National Law Enforcement & Corrections 
Technology Center (2002), http://www.nlectc.org/cmap/cmap_adv_topics_symposium.pdf.  
405See, e.g., Advanced Crime Mapping Topics, supra, at  94-134.  
406See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime, supra.  See, e.g., CERT 
Coordination Center 2002 Annual Report, http://www.cert.org/annual_rpts/cert_rpt_02.html. 
407See, e.g., Internet Fraud Complaint Center, IFCC Annual Internet Fraud Report 2002, supra.
408See, e.g., Statement of Michael J. Heimbach, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the 
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary - Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security (May 1, 2002), http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/heimbach050102.htm
(incidence of online child pornography and its use by child molesters).
409See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
410See, e.g., Peter B. Wood, Walter R. Gove & John K. Cochran, Motivations for Violent Crime 
Among Incarcerated Adults:  A Consideration of Reinforcement Processes, 1994 Journal of the 
Oklahoma Criminal Justice Research Consortium, 
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/DOCS/OCJRC/OCJRC94/940650g.htm.
411See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
Brenner – Distributed Security
160
412See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime, supra (noting that one 
new type of “crime” has already emerged – the denial of service attack).   
413See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, at 3-5 .    
414See supra § II(B)(1)(a).
415See supra § II(B)(1)(a).
416In computer science, “distributed security” denotes a decentralized approach to securing 
computer networks.  See, e.g., Tech FAQ, Techieindex, 
http://www.techieindex.cust.marlabs.com/techie/tech_faq/SecurityFAQ.jsp (“distributed security . . 
. puts intrusion prevention on every node on the network. By placing intrusion prevention on every 
node you are not only protecting each of the computers connected to the network, you are 
protecting the network itself from attack”).  This article uses the term to denote a decentralized 
system of ensuring internal order within a social system.  See infra §§ IV(A), IV(B) & V.
417Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:  Hearing 
Before the House Committee on Science, 107th Cong. 45 (2001) (Statement of Dr. William A. 
Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering), 
http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:QCpaLfFQM0IJ:commdocs.house.gov/committees/scienc
e/hsy75565.000/hsy75565_0.htm+cybercrime+%22distributed+security%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8. 
418See infra § IV(A).
419See infra § IV(B).
420David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla,Networks, Netwars and the Fight for the Future, 6 First Monday, 
(October 2001), http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html.  
421See supra §§ II(B) & III.  The development of this model is the culmination of a process that 
began centuries ago, i.e., the transformation of criminal law enforcement into a state monopoly.  
As criminal law enforcement became a state monopoly, it evolved a hierarchical organizational 
structure, at least as to the processes involving the apprehension of perpetrators.  See id. Civil 
law, on the other hand, tends to have a more lateral structure; the state acts primarily as a 
facilitator, a referee, between private parties.
Brenner – Distributed Security
161
422See, e.g., Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs, supra, at xi-xxii.
423See, e.g., id. at 84-85 (sentient chips).  See also id. at 133-156 (wireless networks), 106-112 
(wearable computers), 102-109 (smart dust & smart rooms), 98-100 (digital cities).
424Id. at xii-xiii.  See also supra note 423. 
425See, e.g., David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, 
supra.
426See, e.g., Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder, Societal Implications in In Athena’s Camp: 
Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age 297 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, eds. 1997) 
(“Hierarchical organizations . . . are the basis upon which most authority, power, and command 
and control have been exercised for millennia”). See also Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the 
Machine:  Technics and Human Development 189-202 (1967).  
427See, e.g., Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs, supra, at 200 (“By organizing workforces and 
military forces hierarchically and breaking their tasks into component parts, entire populations 
could organize into social machines to build pyramids and conquer empires”); Natali Kassavin & 
Uri Merry, Coping with Uncertainty:  Insights from the New Sciences of Chaos, Self-Organization 
and Complexity 21 (1995)  (“People create the nation-state to ensure order in . . . society”).   See 
also Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, supra, at 189-202.
428See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybercrime?  How Cyberspace May Affect the 
Structure of Criminal Relationships, 4 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2002), http://www.jolt.unc.edu/:
[H]ierarchical organizational models are products of the real world. . . . 
Cyberspace. . . .is not a fixed, predetermined reality operating according to 
principles and dynamics that cannot be controlled or altered by man. The 
cyberworld is a constructed world, a fabrication. . . . In the real world, it takes a 
great orchestration of human effort to send a hard copy file halfway around the 
world. In cyberspace, one can send an electronic version of the same file halfway 
around the world with only a few keystrokes.
This essential absence of physical constraints is one factor that differentiates the 
cyberworld from the real world. Another differentiating factor is the way we 
Brenner – Distributed Security
162
experience the two realities. Physical reality has a fixed empirical structure; this 
structure itself is not hierarchical, but we necessarily experience it through the 
filter of socially-organized hierarchical structures. If we want to send a hard copy 
of a file to someone halfway around the world, speak to that person on the 
telephone, or travel to visit, we must rely upon and participate in hierarchical 
structures to do so. . . .The lack of physical constraints in cyberspace . . . means 
that our experiences there do not have to be mediated through hierarchical 
structures. Indeed, the very nature of cyberspace is inconsistent with hierarchy. 
Cyberspace is a network or, more properly, a network of networks. Networks are 
lateral, diffuse, fluid, and evolving. Hierarchies are vertical, concentrated, and 
tend to be rigid and fixed.
See also David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, supra.
429See, e.g., David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, 
supra.
430See, e.g., David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks:  A Framework About Social 
Evolution 5-17 RAND (1996), http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P7967/P7967.pdf; David 
Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, supra.  See also
Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs, supra, at 200 (“The cultural innovations that reorganize social 
interaction in light of new technologies are `social algorithms governing the uses of technology’”) 
(citing Robert Wright, Nonzero:  The Logic of Human Destiny 22-23 (2000)).
431See, e.g., Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder, Societal Implications in In Athena’s Camp, 
supra at 298-299. See also supra note 428.  
432See supra notes 427 & 433 & accompanying text.  See also Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. 
Builder, Societal Implications in In Athena’s Camp, supra, at 301 (“functions that . . . require 
reactive behavior will tend to be executed by groups that are relatively hierarchical in nature, 
while those that . . . allow for proactive behavior will be relatively more networked”). 
433See supra note 428. 
434See, e.g., Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder, Societal Implications in In Athena’s Camp, 
supra at 299 (noting that networks shift power to individuals).
Brenner – Distributed Security
163
435See, e.g., Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs, supra, at 208-215 (“cooperation amplification”).
436David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla,What Next for Networks and Netwars? In Networks and 
Netwars:  The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy 313 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds. 
2001), http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/.   See also Kevin Manson, Robots, 
Wanderers, Spiders and Avatars:  The Virtual Investigator and Community Policing behind the 
Thin Digital Blue Line, Office of International Criminal Justice (1997), 
http://www.dougmoran.com/tatzlwyrm/CACHE/Digital_Officer_Safety/Attachments/Robots_Wand
erers_Spiders_and_Avatars.PDF (“Given the extraordinary pace of new technology development 
and deployment on the Internet, it will become necessary to reevaluate the paradigms that have 
defined the resources and procedures for the delivery of policing. . . .”).
437As noted earlier, the traditional, hierarchical, reactive model of law enforcement will no doubt 
continue to be an effective means of addressing real-world crime.  See supra note 333 & 
accompanying text.  After all, even in the mid-twentieth century world of Minority Report, law 
enforcement’s way of preventing “crime” was to react to the prospect of consummated crime.  
See Minority Report: The Story, http://www.minorityreport.com/. See also Philip K. Dick, The 
Minority Report (2002).
438See supra § III(A).
439See supra § III(C).
440See supra § III(D).
441See supra § III(B).
442See supra notes 374 - 375 & accompanying text.
443See supra § III(B).
444See, e.g., Testimony of Alan Paller, Director of Research – The SANS Institute, Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on “Securing Our Infrastructure: 
Private/Public Information Sharing” (May 8, 2002), 
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/050802paller.pdf (“The fight against cybercrime resembles an 
arms race where each time the defenders build a new wall, the attackers create new tools to 
scale the wall”).  See generally § II(B)(2), supra.
Brenner – Distributed Security
164
Another problem with the alternative discussed above is that since cybercrime disregards 
territorial boundaries, simply hiring more officers in no way guarantees that officers will be able to 
react effectively to particular cybercrimes.  See supra § III(A).
The ultimate futility in this alternative is the fact that there simply are not enough 
resources available to fund hiring even a colorably adequate number of new officers to deal with 
cybercrime.  See, e.g., State Police Announce Promotions, Charleston Gazette (June 26, 2003), 
2003 WL 5473318 (lieutenant colonel said state police agency “is vastly underfunded, 
underequipped [and] undermanned”).  See also Gordon Dillow, LA Wants to Spread Its Disease,
Orange County Register (June 25, 2003), 2003 WL 6999990 (noting the “undermanned and 
underfunded Los Angeles Police Department).  
445See, e.g., Kevin Manson, Robots, Wanderers, Spiders and Avatars, supra  (proposing the use 
of automated intelligent agents as cybercrime-fighters).
446See, e.g., Kevin Manson, Robots, Wanderers, Spiders and Avatars, supra  (“Matters of comity, 
sovereignty and legal jurisdiction will . . . have to be resolved before intelligent agents begin 
coursing through servers in foreign universities, banks and government agencies”).
447Curtis E.A. Karnow, Strike and Counterstrike:  The Law on Automated Intrusions and Striking 
Back, Black Hat Windows Security (February 27, 2003), 
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-03/bh-win-03-karnow-notes.pdf.  See also id.:
Content providers such as record labels and movie studios favor . . . federal 
legislation that would allow them to disable copyright infringers’ computers.  
Software licensors endorse state laws that permit the remote disabling of 
software in use by the licensee when the license terms are breached. Internet 
security professionals debate the propriety and legality of striking back at 
computers which launch worms, viruses, and other intrusions
448See id.
449Id.
450See id.:
Brenner – Distributed Security
165
While it is generally thought to be illegal to strike back, the rationale is usually 
based on the practicality of pinpointing the perpetrator, and killing the wrong 
machine or code.  But . . . the accurate targeting of a perpetrator’s machine itself 
presents serious legal issues: A host of statutes . . . make it illegal to attack or 
disable computers, including those connected to the Internet. . . .
451Id.
452See supra notes 325 - 326 & accompanying text.
453See, e.g., Lawrence Sherman, Thinking About Crime Prevention in U.S. Department of Justice 
– National Institute of Justice, Preventing Crime:  What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising 
(1997), http://www.ncjrs.org/works/.  See also Lancaster (Pa.) Crime Commission, Crime 
Commission Report 2003 § II (“Community Policing and Law Enforcement Organization”), 
http://www.lancasteronline.com/crimereport/0302/comm_police.shtm. 
454
 Lancaster (Pa.) Crime Commission, Crime Commission Report 2003, supra.
455See id.:
[C]ommunity policing is a radical departure from the traditional, reactive model of 
policing. With that method of law enforcement, police are isolated from the 
community, shielded by their patrol cars. . . .  
Community policing . . . recognizes that the neighborhood is the point of 
coordination for . . . crime prevention. . . . [I]t further recognizes that although the 
police are there to support the citizens, it is the people who live in the 
neighborhoods. . . who must act to take back their own streets. . . . 
See also Barry N. Leighton, Visions of Community Policing:  Rhetoric and Reality in Canada, 33 
Canadian J. Criminology 485, 487 (1991).
456See, e.g., Barry N. Leighton, Visions of Community Policing:  Rhetoric and Reality in Canada, 
supra, 33 Canadian J. Criminology at 496-498, 503-511; David Thacher, Equity and Community 
Policing:  A New View of Community Partnerships, 20 Crim. Justice Ethics 1 (2003); Gerasimos 
A. Gianakis & G. John Davis III, Reinventing or Repackaging Public Services?  The Case of 
Community-Oriented Policing, 58 Public Admin. Rev. 1 (1998). 
Brenner – Distributed Security
166
457See supra note 444.  Many law enforcement agencies do have officers who are assigned to 
cybercrime, and many of these officers “patrol” certain areas of cyberspace.  No agency, 
however, maintains a 24/7 presence in cyberspace and it is exceedingly unlikely that any will be 
able to do so in the foreseeable future.  See, e.g., Gary Nurenberg, Cracking Down on Online 
Predators, Tech TV (August 27, 2002), 
http://www.techtv.com/news/internet/story/0,24195,3397013,00.html; Molly Masland, Stalking 
Child Molesters on the Net, MSNBC (September 4, 1998), 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/192795.asp. 
458See, e.g., Peter Kollock & Marc A. Smith, Communities in Cyberspace in Communities in 
Cyberspace 3-28 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds. 1998).  
459See, e.g., “Welcome to Communities.com,” Communities.com, http://www.communities.com/
(“Communities.com is a fun new online community where people from all over the world (now 
with members from 152 countries!) . . . chat and interact”) (emphasis in the original).  
460See supra § III.
461See supra § III.
462See supra notes 444 & 457. 
463See supra notes 453 - 455 & accompanying text.
464See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
465See, e.g.,  William D. Eggers & John O’Leary, The Beat Generation:  Community Policing at Its 
Best, 74 Policy Rev. 1 (1995):
[T]he public began to forget its role in controlling crime and grew increasingly 
dependent on the police. Police departments became more professionalized and 
shifted . . . to crime fighting. . . . 
Americans began to think of crimefighting as the job of police. . . .
Brenner – Distributed Security
167
See also Richard A. Leo, Some Thoughts about Police and Crime in The Crime Conundrum, 
Essays on Criminal Justice 121 (George Fisher & Lawrence M. Friedman eds. 1997).  
466See supra notes 454 - 456 & accompanying text.
467See supra note 456.
468See supra notes 458 - 459 & accompanying text.
469See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
470See supra § II(B)(2)(b).  As explained above, there are compelling legal and practical reasons 
why citizens should not react to cybercrime.  See supra notes 450 - 451 & accompanying text.
471See, e.g., Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 5-7, 37-41 
(February 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.  This is another 
distinguishing aspect of cybercrime:  Much of the conduct defined as cybercrime, and especially 
attacks on computer systems, can provide the predicate for threats to a system’s ability to 
maintain external order, as well as its ability to maintain internal order.  The distinction here is 
between attacks upon individual citizens of a social system (“crimes”) and attacks on the social 
system itself (“terrorism”).  It is true that acts which are encompassed by definitions of terrorism 
also represent “crimes”’; Timothy McVeigh, for example, engaged in a terrorist act and, in so 
doing, committed murder and large-scale property damage and destruction.  The critical 
difference between cybercrime-as-terrorism and “crimes”-as-terrorism is that “crimes” have to be 
executed within the physical boundaries of the system, whereas cybercrimes do not.  See 
generally Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism:  An Argument fo 
Anticipating Cyber-attacks, 2 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 1(2002).
472As used in this discussion, “citizens” denotes both individual and artificial members of a social 
system.  Corporate and other artificial entities, like individuals, can be lax about cybersecurity, 
thereby providing an opportunity for a cybercriminal to exploit.  See, e.g., Office of the President, 
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at x-xiii, 5-11.
473Tort law in many states does impose liability for failing to protect someone from “crime” under 
certain circumstances, such as where a landlord assumes a duty to protect residents from 
victimization.  See, e.g., Peter Everett, Establishing a Duty:  Reaching the Promised Land, 36 
APR Trial 33 (2000).  
Brenner – Distributed Security
168
474See infra § IV(B)(2).  
475See infra § IV(B)(2).
476See supra § II(A).
477Imposing an affirmative legal obligation to maintain personal security by, e.g., installing an 
alarm system, locking doors and taking other precautions to protect the security of one’s property 
and the safety of one’s person would impose another responsibility on an already-overwhelmed 
police force.  In addition to having to react to completed “crimes,” officers would be expected to 
enforce laws mandating security.  This could mean that they would devote time which could more 
profitably be spent discouraging the commission of “crimes” and/or apprehending the perpetrators 
of “crimes” enforcing the laws that mandate security by, e.g., writing tickets to homeowners who 
had not installed alarm systems.  More realistically, it would probably mean that officers would not 
make the enforcement of laws mandating security a priority, at least not unless and until such 
enforcement offered the opportunity to explore the commission of “crimes.”  See, e.g., Stewart v. 
Trask, 2003 WL 21500018 *5 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (seat belt violation as pretext for vehicle stop).
478My victimization does impose a cost on the law enforcement system in that officers will have to 
respond to my report of the “crime” and will have to expend at least some effort in endeavoring to 
find the perpetrator and recover the lost goods.  And if they succeed in doing so, the criminal 
justice system will have to expend resources in prosecuting and, presumably, punishing the 
perpetrator.  These costs are not significant, however, since it is  likely that the perpetrator would 
have burglarized some other home had I not made mine such an inviting target, either because 
she is in the habit of robbing houses or because she was bent on such activity on this occasion.  
One cannot, in other words, say that my carelessness “caused” the burglary.
479See, e.g., Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 39;
John Broughton, Cable Modem and DSL Security Issues and Solutions, 10 Berkely Computing & 
Communications (2000), http://istpub.berkeley.edu:4201/bcc/Apr_May2000/sec.dsl.html. 
480See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Could Your Computer Be a Crimnal?, MSNBC (July 15, 2003), 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/939227.asp:
One thousand home computers hijacked and used to serve up pornography. 
Perhaps tens of thousands co-opted by the `SoBig’ virus, many . . . turned into 
Brenner – Distributed Security
169
spam machines. Hundreds of other home computers loaded with secret software 
used to process stolen credit cards. If your biggest computer crime fear was lost 
or stolen files, think again: Someone may be using your PC to commit crimes.
See also Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 39.  See 
also Mo Krochmal, Distributed Denial of Service Threat Grows, TechWeb (February 8, 2000), 
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000208S0016.
481See, e.g., Xianjun Geng & Andrew B. Whinston, Defeating Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks, http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/works/articles/defeating_ddos.pdf.
As a subsidiary point, my carelessness has also undermined law enforcement’s ability to 
maintain order in cyberspace:  The denial of service attack is an example of automated “crime;”  
as explained earlier, the scale of automated “crime” puts an additional burden on investigating 
law enforcement personnel.  See supra § III(B)(2).  The use of use of zombie computers also 
makes law enforcement’s task that much more difficult; it is harder to trace an attack back along 
the path of the zombies to find the person ultimately responsible for the attack.  See, e.g., D. Ian 
Hopper, Denial of Service Hackers Take on New Targets, CNN.com (February 9, 2000), 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/02/09/denial.of.service.03/.
482See supra note 471 & accompanying text. 
483See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
484See supra §§ III(A)-(C).
485See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
486See supra notes 213 - 217 and accompanying text.  
487See supra notes 213 - 217 and accompanying text.  See also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
6-7 (1975).
488See supra notes 213 - 217 and accompanying text.  
489The approach sketched out above would be functionally analogous to the “safe sex” 
campaigns that seek to reduce the spread of AIDS. See, e.g., Medecins sans Frontieres 
Brenner – Distributed Security
170
Launches Safe Sex Campaign in Mongolia, Medecins sans Frontiers (December 1, 1999), 
http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=EFD71826-E65D-11D4-B2010060084A6370.  
490See, e.g., Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 5-7, 
37-41. 
491Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 Ind. L.J. 1397, 
1401 (1999).  See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 4 (1990).
492See generally Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms with 
Special Reference to Sanctions, supra, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. at 377-380.  It can also be difficult 
to succeed in creating norms.  See, e.g., Cindy Patton, Fatal Advice:  How Safe-Sex Education 
Went Wrong 118-126 (1996).  See also supra note 489. 
493See, e.g., Robyn Israel, Guarding the Fort, Palo Alto Weekly (September 18, 1998), 
http://www.paweekly.com/PAW/morgue/real_estate/1998_Sep_18.HOME18.html.
494
 One reason for the relative lack of concern about cybersecurity is no doubt the fact that the 
risks of individual physical injury associated with cybercrime are, so far, very minor.  One can be 
injured by a person they met online and had a physical encounter with in the real-world, but the 
direct infliction of one-to-one physical injury is simply not possible.  
495See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
496The President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the final version of which issued in 
2003, has been strongly criticized for relying upon a purely voluntary approach.  See, e.g., James 
A. Harvey, An Early Look at the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Giga.Law.com, 
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003-all/harvey-2003-04-all.html (‘`cybersecurity is too tough a 
problem for a solely voluntary approach to fix.... Companies will only change their behavior when 
there are both market forces and legislation that cover security failures”) (quoting James Lewis, 
Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Council on Technology and Public 
Policy). See also Robert Lemos & Declan McCullagh, Cybersecurity Plan Lacks Muscle, CNET 
News.com (September 19, 2002), http://news.com.com/2100-1023-958545.html?tag=rn (“`It has 
no teeth,’ said Steven Kirschbaum, CEO of Secure Information Systems. . . . `The first rule of . . . 
any security policy is you have to have enforcement. Without it, it's just a nice press release’”). 
Brenner – Distributed Security
171
It is perhaps also worth noting that prior systems which depended on citizen participation 
to maintain internal order were predicated on obligatory, rather than voluntary, compliance.  See 
supra § II(B)(2).
497See supra notes 487 - 488 & accompanying text.
498See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra, at 7.  See also H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law 28 (1975).
499See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2 (2003).
500See id. (“Most crimes are committed by affirmative action. . . . But there are . . . crimes which . . 
. may be committed . . . by failure to act under circumstances giving rise to a legal duty to act”).
501See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314A & 322 (1965); Model Penal Code § 2.01(3)
502See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965); Model Penal Code § 2.01(1).
503See supra notes 501 - 502 & accompanying text,
504See infra § IV(B).
505See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Intangible 
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683, 730.   Imposing  duties supported by 
criminal liability can be an effective way to create a norm.  See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How 
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:  Commodifying California’s Carpool 
Lanes, 75 Ind. L.J. 1231, 1278-1279 (2000).  
506See infra § IV(B).
507For individuals, an obligation of this type could include the following installing firewalls and 
other security measures on computers, installing, updating and using anti-virus software and 
keeping software updated. See, e.g., Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace, supra, at 39.  For artificial entities, it could include the activities noted above and 
working to address insider threats and sharing information about known threats.  See id. at 39-41.  
For individuals and artificial entities alike, the obligation could also include educating themselves 
about tactics such as “social engineering” and “phishing,” since much cybercrime is the product of 
Brenner – Distributed Security
172
human, not machine, error. See, e.g., Social Engineering Attacks via IRC and Instant Messaging, 
CERT Incident Note IN-2002-03 (March 19, 2002), http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2002-
03.html;Jeordon Legon, “Phishing Scams Reel in Your Identity,”  CNN.com (July 22, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/07/21/phishing.scam/. 
508The sanction would almost certainly be a fine, perhaps coupled with restrictions on computer 
use for intransigent violators.  Laws of this type would presumably be structured to alleviate or 
eliminate liability for attacks that could not reasonably be prevented by the measures available to 
average citizens.  See infra § IV(B)(1).
509See, e.g., David A. Mobley, Revisiting Alabama's Seat Belt Defense: Is The Failure To Buckle 
Up A Defense In AEMLD Claims?, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 963, 969 n. 45 (2002).  
510See, e.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 27315(d)-(i); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § ch. 90 § 13A.
511See, e.g., Lisa Ruddy, Note, From Seat Belts To Handcuffs: May Police Arrest For Minor 
Traffic Violations?, 10 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 479, 505-506 (2002).
512See, e.g., Barry L. Huntington, Comment, Welcome To The Mount Rushmore State! Keep Your 
Arms And Legs Inside The Vehicle At All Times And Buckle Up . . . Not For Safety, But To Protect 
Your Constitutional Rights, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 99, 104 (2002).
513See, e.g., David A. Mobley, Revisiting Alabama's Seat Belt Defense, supra, 53 Ala. L. Rev. at 
996 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 255.21 (1968)).
514See supra note 507.
515See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Deterrence, 34 Conn. L. 
Rev. 55, 60-61 (2001).
516Since these laws would encompass preventative measures taken to secure laptops and other  
computers that can be used in “public” spaces, it is conceivable that an officer would observe a 
failure to implement such measures when a laptop was being used in public.
517See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
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518Yet another factor differentiating seat-belt laws and the hypothesized cybercrime prevention 
statutes is that the former deal with hazards citizens understand and tend to appreciate, while the 
latter deal with dangers they generally under-estimate.  See supra note 494 & accompanying text.
519See supra note 502 & accompanying text.
520See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 210.1 & 223.2.
521See supra § IV(A)(1).  Laws requiring the use of seat-belts (and motorcycle helmets) are not 
concerned with preventing “crime,” which is understood to be the province of the police.  See 
supra § IV(A).  They are generally regarded as public health and safety measures.  See, e.g.,
Ilise Levy Feitshans, Foreshadowing Future Changes: Implications Of The Aids Pandemic For 
International Law And Policy Of Public Health, 15 Mich. J. Int’l Law 807, 810 (1994). 
522 See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 5.01-5.03 (attempt, conspiracy and solicitation).
523See, e.g., M. Marvin Berger & Martin Alan Greenberg, Auxiliary Police: The Citizen's Approach 
to Public Safety 14 (1984).
524Since “do” laws would be regarded as intrusive and unnecessary, norms of evasion analogous 
to those that emerged during alcohol Prohibition would likely appear.  See generally M. Marvin 
Berger & Martin Alan Greenberg, Auxiliary Police, supra, at 14.  Some individuals would decline 
to take the necessary security measures; others might use token compliance as an excuse, 
installing some minimal security measures and claiming they had satisfied their obligation.  All of 
this would only make enforcement of the “do” laws that much more difficult, expensive and futile.
525See § IV(B), infra.
526For an explanation of this term, see infra § V.
527Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:  Hearing 
Before the House Committee on Science, 107th Cong. at 45. 
528 See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
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529See infra § IV(B)(2).  See generally Scott C. Zimmerman, Ron Plesco & Tim Rosenberg, 
Downstream Liability for Attack Relay and Amplification, CERT (2002), 
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/Downstream_Liability.pdf. 
530 See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
531See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
532See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06 (one is guilty as an accomplice if he, inter alia, promotes 
or facilitates the commission of an offense).
533See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06(1).
534See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a)(3).  See also Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive 
Criminal Law § 13.2(a) (2003) (“Thus, a conductor on a train might become an accomplice in the 
knowing transportation of liquor on his train for his failure to take steps to prevent the offense”).
535See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 10 Haw. App. 73, 81-82,  861 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Haw. App. 1993).  
536See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.06 at 320 n.63 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments (1985)).  See, e.g., Knox v. Com., 735 S.W.2d 711, 711-712 (Ky. 1987).   
537See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a).
538See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at § 13.2(d) (citing Backun v. 
United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940).  Cf. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402-403 
(2d Cir. 1938).
539See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, supra at § 13.2(e).  Some argue that 
reckless conduct should support the imposition of accomplice liability, at least for crimes in which 
the requisite mental state is recklessness.   See also Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 369, 373, 381 (1997).  For the proposition that such liability is absent 
from the criminal codes of other nations, as well, see, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of 
Command Responsibility, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 455, 464-467 (2001).  
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540See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, supra, 49 Am. J. 
Comp. L. at 463.  See also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Amended 
Statute art. 7 ¶ 3 (1993), http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm.  
541Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, supra, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. at 
464. See also Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, supra, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 
372. 
542
 Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, supra, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 382. 
543 Id. at 391.  See also supra note 541 & accompanying text.
544See generally Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, supra, 49 Am. 
J. Comp. L. at 463-464. 
545
“Consequent victimization” is personal victimization that contributes to the commission of 
cybercrimes against others.  See supra § IV(B). 
546See supra note 536 & accompanying text.  Absent a legal duty there is, of course, no obligation 
to prevent a “crime.”  See supra § IV(A)(1).  
547Since such a duty did not exist at common law, it would have to be statutorily imposed.  This 
could be done seriatim, by having states adopt laws to this effect; it might be possible to enact 
such a duty at the federal level, given the deleterious effects cybercrime and cyberterrorism have 
upon interstate commerce.  See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited:  How A 
Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1235, 1243 n. 34 (1999).
Another possibility, using the Model Penal Code’s approach to complicity, would be to 
declare that the failure to prevent a cybercrime which results in the victimization of others is itself 
enough to establish complicity.  See Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(b) (one is an accomplice if “his 
conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity”).
548It is also possible that I can be victimized as the result of my own gullibility, i.e., as the result of 
succumbing to “social engineering” and other tactics.  See infra note 562. 
549See supra § IV(A)(1).   
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550The precise nature and extent of the liability to be imposed is discussed below.  See infra notes 
568 - 575 & accompanying text.
551See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.5(c) (2003). 
552See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d).  A negligence standard would also encompass reckless, 
knowing and purposeful failures to carry out the duty to prevent personal victimization.  See id. at 
§ 2.02(5).  Purposeful and knowing conduct is also discussed below.  See infra note 577 & 
accompanying text. 
553It might also be advisable to incorporate the type of user into the standard so that, for instance, 
corporate entities are held to a higher level than individual, home users of computer technology.
554See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
555See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
556Practical problems entailed by enforcing criminal liability for the failure to prevent cybercrime 
are the primary objection to relying on “do” rules.  See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
557See Model Penal Code § 2.06(6)(a) (victim is not generally an accomplice). 
558See infra § IV(B)(2).
559See supra § IV(A)(2)(b).
560See supra notes 542 - 543 & accompanying text.
561See supra notes 543 - 544 & accompanying text.
562The scenarios discussed above assume that X uses A’s computer as the vector from which to 
launch attacks on others; it is also possible that A contributes to the victimization of others by 
falling prey to “social engineering” and comparable tactics.  See supra note 507.
563If we require that A have acted with the purpose of facilitating X’s attacks or that he knew his 
default would facilitate X’s attacks, we establish a connection between the two that makes it 
reasonable to impute liability for X’s actions to A.  See supra note 543 & accompanying test.
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564Other scenarios would involve instances in which A knew that he might be subject to an attack 
from X or in which A exercised some control over X, perhaps as X’s employer, whom he know to 
have a predilection for cyber-misconduct. 
565Civil liability can be imposed for selling statutorily-controlled products, such as weapons and 
ammunition, to minors.  See, Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction 
Tort: Imposing Common Law Liability On Merchants For Sales And Leases To 'Defective' 
Customers, 1988 Duke L.J. 755, 758.  The only avenue for imposing criminal liability is complicity 
which, as noted above, is not available unless the clerk acted with the purpose of aiding the 
commission of the customer’s subsequent “crimes” or with the knowledge that she was doing so.
566As to the standard A must meet, see supra notes 552 - 553 & accompanying text.
567An imperfect source of analogy, perhaps, are the laws that impose liability upon a parent for 
the parent’s failure to prevent a child from obtaining access to a weapon and using it to commit a 
“crime.”  In State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997), for example, a father 
was charged with criminally negligent storage of a firearm after his son found his handgun and  
used it to kill another child.  See 242 Conn. At 214, 700 A.2d at 4.  See also Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 531-217a(a) (“A person is guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm when he 
violates the provisions of section 29-37i and a minor obtains the firearm and causes the injury or 
death of himself or any other person”).  The father claimed that the criminally negligent storage 
statute impermissibly held gun owners liable “for the acts of another without requiring the state to 
prove that the owner was an accessory” under the state’s complicity statute, which predicates 
accomplice liability only upon affirmative acts taken to facilitate the commission of a “crime.” See 
242 Conn. at 232, 700 A.2d at 12. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed:  “Although criminal 
liability under § 531-217a does not attach . . . until a minor injures or kills himself or another 
person, the offense . . . is not the resulting injury or death but, rather, is the improper storage of 
the weapon that led to the tragedy.” 242 Conn. at 232-233, 700 A.2d at 12.  
568See Model Penal Code § 2.06(1).
569See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(d) (2003).  
570See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(d) (2003).  
571See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.08 (2003). 
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572See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.05 (2003). 
573See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.01 (2003). 
574See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.00 (2003).  For the distinctions responsible for the different 
offenses, see, e.g., 35 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 3652 (2003).
575Since some codes use criminal facilitation to reach complicitous conduct that is predicated on 
knowledge, but not purpose, other, more serious types of activity could provide the basis for a 
criminal facilitation of cybercrime charge.  See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 13.2(d) (2003). 
576See generally United States v. Ristine, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 21507205 *3 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(sentence included restrictions on use of computer and access to Internet).  New York’s criminal  
facilitation offenses are not sources of guidance on this issue because they require “intentional” 
conduct.  See supra notes 571 - 574.  
577See, e.g., Malaysia Computer Crimes Act 1997 § 7(1) (“abetments . . . punishable as 
offenses”), http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/9239/comcrime.html.  
578A more detailed treatment of this alternative can be found in Susan W. Brenner,Toward A 
Criminal Law for Cyberspace:  A New Model of Law Enforcement?, __ Rutgers Computer & 
Technology Law Journal ___ (2003).
579See supra § IV(A)(1).  
580See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) §§  496B & 496C.
581See, e.g., Chris Zimmerman, Prosecutorial Discretion, 89 Geo. L.J. 1229, 1229 (2001).
582See supra § III. 
583See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496C(1).
584See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496D, Comment b.
585See supra § IV(B)(1).
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586See supra § IV(B)(1).
587See, e.g., Bidding in an Online Auction?  Beware of Scams, BusinessWeek (November 3, 
1998), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct1998/sr81103b.htm (woman paid $1,800 
for a fake Beanie Baby).
588Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages 200 (1994).   
589As noted earlier, it is still necessary to retain a reactive apparatus to deal with real-world 
“crime,” which continues to be territorially based.  See supra note 437.  A reactive apparatus is 
also necessary to apprehend perpetrators of cybercrime whenever they are successfully 
identified.   
590See generally Drew Clark, House Passes Law Enforcement Information-Sharing Bill,
GovExec.com (June 26, 2002), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0602/062602td2.htm.
591See supra § II(A).
592See generally § II(A).
593See supra § II(B)(2).  To maintain external order, nation-states create analogous organizations 
(“military”) and assign them the task of resisting threats from “outside” the system, i.e., threats 
emanating from outside the nation-state’s territorial boundaries.  Until recently, the external 
threats nation-states faced were each other (war); that has changed with the permeability of 
cyberspace.  Nation-states now find themselves confronting an additional type of external threat:  
the non-state actor.   Either type of external threat – the alien nation-state threat and the non-
state actor threat – can be delivered via cyberspace.  The distributed security approach proposed 
above as a means for dealing with threats to internal order (“crimes”) can also help nation-states 
to resist these new external threats.  
594See supra § II(B)(2).  Removing offenders also contributes to the maintenance of internal order 
by incapacitating them from committing further offenses. 
595See supra § III. 
596See supra § III.   See also supra § II(A).
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597See supra § III. 
598See supra § III. 
599See supra note 437.
600See generally Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 
57-58.  
601See, e.g., Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:  
Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, 107th Cong. 45 (2001) (Statement of Dr. 
William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering), supra, at 48-49.
[T]he basic model . . . is based is flawed. I call it the Maginot line model. It is a 
perimeter defense model. . . . It is a notion that there is bad stuff out there and 
good stuff in here and we want to protect what is in here against the bad guys out 
there. That model doesn't work. 
Id. at 44.  See generally Vivian Rowe, The Great Wall of France:  The Triumph of the Maginot 
Line (1961).
602See, e.g., Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:  
Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, 107th Cong. 45 (2001) (Statement of Dr. 
William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering), supra, at 52 (noting that “[m]uch 
better models: are available, “especially models like the immune system response that distribute 
the responsibility for protection and defense rather than concentrating it at the Maginot Line”). 
603See supra § IV(B).
604See supra § III(D).
605See supra § IV(B)(2).
606
“Scale” would presumably be defined in terms of the number of victims, the cumulative extent 
of the loss attributable to a series of cybercrimes and/or the geographical scale of victimization.
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607As noted earlier, the obligation placed on citizens to avoid becoming victims of cybercrime 
would not impose strict liability; it would require that they take all reasonable, state-of-the-art 
measures to avoid being victimized.  See supra § IV(B)(2).  It follows that those who have taken 
such measures will still be victimized, since average citizens cannot be expected to defeat 
emerging tactics utilized by ambitious, technologically-adept cybercriminals.  One of the virtues of 
implementing the assumption of risk doctrines set out in § IV(B)(2), supra, is that they in effect 
create a triage system; that is, the state can focus its efforts on reacting to and otherwise dealing 
with cybercrimes committed against those who did not assume the risk of their commission, since 
these clearly represent the most dangerous threats to a social system.  
608See supra § IV(B)(2)(b).
609See generally Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 
57-58.   
610See id.
611See, e.g., Norman F. Cantor.  The Civilization of the Middle Ages 185-204 (1994).  
612See generally Highly Secure Web Based Collaboration Portal Used to Coordinate TOPOFF 2, 
The National Terrorism Response Exercise in Seattle, Chicago and Washington, FindLaw (May 
21, 2003), http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20030521/21may2003105912.html.
613At a minimum, the portals would only have to offer the reasonable level of security needed to 
protect users from victim assumption of risk and victim-facilitator liability.  See supra § IV(B)(2).  
Portals could certainly offer higher levels of security and, indeed, might find financial incentives to 
do so.  Subscription portals could develop which offered superior levels of online security for 
subscription fees.  
614The benefit for the employer could be protecting its employees from personal victimization and 
personal criminal liability.  Maybe also minimize the risk that the employee’s (or family’s) 
victimization could implicate the employer?
615See supra note 507. 
616David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The New Structure of Policing 1, U.S. Department of 
Justice – National Institute of Justice (2001), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187083.pdf. 
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